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This dissertation reads the nineteenth-century discourses on female sexuality 
of the free love and social purity movements against the background of the scientific 
discoveries of the time. At the same time that scientists produced new knowledge of 
the body, American feminists in social movements for free love and social purity 
began to critique how the marriage system allowed the sexual subjugation of women, 
to demand the right to control when they chose to have sex and under what 
conditions, and to urge the elimination of sexual double-standards, repressive 
ideologies of female sexuality, and even the marriage system itself. The central 
scientific disciplines of physiology, bacteriology, embryology, heredity provide the 
basis for these women’s arguments. Each chapter of this dissertation recounts the 
scientific discoveries in a particular discipline, then traces the dissemination of the 
new scientific knowledge through medical popularizations, and then reads the 
discourse of the reformers as entering this larger conversation about sexuality and 
women’s rights. Using the rhetorical theories of Lloyd Bitzer’s “rhetorical situation” 
and Stephen Toulmin’s model of argument, it shows how women drew on the 
exigence, framework, and warrants of the new sciences to make arguments for 
women’s rights. Reading these women’s arguments against the background of science 
reveals new dimensions to their arguments. It also shows that science provided the 
warrants for women’s rights. Finally, it concludes that new warrants from science 
“refreshed” old arguments for women’s rights, giving new life and new meaning to 
the claims of free love rhetors Mary Gove Nichols, Victoria Woodhull, Juliet 
Severance, Angela Heywood, Lois Waisbrooker, and Hulda Potter-Loomis, among 
others. This dissertation counters the traditional view of the relationship between 
science and feminism by showing that science was a source of feminist arguments. 
This project participates in the growing recovery and rereading of nineteenth-century 
women’s rhetorical practices and enlarges our view of what these women spoke about 
and what their sources of argument were. 
 
UNLIKELY RHETORICAL ALLIES: HOW SCIENCE WARRANTED U.S. 







Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




Professor Jeanne Fahnestock, Chair 
Professor Jane Donawerth 
Professor Shirley Logan 
Professor Leigh Ryan 
Professor Claire Moses 
 







Special thanks to Jeanne Fahnestock. I also thank my two writing groups: Lisa 
Zimmerelli, Andrea Shanklin-Dardello, Thomas (Jody) Lawton, and Barbara Cooper 




Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... iii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 
Contemporary Criticism........................................................................................ 3 
Free Love Advocacy and Social Movement Discourse............................................ 5 
Who Were the Free Lovers? ................................................................................... 15 
Mary Gove Nichols............................................................................................. 15 
Victoria Claflin Woodhull .................................................................................. 18 
Juliet Severance .................................................................................................. 22 
Angela Heywood ................................................................................................ 24 
Lois Waisbrooker................................................................................................ 26 
Free Love Feminists............................................................................................ 28 
Free Love versus Social Purity ............................................................................... 30 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Questions of Sexuality ....................................... 35 





Scientific Discourse in the Popular Sphere......................................................... 49 
Women’s Involvement in Science ...................................................................... 50 
Explanation of Methodology .................................................................................. 52 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 57 
Chapter 2: Physiology............................................................................................... 59 
The Science of Nineteenth-Century Physiology..................................................... 63 
Enlightenment Philosophies of the Body............................................................ 64 
“One Sex” or “Two Sex”? .................................................................................. 67 
Into the Nineteenth Century................................................................................ 70 
A Public Knowledge: The Scientific and the Social in Medical Discourse on 
Women’s Bodies..................................................................................................... 71 
“Physiology” and its Uses................................................................................... 72 
Physiology in Medical Advice Books and Lectures ........................................... 77 
The Rhetorical Situation of Nineteenth-Century Popular Health Texts ......... 80 
Mary Gove (Nichols) ...................................................................................... 83 
Russell Trall .................................................................................................... 88 
Elizabeth Blackwell ........................................................................................ 92 
Clelia Mosher.................................................................................................. 95 
Physicians’ Advice on Sex................................................................................ 101 
Free Love as the Answer: The Argument for Women’s Sexuality and Women’s 
Health.................................................................................................................... 102 
Mary Gove Nichols........................................................................................... 103 
Victoria Woodhull ............................................................................................ 106 
Hulda Potter-Loomis......................................................................................... 112 
iv 
 
Dora Forster ...................................................................................................... 114 
Free Love and Physiology ................................................................................ 116 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 117 
Chapter 3: Bacteriology ......................................................................................... 119 
The Warrant Established: Bacterial Agents of Venereal Disease......................... 122 
The Making of A New Science......................................................................... 122 
The Shifting Knowledge of Venereal Diseases ................................................ 125 
The New Discourse of Disease ......................................................................... 127 
The Situation Exploited: Medical Writers and the Discourse of Disease............. 128 
John Scudder..................................................................................................... 129 
Elizabeth Blackwell .......................................................................................... 134 
Prince Albert Morrow....................................................................................... 138 
The Situation Transformed: Opportunities for Social Applications and the Alliance 
of the Scientific, the Medical, and the Domestic .................................................. 143 
The Situation Exploited and the Warrant in Use: The Rhetoric of Sexuality in 
Feminist Reform Discourses................................................................................. 148 
Social Purity...................................................................................................... 149 
Free Love .......................................................................................................... 153 
Birth Control: Sanger........................................................................................ 158 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 162 
Chapter 4: Embryology .......................................................................................... 164 
The Part as the Whole Warrant: Embryology in the Nineteenth Century ............ 167 
Older Views in Embryology ............................................................................. 167 
Nineteenth-Century Developments in Embryology.......................................... 169 
Warrant-Establishing and the Discourse of Embryology ................................. 177 
From the Science to the Mainstream: Medical Practitioners and the Popularization 
of Embryology ...................................................................................................... 180 
Russell Trall ...................................................................................................... 181 
John Cowan....................................................................................................... 187 
Emma Drake ..................................................................................................... 190 
The Discourse of Popularization and Implications for Reformers ................... 193 
Birth control ...................................................................................................... 195 
The Reformers: Embryology as Warrant .............................................................. 196 
The Woman’s Role in Racial Uplift with Embryology as Warrant.................. 197 
The Woman’s Need for Sexual Rights with Embryology as Warrant.............. 201 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 209 
Chapter 5: Heredity ................................................................................................ 211 
Towards a Science of Heredity and a Warrant for Women’s Rights.................... 215 
Lamarckian Theories of Heredity ..................................................................... 216 
Darwinian Discourse and Heredity................................................................... 218 
Beyond Lamarck: Weismann and Mendel........................................................ 221 
Social Implications and Applications: Malthus, Spencer, and Galton.............. 226 
Medical Popularizations and the Power of Heredity ............................................ 233 
Russell Trall ...................................................................................................... 234 
John Cowan....................................................................................................... 236 
Elizabeth Blackwell .......................................................................................... 238 
v
Emma Drake ..................................................................................................... 241 
Medical Advice and Heredity ........................................................................... 244 
Feminist Reformers, Heredity, and Eugenics ....................................................... 245 
Social Purity...................................................................................................... 247 
Racial Uplift...................................................................................................... 252 
Free Love .......................................................................................................... 258 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 268 
Coda: Rereading and “Refreshing”: Contributions to Rhetorical Scholarship on 
Women’s Movements.............................................................................................. 271 
Feminist Historiography ....................................................................................... 272 
“Rereading”........................................................................................................... 274 
“Refreshing” ......................................................................................................... 276 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 282 
Appendices............................................................................................................... 283 
Appendix to Chapter 2: Timeline of Texts on Physiology ................................... 283 
Appendix to Chapter 3: Timeline for Bacteriology .............................................. 285 
Appendix to Chapter 4: Timeline for Embryology............................................... 287 
Appendix to Chapter 5: Timeline for Heredity..................................................... 289 




“The season of love is that of battle” (Darwin, The Descent of Man 48). 
From 1900 to 1910, when Dr. Clelia Mosher sought funding for her research on 
menstruation to question whether it debilitated women, no institution would grant her 
request (Jacob par.16). Debunking the myths associated with women’s bodies would not 
be profitable for an industry based on treating women’s “illnesses.” Mosher, a determined 
young physician, did not let her lack of resources deter her from what she knew was 
important work. She had already published a study refuting the idea that men and women 
breathed differently because of the physiological restrictions of women’s reproductive 
organs. (Men were assumed to breath from the diaphragm while women were assumed to 
breath from the upper chest [Jacob par. 9]). This study became her master’s thesis at 
Stanford in 1894. Entering Johns Hopkins Medical School in 1896 as one of thirteen 
women in an incoming class of forty-one students (Jacob par. 11), Mosher looked 
forward to countering other myths about the female body.  
In 1914, Mosher was finally able to publish her findings derived from a study she 
performed while at Johns Hopkins in the 1890s. Her findings proved that painful 
menstruation did not have to hinder women from fully participating in education and the 
workplace: through diet, less constricting dress, and deep breathing exercises that became 
known as the “Moshers” (Jacob par. 19), women could attain their “physical freedom” 
(Mosher, Woman’s Physical Freedom). After serving her country during the first world 
war as a medical director of the Bureau of Refugees and Relief in France (Jacob par. 24), 
Mosher returned to take a position as a Professor of Hygiene at Stanford and published 
two works detailing her arguments for women’s rights using medical evidence: Woman’s 
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Physical Freedom in 1923 and Personal Hygiene for Women in 1927. Her work was 
corroborated by other physicians and she achieved success in helping to alleviate a 
century of restricting ideologies about women’s bodies. 
However, there was one study that Mosher never published that would have 
secured her status as a feminist medical pioneer. While obtaining her medical degrees and 
working in clinics in the 1890s, Mosher initiated a survey that she gathered from at least 
forty-seven women. The subject of this survey was not women’s breathing patterns or 
their experiences with menstruation. The questions included how many times per week 
these women experienced intercourse, how often they desired intercourse, and how often 
they experienced “venereal orgasm” (The Mosher Study). Long before Kinsey would ask 
the questions that made his study of American sexual habits famous, Mosher was 
studying the sexual habits of women in “Victorian” America--a place where, we are told, 
women were taught not to have sexual feelings. It would seem that Mosher had set out to 
abolish even more myths about women; the collection of papers that she entitled 
“Statistical Survey of the Marriages of Forty-Seven Women” would have shown how 
middle-class women in the late nineteenth century worked (all but eight of the thirty-
eight women responding to this question had held jobs before marriage), desired sexual 
intercourse (thirty-five out of forty-four), and as one remarked, found it quite enjoyable, 
experienced orgasm, and practiced birth control (The Mosher Study; Jacob; Degler). 
Mosher’s study of sexual beliefs and practices certainly paints a picture different from the 
chaste, passionless “Victorian” woman. But she was not the only one challenging such 
stereotypes through the use of science. Women in the free love movement had been doing 
so since the 1830s. 
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Nineteenth-century science seems an unlikely ally to a movement arguing for 
sexual freedom for women. The scientific and medical fields perpetuated stereotypes 
about women: women have smaller skulls and therefore less intelligence than men; 
women are less evolved than men; women cannot do the same work as men since they 
menstruate and bear children; women’s menstruation hinders them from receiving 
education; women are passionless and asexual, and only abnormal women have sexual 
feelings. But these anti-feminist views were not the only ideas disseminated, merely the 
ones that have received the most critical attention. The nineteenth-century conversation 
about women’s bodies among the scientific, medical, and feminist discourse communities 
was multi-voiced and multi-faceted. Not only were there liberating ideas about women’s 
bodies and abilities to contest some of the prevailing ideologies in scientific and medical 
discourses, but women themselves also critiqued the more limited theories. This 
dissertation tells the story of women who embraced sexuality and urged its acceptance 
and indulgence, using science to support their ideals of sexual freedom and free love.  
Contemporary Criticism
The relationship between science and nineteenth-century feminism has been 
heavily examined, notably by critics, like Carol Smith-Rosenberg (1974; 1985), who 
examine science’s role in defining women by their bodies. Much scholarship, such as 
Cynthia Eagle Russett’s Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood 
(1989), argues that the scientific breakthroughs of the nineteenth century fueled the 
oppression of women. Another critic, Fiona Erskine (1995), even blames “men of 
science” for “the dissolution of the women’s movement by conferring the imprint of 
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evolutionary science on traditional concepts of female difference and female 
subordination” (117).  
The relationship between science and feminism is complicated in this study by 
analyzing the rhetorical strategies of women who used the sciences to their advantage. 
Many nineteenth-century women critiqued scientific arguments in order to challenge 
gender oppression, while others shaped scientific knowledge for their own feminist 
needs. This dissertation concentrates on how science informs women’s arguments on 
sexuality to promote changes in how their sexuality was conceived and how women, and 
men, should relate to this sexuality. While I am not ignoring or refuting feminist work 
that shows the anti-feminist uses of science, my goal is to expand our conception of the 
relationship between the rhetoric of science and the rhetoric of feminist advocacy, by 
showing how women not only suffered from but also took advantage of science. My 
project highlights the ways science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries frames 
and informs certain discourses on sexuality in order to reveal the symbiotic relationship 
between the sciences and the social reform movements. While many of the reformers’ 
arguments to support women’s sexual freedom were not new, the sciences provided them 
with new warrants and support, thus changing the ways sexuality was discussed. 
While scholars of nineteenth-century women’s rhetoric have recovered and 
regendered the rhetorical tradition, demonstrating the richness of this period for rhetoric 
aimed at social advocacy, they have often focused on the more mainstream or prevalent 
rhetoric of women’s rights in the movements for suffrage, abolition, and temperance, 
such as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s (1989) study of suffrage rhetoric, Shirley Wilson 
Logan’s (1999) study of abolitionist and racial uplift rhetoric, and Carol Mattingly’s 
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(2002) work on temperance rhetoric, to name a few. At the same time, scholars such as 
Susan Wells (2001) have shown how women participated in the discourse of science in 
the medical schools, writing anatomical treatises, textbooks, public health manuals, and 
research articles. However, these two fields--rhetorical discourse aimed at social 
advocacy and at forming and disseminating scientific knowledge--are rarely examined 
together. The interconnections of these two areas are revealed when we examine the 
rhetoric of sexuality in the nineteenth century and the efforts at social reform in the free 
love movement. Women involved in movements not only for free love, but also for 
temperance, social purity, medical reform, and racial uplift critiqued many of the 
dominant ideologies of women’s sexuality by using scientific warrants. Women who 
spoke and wrote about sexuality in the nineteenth century participated in the discourse of 
science in unique ways, and analysis of their rhetorical choices offers insight into how 
more professional discourses affected the popular realm.  
This chapter reconstructs the free love movement whose rhetoric is the main focus 
of this dissertation, first identifying the common threads that constitute it, then surveying 
some of the major free love rhetors examined in this dissertation. It then shows how the 
discourse of other movements involved in women’s rights overlapped with free love 
discourses. Finally, it provides an overview of nineteenth-century science in order to 
build the basis for reading free love discourse in the new context provided by the 
sciences.  
Free Love Advocacy and Social Movement Discourse 
 While many first-wave feminists in the nineteenth century recognized marriage as 
a battleground, their arguments mainly focused on legal rights in the institution of 
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marriage. However, other groups took matters further and advocated reforms in sexual 
relations between men and women. While temperance and “social purity” reformers 
delved more closely into the politics of the home, it was the free love advocates who 
made sexual relations between partners their primary focus. They took the public ideals 
of citizenship and equality into the most private of places--the bedroom.  
 The free love movement, while never as cohesive or organized as the women’s 
suffrage or temperance movements, included many women actively writing and speaking 
publicly about the “taboo” topic of sex. Some free love advocates argued for the abolition 
of marriage as an institution because it degraded women. Central to their ideology was 
the idea of women as sexual beings, a counterargument to some of the dominant ideas 
about women’s sexuality at the time. Among the women advocating free love were Fanny 
Wright in the 1820s and 1830s, Mary Gove Nichols in the 1840s and 1850s, Victoria 
Claflin Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin in the 1870s, and Juliet Severance, Angela 
Heywood, Lois Waisbrooker, Lillian Harman, Hulda Potter-Loomis, Lillie White, Dora 
Forster, and Voltairine de Cleyre in the 1880s and 1890s. Their contributions to the 
history of women’s rights, the history of social reform movements, the history of science, 
and the history of women’s rhetoric have yet to be fully recognized.  
“Free love,” as they named the movement, began to emerge in the 1850s before 
having its heyday in the 1870s. It began to wane after the persecution of free love 
advocates by the Comstock law in the 1880s and 1890s, and a movement toward 
anarchism and eugenics by many former free lovers. The movement began with small 
groups of people meeting to discuss social questions about marriage, later forming small 
communes such as Oneida, Modern Times, and Berlin Heights, and finally bringing their 
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ideas to the general public through periodicals and lectures. They disseminated their ideas 
in periodicals such as Nichols’ Journal of Health, Water-Cure, and Human Progress 
(1853-54) and Nichols’ Monthly (1855-57), both edited by Mary Gove and Thomas 
Nichols; Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly (1870-76), edited by Victoria Woodhull and 
Tennessee Claflin; The Word (1872-93), edited by Ezra and Angela Heywood; 
Foundation Principles (1880s-1894) and Clothed with the Sun (1900-1902), edited by 
Lois Waisbrooker; and Lucifer, the Light-Bearer (1883-1907), edited by Moses Harman, 
Lillian Harman, Lois Waisbrooker, and Lillie White,1 which later became The American 
Journal of Eugenics (1907-1910), edited by Moses Harman.2
Women played key roles in creating and editing these journals, and were the more 
public faces of the movement since they were the ones who lectured on free love 
ideology to audiences across the country. Another unique aspect of the free love 
periodicals was their insistence on publishing all letters to the editor, even from 
opponents. They also invited women from around the country, particularly those in rural 
areas, to write in and share their stories in the periodicals.3 Free love periodicals and 
lectures helped to set up a “counterpublic,” to use the term Michael Warner ascribes to 
those who challenge the dominant “public,” where women were empowered to challenge 
the dominant ideologies constructing their bodies through telling their stories. It is mostly 
through these periodicals and writings that a “movement” can be discerned in the 
dialogue between different social reformers, many of whom probably never met. Thus, 
 
1 Lillian Harman (Moses Harman’s daughter), Waisbrooker, and White often took over the editing of the 
periodical when Moses Harman was in prison for violating obscenity laws.  
2 Joanne Passet has documented these titles and years of publication. 
3 These letters are only recently gaining attention from scholars like Joanne Passet (2003) and Jesse Battan 
(1993, 1999, 2004), who both examine how the periodicals affected their readers. Closer study of these 
letters could shed new light on literacy practices in the nineteenth century, particularly since this literacy 
also includes knowledge about sex. 
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free love is a movement made into a cohesive discourse community by its rhetorical 
practices. 
In addition to its lack of cohesiveness, another complication to analyzing this 
movement stems from the ambiguity of the term “free love” itself. Not only did it change 
throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, but different theorists also had 
different ideas about how the term should be applied. Joanne Passet (2003) explains that 
while for some “free love” meant a lifelong commitment, though not necessarily within a 
marriage, for others it meant a kind of “serial monogamy.” Some advocates for “free 
love” championed chaste relationships and some championed multiple partners (2). Many 
free lovers seemed to be more theorists than practitioners of free love, since many of 
them were married. However, it is not known if Victoria Woodhull was legally married to 
her second husband Colonel Blood. Similarly, Lillian Harman earned fame for her 
publicized “free union” with Edwin C. Walker and their subsequent arrest. Most of the 
women active in the movement, including Woodhull, Nichols, Waisbrooker, and 
Severance, were divorced from at least one legal union. It was often after their first 
disastrous marriages that they began to espouse free love ideology, though many of them 
married second husbands who also promoted free love. Yet, while they may have differed 
on the application of free love theory, their rhetoric does show similarities that enable us 
to piece together what “free love” means in this discourse community.  
 While not all of these women explicitly embraced the term “free love,” they did 
embrace its theories. Victoria Woodhull and Juliet Severance seem to be the most explicit 
in their use of the term, Woodhull even proclaiming in her 1871 speech at Steinway Hall, 
“And the Truth Shall Make You Free:” A Speech on the Principles of Social Freedom,
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“Yes, I am a Free Lover. I have an inalienable, constitutional and natural right to love 
whom I may, to love as long or as short a period as I can; to change that love every day if 
I please, and with that right neither you nor any law you can frame have any right to 
interfere” (23; emphasis in original). Woodhull makes no distinction between the terms 
“free love” and “social freedom,” using both interchangeably. Juliet Severance (1881), 
however, distinguishes between the two: “I am not only a believer in Social freedom, but 
I am a believer in Free love, and that word Free-love signifies to me the most exalted 
condition ever reached by mortal or angel” (A Lecture on Religious, Political, and Social 
Freedom 15). To Severance (1891), “Social freedom declares every person has a right to 
live in his social relations according to the dictates of his own conscience and reason, the 
same as he has religiously” (A Discussion of the Social Question 11). She then defines 
“free love”: 
There is really but one question in the matter, which is this: “Shall mutual 
love (as is proposed by Free-lovers) or selfish lust (as it exists to-day in 
and out of marriage) be the basis of the relations of the sexes?” If you 
reply that mutual love should be the basis, then you are a Free-lover. If 
you reply that it should be lust, you are in sympathy with the present laws 
and customs of society, in which purity of life for woman becomes an 
impossibility. (A Discussion of the Social Question16)
Under Severance’s definition, the terms “free love” and “social freedom” are distinct, yet 
many of the texts conflate these two terms, or use one more frequently than the other. 
“Social freedom” has more to do with the right of individuals to choose their lifestyles 
and free love is one such lifestyle. Severance shows here that whether someone is 
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practicing free love has more to do with the ideologies behind their unions, and the basis 
of their unions, than with legal definitions (thus, free lovers could be married and still be 
practicing free love). Angela Heywood (1881) supports such a definition in her 
conception of free love. She insists, “One is not a Free Lover because she cohabits with 
one or more men, or with none at all, but rather by the import and tone of Association” 
(qtd in McElroy, Individualist 40). Both Severance and Heywood show the emphasis in 
free love discourse on love, rather than economic necessity or social pressure, as the basis 
of free love unions.  
 In their advocacy and use of the term “free love,” these feminists also had to fight 
accusations of promiscuity. While most female free love advocates disdained 
“promiscuity,” they championed the right of the individual to practice it. They did, 
however, draw a line between the definition of “promiscuity” and “free love,” clarifying 
that practicing free love did not necessarily mean practicing promiscuity. Later male free 
love advocates often promoted “variety” as the basis of free love, which free love 
advocate Lois Waisbrooker rebelled against. Thus, while free love was subject to 
multiple interpretations in practice and theory, at its basis was the right of the individual 
to choose his or her sexual practices without intervention from church or state and to 
choose those unions based on love. In using the term and theory behind free love, 
however, many women opened themselves up to criticism, which is why some preferred 
to use the term “social freedom.”  In this dissertation, I use the term “free love,” which 
many activists used themselves. 
 Commonality among the different free love theories rests on their conceptions of 
marriage and of sexuality. The “free” in “free love” emphasizes the right for women and 
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men to choose their partners regardless of institutional involvement. Revealing marriage 
as an institution that fosters the degradation and inequality of women, many advocates of 
free love urged the rights of the individual in choosing sexual unions. A number of these 
advocates rejected the ideologies behind marriage altogether. They pointed out that the 
institution of marriage did not stop men and women from cheating, nor did it protect 
women from abuse. Furthermore, they revealed the inconsistencies in laws that punished 
certain sexual behavior outside of marriage, but turned a blind eye to the same practices 
within the marriage system. Like the suffragists, they objected to the laws that rendered a 
woman’s legal identity obsolete once she was married. To free love advocates, 
institutional marriage perpetuated so many inequalities that women could not attain 
freedom within it. 
 Another unifying feature among the different rhetors in this movement is their 
insistence on “plain speaking” on sexual matters as a rhetorical accommodation, though 
some took this tenet further than others. Many free love advocates urged “plain speaking” 
about sexual matters, blaming ignorance and modesty for many of the abuses women 
suffered within the marriage system. Later free love advocates, particularly Victoria 
Woodhull, made it their mission to reveal hypocrisy both in the system that denied sexual 
knowledge to women and in the men who condemned “promiscuous” women and the 
free love movement, yet who by their actions showed that they did not revere the 
institution of marriage, such as Henry Ward Beecher.4 The free lovers’ insistence on 
“plain speech” also contained class implications. In his reading of the “plain speech” 
 
4 Woodhull’s notoriety increased after she published the scandal of Beecher’s affair with the wife of his 
protégé, Theodore Tilton in her radical newspaper. Woodhull’s defense of her scandalous announcement 
was her insistence on shedding light on hypocrisy and stimulating discussion about sexual practices (see 
Tried as by Fire).   
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employed by free love periodicals such as Lucifer and The Word, Jesse Battan (1993) 
notes that the free lovers were also breaking class boundaries by disdaining polite 
euphemisms and embracing the “sniggering vulgarity of backstreet conversations” (“The 
Word” 121).  
The need for a language to express sexuality occupied many free love advocates. 
Woodhull (1874) noted that direct terms were essential; they are “not to be explained … 
in terms of glittering generalities, or of poetic fancy, or in gingerly words that my leave 
any in doubt as to what is intended, but plainly, honestly and earnestly, so that no one can 
misunderstand” (Tried as by Fire 1). The sexual education she endorsed required “plain 
speech,” though many of the terms she employed would not be considered very radical in 
our day. The same cannot be said for the editors of Lucifer and The Word. Lucifer’s 
editors printed a story about a young girl asking her mother the meaning of “fuck” and 
the mother responding with “plain speech” and visual aids (Battan, “The Word” 101). 
Radical Angela Heywood, writing for The Word, exposed the hypocrisy of “cultured 
men,” whose speech to working class women she characterized as insulting and 
degrading (112). She was weary of their hypocrisies and advocated the speech often 
attributed to the lower classes in order to “revitalize” the language constrained by 
“Victorian prudery” (112). She even argued to replace “penis” with “cock,” to make 
words “truer to their function” (qtd in Battan, “The Word” 113-114). Many free love 
advocates celebrated the language deemed “vulgar” and pointed out that these words 
contained more truths than prudish euphemisms. They also took language deemed 
“private” into the “public,” foreshadowing some of the arguments of late twentieth-
century feminists. 
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Also central to the idea of free love was conceiving women as sexual beings. 
While some advocates, such as Mary Gove Nichols, argued for chaste relationships, as 
they did so, they did not deny the sexuality and sexual feelings of women. Free love 
theory, then, opened the doors to discussing details about sexual unions on both personal 
and political levels, a tenet that second-wave feminists later embraced. 
Nineteenth-century free love advocates can also be seen as the foremothers of the 
birth control and abortion rights movements. Though many of them vacillated on their 
opinions about birth control, most deemed it a necessary evil: since women were not 
granted the freedoms they should have, birth control practices and devices were 
necessities. They believed that no unwanted children would be born under a free love 
system, but until others came to embrace their philosophies, women had to rely on birth 
control methods. Many free love advocates, including the Heywoods, were jailed for 
distributing information about contraception. Most of them also condemned abortion, 
viewing it as a symptom of the problems inherent in the sexual system. The arguments 
these women used to promote their free love theories were the same arguments used by 
later feminists instrumental in the birth control movement, such as Margaret Sanger. A 
few, moreover, were outspoken in supporting both birth control and abortion, notably 
Angela Heywood, whose rhetorical techniques seem similar to the more radical factions 
of the 1970s second-wave feminists.  
 Motherhood was also a central concern of free love advocates. Like the 
suffragists, they believed in voluntary motherhood, but several took this concept further 
than just arguing that women should be able to choose how many children they bore. Free 
love advocates argued that women should be able to become mothers with men of their 
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choice, even if those unions were not sanctioned by law. Many free love advocates saw 
partnerships as more spiritual than lawful, and promoted relationships that were not 
defined by legalities but by love between partners. In addition, like many of the 
“argument from difference”5 feminists of the nineteenth century, free love advocates 
wished to elevate the position of women and professionalize the role of motherhood. In 
many of their theories, women who were granted sexual freedom would then be able to 
enter more fruitful unions, conceive children out of love, and bear and raise healthier and 
happier children. Though motherhood was not considered the only end of sexual freedom 
and free love, it was an end whose improvement often produced stronger agreement from 
their audiences. D’Emilio and Freedman (1988) note that the free lovers often highlighted 
the benefits of free love to reproduction in order to make their arguments more acceptable 
to middle-class audiences (164). 
 The emphasis on motherhood as a result of sexual freedom and the articulated 
goals of producing “superior” children led to the eventual waning of free love advocacy 
as a social movement, as this emphasis merged into more explicitly eugenic discourse. 
Free love advocates throughout the mid to late nineteenth century often credited free love 
unions with producing healthier and more intelligent children. This discourse evolved 
into eugenic discourse, and many free love feminists explicitly endorsed eugenics, or 
what they considered the science of proper breeding. Even Lois Waisbrooker, who 
argued against male interpretations of eugenics, did not reject the goal of producing 
“superior” children as an outcome of free love. The movement from free love to eugenics 
 
5 Rhetorical scholars Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1989) and Nan Johnson (2002) have focused on the 
prevalence of the argument from difference, or “argument from expediency” to use Campbell’s term. They 
find that many nineteenth-century women argue for rights on the basis of women’s differences from men, 
rather than their similarities. I find evidence of both types of arguments in free love discourse. 
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culminated in the dissolution of many free love periodicals. One example of this shift is 
the renaming of the free love periodical Lucifer, the Light Bearer into The American 
Journal of Eugenics in 1907. Reading free love discourse through the lens of scientific 
discoveries will illuminate this rhetorical and ideological shift. 
 Women advocating free love came to it from various backgrounds and 
experiences, but all found a common ground in critiquing sexual practices. The texts left 
behind by these women allow us to reconstruct this movement and its connections to 
scientific discourse. The following section surveys some of the prominent feminist 
rhetors in the movement and their main arguments. 
Who Were the Free Lovers? 
 
Many of the women involved in the free love movement advocated their views in 
books, pamphlets, lectures, and periodicals and became the more public faces of the free 
love movement. These women came from differing backgrounds, but they share some 
similarities. Many began advocating free love after disastrous first marriages. Some later 
turned their back on free love ideology, finding more conservative causes or adopting 
even more radical theories of anarchism. Whether they came from the more conservative 
or the more radical factions of the movement, their arguments share similarities that 
enable us to enlarge our view of women’s rhetorical practices in the nineteenth century.  
Mary Gove Nichols
Mary Sargeant Neal Gove Nichols (1810-1884)--novelist, speaker, and physician-
-participated in both medical and free love discourse communities. Born in 1810 in 
Goffstown, New Hampshire, to the freethinker William Neal and his Calvinist wife 
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Rebecca Neal, Mary Neal grew up with an interest in books and became a schoolteacher 
during the 1820s (Passet 20-21; Silver-Isenstadt 22). She was interested in her brother’s 
anatomy textbooks and read them secretly, until her brother discovered his missing books 
and angrily told her that such topics were not appropriate for a woman to study (Silver-
Isenstadt 22). She nevertheless continued her secret study of medicine, though she knew 
she could not study for a medical degree. No school was granting women medical 
degrees in the 1820s (22). After a first marriage to Hiram Gove, a frequently jealous man 
eleven years her senior (22), where she endured five pregnancies with only one child 
surviving and consequently suffered ill health, Mary Gove became interested in the 
alternative medical movement known as the “water cure.” This homeopathic medical 
movement emphasized natural remedies and preventative practices over surgical 
treatments and drugs. In 1837, after hearing Sylvester Graham speak in Lynn, 
Massachusetts, Gove embraced his philosophy of natural healing, along with 
vegetarianism and dress reform (Passet 21). She became a water cure physician herself 
after self-study and apprenticing. In 1845, she apprenticed at Dr. Robert Wesselhoeft’s 
water-cure medical school in Brattleboro, Vermont (Silver-Isenstadt 72), and then served 
as a resident physician at Dr. Joel Shew’s New Lebanon, New York, water-cure 
establishment (72-73).6 As a reformer and then a physician, Gove lectured to women on 
health and physiology in the 1830s and 40s, where she addressed sexuality and explained 
women’s physiology. She later married Thomas L. Nichols, with whom she edited 
several journals and briefly operated a water cure medical school. The two also joined a 
 
6 Joel Shew founded several water cure facilities and professional journals. His wife Mary Shew also 
published works on water cure. For additional information about the medical facilities he founded, see 
Silver-Isenstadt, 72-73. 
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free love commune, Modern Times. They later converted to Catholicism and moved 
away from their free love roots.7
Gove Nichols was a more conservative theorist of the free love movement. While 
she acknowledged the presence of women’s sexual feelings, she often spoke against their 
“abuses,” writing anti-masturbation tracts and attributing many female illnesses to 
masturbation. She advocated temperate sexual relationships based in love. Much of Gove 
Nichols’s rhetoric of women’s rights is found in her published medical lectures. In 
Lectures to Women on Anatomy and Physiology (1846), she elaborates lifestyle choices 
to keep women healthy that include less constricting dress, a healthy vegetarian diet, and 
fresh air and exercise, necessities that she feels women are denied. Her theories on 
women’s health also allude to sexuality, and, like sweets or coffee, Gove warns that sex 
should not be indulged in excess. However, she does not explicitly urge women to deny 
their sexual feelings, but rather to recognize overindulgence as harmful to their health. 
Her later work, Marriage: Its History, Character, and Results; its Sanctities, and its 
Profanities; its Science and its Facts. Demonstrating its Influence, as a Civilized 
Institution, of the Happiness of the Individual and the Progress of the Race (1854), co-
written with Thomas L. Nichols, provides a critique of the marriage system in which 
women’s health suffers as a result of husbands’ overindulgence and wives’ excessive 
childbearing. She attributes “hereditary evils to children born in a sensual and unloving 
marriage” and illness, weakness, and crime to the conditions under which children are 
born to tired, ill mothers suffering under the marriage system (“Murders” 305). She also 
condemns the “false virtue” of those who allow such conditions to continue (305).  
 
7 For more biographical information on Gove Nichols, see Jean Silver-Isenstadt’s 2002 work, Shameless: 
The Visionary Life of Mary Gove Nichols.
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Gove Nichols’s rhetoric often seems more in line with “social purity” aims in her 
emphasis on a certain mode of living, but it also shares many similarities with later free 
love rhetoric. Like Woodhull, Gove Nichols condemns the churches and medical 
establishments that define “virtue” as being “chaste as ice” (“Murders” 305), insisting, “It 
is not natural, or true, for women to be without the amative passion” (306). This 
redefinition of what is “virtuous” and this critique of the moralists and physicians who 
withhold sexual knowledge from women while insisting upon chastity are key features of 
free love rhetoric. Gove Nichols was radical for her time and a precursor to the more 
extremist free love advocates who followed her decades later. Later radicals like 
Woodhull and Severance were in debt to the rhetorical strategies she initiated. Scholar 
Dawn Keetley (2000) proposes that Gove Nichols’s key contribution to the history of 
women’s rights is her “rewriting” of the “diseased” institution of marriage. As a 
physician and free love advocate, Gove Nichols brought the issue of women’s bodies and 
women’s health to the forefront of the debate over marriage and sexual practices, an 
important step in using contemporary science to promote free love ideology. 
Victoria Claflin Woodhull
Victoria Claflin Woodhull (1838-1927) is perhaps the most notorious free love 
feminist of the nineteenth century, and her arguments reached large audiences, thus 
making her one of the faces of the movement to the general public. She was born in 
Homer, Ohio, to a poor family, and was the seventh of ten children. Her mother, Roxanna 
Hummel Claflin, was illiterate and her father, Reuben “Buck” Claflin, traveled with a 
carnival, running fortune-telling and palm-reading shows. Woodhull and her sister 
Tennessee often participated in these shows as teenagers, which led to Woodhull’s later 
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career as an actress (Passet 96). After marrying the older Canning Woodhull, an 
alcoholic, Woodhull bore two children, a mentally-challenged son, Byron, and a 
daughter, Zulu Maud. Her early experiences with her father’s shows, her career as an 
actress, and her hardships during her first marriage all influenced her often flamboyant 
rhetoric of free love. 8 
Woodhull made a career out of breaking gender conventions as the first woman to 
address a congressional judiciary committee, the first woman stockbroker, and the first 
American to publish Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto. She was a prominent lecturer, a 
publisher of a radical newspaper, and certainly not least, the first woman to run for 
president. During her lecturing career, Woodhull spoke to large audiences, even 
conducting lecture tours and lecturing for pay throughout the 1870s. Her lectures 
included advocacy of free love9 and women’s rights.10 These lectures were attended by 
many who seemed drawn to her notoriety, rather than her speech. Branded “Mrs. Satan” 
by cartoonist Thomas Nast, Woodhull attracted crowds who expected to hear scandalous 
talk from a scandalous woman. Instead, as the reviews of her speeches, reprinted at the 
end of her pamphlet The Human Body the Temple of God; or the Philosophy of Sociology 
(1890), suggest, they found a woman who “advocated free love; but in a sense so high 
and language so pure that the very personification of chastity could not justly find fault 
with it” (425; emphasis in original).   
8 Woodhull’s scandalous life has long interested biographers, and it is difficult to separate fact from fiction 
in accounts of her life. Several recent biographies have given more insight into the life of this controversial 
figure, including Lois Beachy Underhill’s The Woman Who Ran for President (1995) and Mary Gabriel’s 
Notorious Victoria (1998). 
9 Her endorsement of free love often caused a rift with more mainstream suffragists. 
10 Her suffrage argument, identified as the “new departure” strategy, was picked up by many key 
suffragists, including Susan B. Anthony, who used it as her defense when she was arrested for voting. 
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Woodhull was a controversial figure due to her advocacy of free love and sense of 
sensationalism, and her notoriety increased after her arrest for exposing Henry Ward 
Beecher’s extramarital affair in her radical periodical, Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly.
With her sister Tennessee Claflin, she continually tested the patience of Anthony 
Comstock and his obscenity laws.11 Her prolific writing makes her a key figure in the free 
love movement. Passet views Woodhull as an important figure, as a “bridge connecting 
the utopian free love theories” of the Nichols and Berlin Heights free love communities 
to the radical anarchist free love movement of the late nineteenth century (Passet 91). 
Like Gove Nichols, Woodhull later cut her ties to free love ideologies. But her rhetoric 
made an impact on the free love feminists of the 1880s and 1890s and her arguments 
illustrate how the movement began to shift away from a focus on women’s sexual 
freedom and toward eugenics.  
 In her arguments for free love, Woodhull often employed redefinitions of 
cherished ideals and terms, and, like Gove Nichols, Woodhull attempted to expose the 
hypocrisy of the uses of “virtue.” Her sister, Tennessee Claflin, a less known and less 
prolific rhetor who probably collaborated with Woodhull on some of her speeches,12 
illustrates this same strategy in an article from Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly, “Virtue; 
What It Is and What It Isn’t,” in the August 30, 1873 issue. Claflin recognizes the way 
“virtue” is used to constrain women: “The world enslaves our sex by the mere fear of an 
epithet; and just so long as it can throw a vile term at us, which we cower before, it can 
 
11 See Frisken (2000; 2004) and Lefkowitz-Horowitz (2000; 2002) for more on Woodhull’s brushes with 
this law. These historians show how Comstock’s pursuit of Woodhull became a personal vendetta.  
12 Scholars have often questioned the authenticity of Woodhull’s speeches because of their collaborative 
nature. In addition to her sister, Woodhull collaborated with her husband, Colonel Blood, and philosopher 
Stephen Pearl Andrews, and many have attributed some of her speeches to these men. The rhetorical 
techniques in some of these speeches, however, continue to be used by Woodhull long after her association 
with these men ended. Thus, I conclude that she did have input into these speeches, even when she 
collaborated with others. 
21
maintain our enslavement. It is not free love alone, but every other epithet intended to 
degrade, that woman must grow strong enough to defy before she will be free….” 
Woodhull takes these arguments further in her speeches by presenting redefinitions of 
“virtue” and “vulgarity” in relation to women’s sexuality:  
Others again seem to glory over the fact that they never had any sexual 
desire,  and to think that this desire is vulgar. What! Vulgar! The instinct 
that creates immortal souls vulgar! Who dare stand up amid Nature, all 
prolific and beautiful,  whose pulses are ever bounding with the creative 
desire, and utter such sacrilege! Vulgar, indeed! Vulgar, rather, must be 
the mind that can conceive such blasphemy. No sexual passion, say you? 
Say, rather, a sexual idiot, and confess that your life is a failure, your body 
an abortion, and no longer bind your shame upon your brow or herald it as 
purity. Call such stuff purity. Bah! Be honest, rather, and say it is 
depravity. (Tried as by Fire 24-25) 
This rhetorical strategy of inverting a cherished belief by juxtaposing it with negative 
terms continues through much of Woodhull’s writing. It is this strategy that acts as a 
basis for later free love discourse, found in the texts of Lois Waisbrooker and Voltairine 
de Cleyre. Though her career as a free love speaker was considerably shorter than these 
women’s, Woodhull thus left her mark on free love discourse. 
 Woodhull’s discourse of free love also shows evidence of explicit engagement 
with scientific and medical discourse. While not able to refer to a medical practice, like 
Gove Nichols, Woodhull did show her knowledge of women’s physiology and diseases 
by referring to testimony by medical experts. Her 1874 speech delivered during a lecture 
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tour, Tried as by Fire, or the True and the False Socially, which I consider to be a 
synthesis of her philosophy and the best illustration of her rhetorical strategies, not only 
relies on the arguments from a legal perspective evident in her 1871 speech, “And the 
Truth Shall Make You Free:” A Speech on the Principles of Social Freedom, but also 
relies on an evolutionary perspective, as well as the work of physician John M. Scudder. 
Woodhull sets herself up as an interpreter of science, saying, “I am only reiterating what 
is known to be true, by those who have investigated the subject, medically and 
physiologically, when I say that a change for the better must soon be made…” (Elixir 
10). Woodhull’s reliance on testimony from physicians then becomes another key feature 
of free love discourse. 
 Finally, Woodhull’s shift into more explicitly eugenic discourse illustrates the 
changing movement, though her eugenic theories arrive much earlier than the more 
explicit shift in the movement. She goes from arguing for healthier and more intelligent 
children as a product of free love practice in her 1873 and 1874 speeches, to arguing less 
for women’s rights and more for eugenics in her books Stirpiculture; or, The Scientific 
Propagation of the Human Race (1888) and The Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit (1891). 
Woodhull’s strategies of redefinition, of testimony from physicians, and of eugenics then 
illustrate the progression of the rhetoric of the free love movement.  
 Juliet Severance
Referred to as the “Woodhull of Wisconsin,” Juliet Severance (1833-1919) also 
left her mark on the lecture circuit, though she is not as well-known as Woodhull is 
today. Severance also brought values of spiritualism to her free love rhetoric, believing 
that only free love could help humanity attain higher evolution. Like Gove, Severance 
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bridged the gap between the medical community and the free lovers as both a physician 
and free love advocate.  
 Juliet Hall Worth Stillman Severance was born in 1833 in Madison County, New 
York, as the thirteenth of seventeen children (Passet 121-122). She was a distant cousin 
of another prominent feminist reformer, Lucretia Mott (122). Severance’s family worked 
in dairy farming, and her daily contact with animals led to her interest in medicine (122). 
As devout Quakers, her family believed in educating females, and Severance was well-
educated (122). In 1857, she attended the Hygeio-Therapeutic College in New York City, 
a water cure medical school founded by physicians Russell Trall and Joel Shew, a school 
whose program stressed the naturalness of women’s bodies and the naturalness of female 
orgasm (Passet 123). These values attracted Severance, who favored “scientific notions” 
over popular, superstitious ones. Severance became a voice for many causes, having also 
aided in the Underground Railroad and joined labor parties working to improve job 
conditions. Like her mentor, Russell Trall, as a physician she counseled patients on 
sexual matters and provided information on contraception and abortion (Passet 126).13 
Severance’s lectures include both medical topics, such as A Lecture on the 
Philosophy of Disease, and How to Cure the Sick Without Drugs (1876), and social 
topics, such as A Lecture on Religious, Political, and Social Freedom (1881). Her 
rhetorical strategies are similar to Woodhull’s in emphasizing the law’s abuse of women 
within the marriage system and in comparing marriage to sexual slavery. However, she is 
also similar to Gove Nichols in her insistence on the naturalness of women’s sexual 
feelings and on women’s rights to take control of their own health. Like Gove Nichols, 
she believed the free love system was the key to helping women improve and maintain 
 
13 No biography of Severance exists and Passet is the only scholar to treat this rhetor at length. 
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their health. Severance also participated in the redefining of “virtue,” stating, “We should 
insist that virtue is not necessarily feminine, but that men as well as women should be 
expected to be pure in their lives and that virtue consists in living true to organic law in 
every department of being; that a person may be ‘not virtuous’ just as truly as by 
unnatural repression as by excessive indulgence, that both should be avoided” (A Lecture 
on Religious, Political, and Social Freedom, 15). While her insistence that men and 
women should be held to the same standard here seems closer to a “social purity” ideal, 
her definition of what is “virtuous” relies on free love ideology: one who is virtuous can 
have sexual feelings and experiences. 
Severance, a voice for health reform, dress reform, and free love reform, 
professed free love ideology, but did not attract scandal to the same extent as Woodhull. 
She did raise eyebrows when she married Anson Severance shortly after his divorce, 
prompting some to call her a “practical” (versus theoretical) free lover (Passet 127). Yet, 
Severance continued her advocacy of free love and never renounced it, as Gove Nichols 
and Woodhull did. As a physician, she also had a more explicit connection with scientific 
discourses, and many of her writings reflect the medical debates of the time. 
Angela Heywood
While Woodhull was the most notorious, Angela Fiducia Heywood (1840-1935) 
was in fact the most shockingly outspoken free love feminist. Born into a poorer family 
of farmers in Deerfield, New Hampshire, Angela Fiducia (whose name means “angel of 
fidelity”) worked as a domestic servant, cook, and factor worker, which stimulated her 
interest in labor reform (McElroy, Individualist 22).  Like Woodhull, Heywood had little 
formal education but was self-educated. With her husband, the social radical Ezra 
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Heywood, she edited The Word: A Monthly Journal of Reform, and contributed articles to 
this and other radical periodicals. The “plain speech” policy of The Word is often 
attributed to Angela Heywood, though Ezra Heywood was the one often imprisoned for 
it. She seems to be one of the most radical free love advocates, not only in her language, 
but also in her stances on abortion and women and economics.14 
Heywood took the insistence on “plain speech” much further than Woodhull and 
the tone of much of her writings has led some scholars to refer to her as “ill-tempered” 
and bitter (Gordon 104). Referring to marriage as “The Penis Trust,” Heywood espoused 
radical ideas that other free lovers would merely hint at, such as abortion. In an 1893 
article in The Word, she notes that women’s bodies were controlled by laws regulating 
birth control and abortion. To argue for women’s rights to contraception and abortion, 
she invokes a metaphor of abortion as “body housekeeping”:  
Not I, but Congressmen force the sex issue. Is it “proper,” “polite,” for 
men, real he men, to go to Washington to say, by penal law, fines and 
imprisonment, whether woman may continue her natural right to wash, 
rinse or wipe out her own vaginal opening,--as well as legislate when she 
may blow her nose, dray [sic] her eyes, or nurse her babe. Cold water 
prevents conception; will men therefore indite pumps and 
reservoirs?…This indicates that man is not so alarmed about preventing 
conception, for doth not CASTRATION accomplish it with a vengeance? 
(Heywood 131; emphases and caps in original) 
 
14 While no comprehensive biography of Heywood exists, Jesse Battan’s (1993) and Wendy McElroy’s 
(2001) works have gone far in illuminating her life. See also Garraty and Carnes’ (1999) entry on Heywood 
in American National Biography.
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In her arguments, Heywood predates many modern feminists by noting that men control 
women’s bodies through their laws, not only banning the practices of contraception and 
abortion, but also stopping the dissemination of information about women’s control of 
their bodies. 
 Heywood did not have an outright association with scientific discourse, since she 
was not a physician and did not rely on expert medical testimony. Therefore, her 
discourse illustrates how even texts which do not mention scientific breakthroughs should 
be read in the context of the science of the time. Many of her arguments would not have 
been as strong if they lacked the knowledge that the scientific community had made 
available about women and sexuality.  
Lois Waisbrooker
Lois Waisbrooker (1826-1909) is another rhetor who foreshadows the radical 
feminist rhetoric of the late twentieth century, or “second wave” feminism, in her views 
of how men were destructive to women and of how birth control “enslaved rather than 
liberated women” (Passet 121). Waisbrooker, born Adeline Eliza Nichols (no relation to 
Mary Gove or Thomas L. Nichols), was born in Catharine, New York. Her father was a 
day-laborer and her mother died of consumption at age 36 (Passet 113). Waisbrooker 
often referred to herself as being from “the lower strata of life” (qtd in Sears 231), and 
started her career as a domestic servant. She was widowed before she was twenty after a 
first marriage to George Fuller at seventeen, which her father pressured her into because 
she was pregnant. The birth of her daughter five months after her marriage produced a 
stigma that would later influence her advocacy of free love.  
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Waisbrooker, as she renamed herself, became an activist for many causes, 
promoting abolition and teaching African American children in Muskinghum County, 
Ohio, during the 1850s until she was forced to quit in 1856 because her father pressured 
her into marrying yet another man she deemed “a stranger” to her (Passet 114). Like 
Woodhull and Severance, Waisbrooker promoted spiritualism in addition to lecturing on 
free love and eugenics. She also called for the “scientific study of women’s sexual 
desire” (Passet 120). In fact, many of her arguments blend the spiritual with the scientific 
in her advocacy of free love. 
 Writing in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Waisbrooker 
often set up her works as proposals with axioms to be proven, using evidence from 
science, spiritualism, and women’s rights discourse. Like other free lovers, she promoted 
changes in the conditions under which women entered and sustained sexual relationships. 
Her rhetoric is often similar to social purity advocates in her aim to find the “purest” use 
of sex (Fountain of Life 14), but she is aligned with free love in her protests against 
marriage and patriarchy.  
However, Waisbrooker’s ideals clashed with the ideals of other free love 
advocates. She critiqued the (mostly male) advocates of “variety,” but still championed 
sexual freedom (Fountain of Life 40). In this way, she was more conservative than 
Woodhull or Severance who advocated the right of individuals to choose their own 
sexual practices, no matter what those practices may be. She also argued against the shift 
towards the more eugenic theories of the later free love advocates, claiming, “the 
transformation from sex slavery to living for the next generation is not freedom” 
(Eugenics 65). Furthermore, her ideals clashed with Heywood’s “plain speech” policies. 
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In an 1885 editorial printed in her journal Foundation Principles, she took issue with The 
Word’s policy on “plain speech,” advocating a more scientific language instead: 
A letter from Mrs. Heywood of Princeton, Mass., speaks of the organs of 
sex as  “Race Creating.” We like the term. It carries with it honor, 
dignity,--such as should ever be accorded to those life centers. “Race 
Creating”; take in the full meaning of the term, and then think lightly--
speak lightly--or act lightly in connection with those functions if you can. 
We believe in calling things by their legitimate names, when we speak of 
them; but we do not believe in (even privately) using the language of the 
street--of the rabble, simply because we can. Even allusions thereto hurt. 
(Qtd in McElroy, Individualist 83). 
Thus, Waisbrooker disagreed with some of the more “vulgar” language being used by 
Heywood and opted for a language that would professionalize free love theory--the 
language of science. Unlike Gove Nichols and Woodhull, Waisbrooker never renounced 
or converted from her free love views. She published articles, journals, and novels until 
her death. 
Free Love Feminists
The free love rhetors surveyed here share many rhetorical similarities, even when 
they diverge in their views. Their goals of increased sex education, freedom to choose 
when to conceive, and change in how sexuality was conceived were eventually 
successful, even if some of their more radical ideas, such as the abolition of marriage as 
an institution, were not. By 1907, when free love ideology had waned and many of its 
advocates had either ceased to embrace it or turned to eugenics, the message of the free 
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lovers had become more mainstream: sex education, birth control, and women’s rights 
were no longer considered unspeakable ideas from radical people (D’Emilio and 
Freedman 166). I, however, believe their greatest rhetorical success was their initiation of 
discussion and dialogue about sexuality. Whether couched in terms of spiritualism, 
individualism, or science, the free lovers achieved their goal of bringing private matters 
into the public sphere of debate. Their influence on twentieth-century women’s 
movements is clear, yet for many years, historical criticism has dismissed them as “the 
lunatic fringe,”15 or treated them only as extensions of the men they were associated 
with.16 They have only recently gained attention from scholars as social reformers,17 and 
have received even less attention from scholars of women’s rhetoric, perhaps because of 
what seem like very odd rhetorical strategies and goals. This dissertation aims to explain 
their vexing rhetoric by reading it through the backdrop of the scientific discoveries of 
the time. 
 
15 Taylor Stoehr’s introduction to Free Love in America: A Documentary History (1979) illustrates this 
tendency. It does not treat the male free love advocates as social reformers or theorists, and marginally 
includes the women.  
16 For example, John Spurlock’s study of the free love movement, Free Love: Marriage and Middle-Class 
Radicalism in America (1988), constructs these women only as extensions of the men they were associated 
with: Gove Nichols is merely an extension of her husband, Thomas L. Nichols; Victoria Woodhull is 
portrayed as a puppet of her mentor Stephen Pearl Andrews and her companion Colonel Blood; and Lois 
Waisbrooker, Lillian Harman, and Angela Heywood are treated marginally, often through the men they 
were associated with, namely Moses Harman and Ezra Heywood. In Spurlock’s study, it would seem that 
women do not come to consciousness about free love without the men in their lives. Additionally, Spurlock 
even blames the visible women, such as Victoria Woodhull, for the strained relationships between other 
movements and free love advocates and for the public’s negative perceptions of the movement (216). 
Furthermore, Spurlock’s study mistakenly groups together free love advocates as middle class, which 
figures like Woodhull, Heywood, and Waisbrooker complicate 
17 The roles of the women in the free love movement are also given their due in the brief summaries 
provided by Linda Gordon (1977), and John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman (1988), but it is Joanne 
Passet’s book length study, Sex Radicals and the Quest for Women’s Equality (2003), that most firmly 
addresses the key roles of the women in the free love movement. 
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Free Love versus Social Purity 
Tracing the ties to other movements helps elucidate the key features of free love 
discourse. The free love movement had ties to several other movements, including 
women’s suffrage, of course, but also the medical movements of dress reform and water 
cure, spiritualist movements, and late nineteenth-century anarchist movements. However, 
it is with the social purity arguments of the nineteenth century that free love discourse 
most clearly overlaps. The social purity movement had much in common with the free 
love movement in how advocates addressed sexuality, but their final aims were quite 
different. While rhetors in both movements critiqued the institution of marriage, social 
purity advocates did not urge its abolition, but its reform. The arguments for social purity 
were also successful since their proposals were actually implemented, such as reforms in 
divorce laws and age of consent. However, often their ideals were no less radical than the 
free lovers’ for their time, though their rhetorical techniques were ultimately more 
persuasive. 
Social purity advocates occupy a central place in the connection between science 
and reform discourse. Both male and female physicians often subscribed to social purity 
ideals and many reform societies aligned with social purity goals included both 
physicians and lay reformers. Key figures of the social purity movement included 
physicians Elizabeth Blackwell and Emma Drake,18 as well as popular speakers such as 
Frances Willard.  
Elizabeth Blackwell (1821-1910) was one of the most prominent advocates of 
social purity. One of the first women to earn a medical degree, Blackwell drew on 
 
18 Very little is known about Emma Drake’s life. She was a physician who published several advice 
manuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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scientific, medical, and social discourses in her advocacy of social purity. Born in Bristol, 
England, Blackwell moved to America at age eleven after her father sought more venues 
for his abolitionist aims (Garraty and Carnes 2.892). Members of Blackwell’s family 
were involved in several reform movements and there was a strong sense of women’s 
rights in her family. Her brother Henry married reformer Lucy Stone, and her brother 
Samuel married preacher Antoinette Brown. After a friend’s death of cancer, Elizabeth 
Blackwell was prompted to give up her career as a teacher in favor of medical study 
(2.893). She began her study at Geneva Medical School in New York, after a lengthy 
debate among students and administrators on whether to accept her. In 1849, Blackwell 
received her medical degree and then left to study midwifery in London and Paris. After 
returning to America to open her own practice, Blackwell decided to settle in London in 
1869, where she ceased medical practice to turn her energies to reform (2.893).  
During her reform career, Blackwell promoted both medical and social reforms. 
She published many essays and gave several addresses on the medical education of 
women, and she was also involved in the anti-vivisectionist medical movement. In 
addition, Blackwell brought her ethos as a physician to discussions of prostitution and 
sexual reform. She published essays on “rescue work” and human sexuality. Furthermore, 
Blackwell was one of the leading voices in the campaigns against Britain’s Contagious 
Disease Acts that punished only women for the spread of venereal disease (see Chapter 
3). She was a prolific writer and speaker and published a collection of her essays, entitled 
Essays in Medical Sociology, in 1902. In many of these essays, her key argument for 
reform concerns the double-standard between men and women. 
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Frances Willard was another prominent social purity reformer who shared similar 
goals with Blackwell. Willard was born in Churchville, New York, to businessman and 
farmer Josiah Willard and teacher Mary Hill. The family moved often, from New York to 
Ohio, to Wisconsin, to accommodate Josiah and Mary’s educational goals. Educated by 
her mother and then at Milwaukee Female College and North Western Female College, 
Frances Willard earned her degree in 1859 (Garraty and Carnes 23.410). After working 
as a teacher, she turned her attention to several reform movements, including suffrage 
and temperance. She founded the Women’s Christian Temperance Union in 1874, an 
organization that she helped to expand on an international scale. A prolific writer, 
Willard addressed many issues of women’s rights in her goals of “home protection”: 
from women’s right to vote to women’s right to preach; from temperance to “scientific 
motherhood.” The title of her 1895 work illustrates the scope of her reform goals: Do 
Everything: A Handbook for the World’s White Ribboners.
Blackwell, Willard, and others advocating social purity urged the elimination of 
the double standard that repressed women’s sexuality but encouraged male sexual 
license. While they recommended more chaste relationships than many of the free love 
feminists, social purity activists did not negate the importance of women’s sexuality. 
They, too, refuted the “passionless” ideology, or the idea that women were without sexual 
desires. But social purity advocates critiqued this ideology for different aims. In contrast 
to the free love advocates who often encouraged sexual relationships outside of marriage, 
social purity advocates wanted men to be held to the same standard as women, with both 
in more chaste relationships before and after marriage. Thus free love and social purity 
arguments overlap in their critiques of marriage, but diverge in their ultimate ends.  
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In addition to their views on how sexuality should be expressed, social purity 
advocates differed from free love goals in their views on the role of laws in women’s 
lives. Rather than repudiating all legal intervention in sexual relationships, as free love 
advocates did, social purity advocates argued for changes in laws governing prostitution, 
age of consent, and marital rape. As Blackwell urged, their agenda included legislation, 
then education (Blackwell, Essays 118). Though laws had never treated women equally, 
activists like Willard hoped that arguing for “home protection” would result in more 
equitable laws, even if these reforms were a result of arguments that emphasized the 
differences between men and women and women’s special circumstances, called the 
argument from expediency by Karyln Kohrs Campbell. Willard incorporated such diverse 
issues as temperance, labor reform, and social purity under her goal of “home 
protection”: 
Only by convincing Labor that a high tariff meant material protection for 
the home, was that election won; only by convincing wage-workers and 
women that the outlawing of the saloon means protection for those who 
dwell within the home, will Prohibition ever gain the day; only by 
convincing wage-workers and temperance voters that through equal 
suffrage women will help to protect both the external and the internal 
interests of the home, will the Woman Question ever be wrought out in 
government. But beneath this trinity of issues is the fount from which they 
follow and that is Home itself, and back of Home is the one relationship 
that makes it possible. (“A White Life for Two” 319)  
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Changes in laws dealing with sexuality, such as laws regulating prostitution, age of 
consent, and marital rape, would also fall under her “home protection” mantra. Thus, 
social purists tried to work with the laws, in contrast to the free lovers, and their less 
confrontational rhetoric accommodates that end. However, these two movements were 
similar in using scientific warrants to support their characterizations of sexuality. 
The social purity movement was also instrumental in establishing sex education. 
Willard often used the argument that education would create better mothers, and she did 
the same for sex education. For Blackwell, most of the abuses of sexuality would be 
solved through sex education with an emphasis on the importance of self control (Essays 
250). Unlike the free lovers, however, Blackwell insisted on specific circumstances for 
discussions of sexuality, deeming sex not a “topic of idle gossip, of unreserved publicity, 
nor of cynical display” (The Human Element in Sex 57). Her views contrast with 
Woodhull’s, who provided a forum for sexual discussions in her radical newspaper, and 
who also urged that sex should be “the topic of conversation at the breakfast table, at 
dinner, at supper--everywhere--until the whole matter is well understood by everybody” 
(Tried as by Fire 13). Blackwell would have condemned the type of sex speech 
Woodhull initiated and participated in with Woodhull’s expose of Henry Ward Beecher. 
Blackwell was especially emphatic that equal instruction be given to males and females 
about sex, since males often received mixed messages (Essays 213). Thus, social purists 
advocated that moral education include a sex education focused on abstinence, taught 
primarily by parents and educators, which would help to eliminate the double standard 
between men and women. It was the social purists’ view of sex education that was 
instituted in schools in the twentieth century. 
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While this dissertation primarily concentrates on rereading the discourse of the 
free love movement through the background of science, it also elaborates on the social 
purists’ role. Social purity advocates used the knowledge about women’s sexuality and 
about venereal disease coming out of the scientific community and the discourses of 
those findings in their arguments for eliminating the double-standard between men and 
women concerning sexuality. In order to successfully situate the free love movement’s 
discussion of sexuality, this dissertation looks at the overlap of free love discourse with 
other movements discussing sexuality, including social purity, racial uplift, and birth 
control. Each chapter analyzes free love texts alongside texts from one of these other 
movements in order to trace the prevalence of scientific warrants to feminist arguments. 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Questions of Sexuality 
 While the rhetorics of advocates for free love and social purity share 
characteristics with legal, suffragist, and religious rhetorics, it is the backdrop of science 
that gives the most insight into their rhetorical strategies and their reconfiguring of 
sexuality. As nineteenth-century science became more professionalized, scientific 
discourses permeated the public sphere. Scientific discoveries became a part of everyday 
life and speech. The science of evolution was, of course, the most prominent influence, 
yet nineteenth-century science also saw major changes and breakthroughs in other 
disciplines relating to the body, including physiology, bacteriology, embryology, and 
heredity. Science grew in cultural prestige and increased as a resource across the century; 
science could therefore be invoked in social reform claims. 
The professionalization and specialization of science throughout the nineteenth 
century yielded many breakthroughs, discoveries, and new disciplines, from 
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thermodynamics, to chemistry, to botany. This dissertation, however, is concerned with 
the sciences that produced greater understanding of the human body and its sexual 
functions. Though it was not until the twentieth century that major breakthroughs came 
by way of endocrinology and genetics, nineteenth-century sciences helped to change the 
discourse about women’s bodies. While some of that knowledge has since been refuted, 
the new theories often provided the germ for later understandings of the body. There was 
much that nineteenth-century scientists did not yet know in relation to sexuality, but there 
was also much that they did know. In the beginning of their history of sexuality, 
D’Emilio and Freeman caution against viewing the history of sexuality as one of 
“progress from repression to liberation, ignorance to wisdom, or enslavement to 
freedom” (xii). Likewise, the history of scientific breakthroughs cannot be viewed as the 
story of ignorance yielding to illumination. At times, nineteenth-century science was 
radically wrong in its conception of the body. At times, discoveries produced the wrong 
conclusions. Yet, the making of scientific knowledge can be found even in theories that 
have since been refuted. Like the history of attitudes towards sexuality, the history of 
science in relation to sexuality is more cyclical than linear. 
Darwin’s Warrants as the Core of Free Love Feminism
The most obvious scientific influence on sexual reform discourse was Charles 
Darwin. Darwin’s influence on nineteenth-century social ideologies was certainly far-
reaching and evolutionary theory presents the most obvious connection with free love 
discourse. Similar to Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s famous claim in Women and Economics 
(1898) that limitations on women’s economic and social status were hindering the 
progress of the human race, free love feminists asserted the claim that women’s status in 
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marriage as the sexual slaves of men was restraining progress. A key argument of the free 
lovers was elimination of a marriage system that subjugated the wife to the husband; 
these claims used Darwinian discourse as their warrant, positioning the marriage system 
as an unnatural and culturally imposed process. Darwin’s theories of natural selection and 
sexual selection elaborated in The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man 
(1871) provide grounding for free love arguments. 
 The traditional interpretation of Darwinian discourse and feminism is that 
Darwinism lent support to efforts to restrain the progress of women. Cynthia Eagle 
Russet (1989) endorses this view when she analyzes how Darwin’s views on the 
differences between the sexes reinforced female inferiority and set the stage for later 
psychologists who would take these views even further (40). Fiona Erskine’s article, “The 
Origin of Species and the Science of Female Inferiority” (1995), also analyzes the 
negative connection between Darwin’s theories and feminism. She argues that Darwin’s 
Descent shows how he was influenced by the rhetoric of female inferiority employed by 
other scientists (99). Even though the Origin does not explicitly address gender, Erskine 
finds in it an implicit view of female subordination (101).19 Like most texts, however, 
Darwin’s are open to multiple interpretations. The women in the free love movement 
were able to use Darwinian discourse for feminist ends, and not all of it was radical 
interpretation—Darwin’s texts could be interpreted as endorsing some of these 
viewpoints. 
 
19 She argues, “The Descent gives voice to Darwin’s deeply-rooted beliefs. If his Origin statements appear 




The emphasis on progress in Darwin’s texts and popular theories based on 
Darwin’s ideas also gave free love advocates an important argument: free love will lead 
to progress. Darwin’s emphasis on natural occurrences also provides implications that 
they exploited: what aspects of women’s lives could be attributed to nature and what to 
socially impositions? Furthermore, the popular tactic used by reformers of looking at 
nature to show how human laws violate nature’s laws was given salience in free love 
feminist rhetoric. The theory of natural selection, then, gave feminists a perspective and a 
language to critique sexual behaviors in the marriage system. 
 The more popularized versions of Darwin’s theories also illustrate how free love 
discourse applied the warrants established in The Origin of Species. Herbert Spencer’s 
theories of social evolution insisted: “Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a 
necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with 
the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower” (13). Erskine notes the 
importance of Spencer’s work to arguments calling for social progress (103). Spencer’s 
application shared similarities with theories of free love as natural progressive evolution. 
While Spencer’s discourse sometimes had clear anti-feminist implications,20 it was 
nevertheless similar at points to the feminist discourse that defined the key role of women 
in society’s progression.  
 Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, mentioned in The Origin of Species and 
elaborated in The Descent of Man, also heavily influenced free love feminism because of 
its emphasis on female choice. Although this theory was often challenged by other 
scientists, especially in the late nineteenth century,21 many male and female reformers 
 
20 See Russett’s (1989) criticism of Spencer, for example. 
21 See Frankel (1994), “The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory.” 
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found support for their arguments in this theory. Darwin’s theory of sexual selection 
posits that males compete for the females and the females then choose from among the 
most superior males. Female choice is then the rule in the animal kingdom. Sexual 
selection refers to the process that occurs when male secondary sex characteristics, that is 
characteristics that do not deal with reproduction, evolve to make males more desirable to 
females. Darwin’s example of sexual selection centered on the plumage of the bird; the 
bird’s plumage changed to attract the female, who would choose amongst the males. 
While female choice is the rule in this theory, the onus of change and competition is on 
the male: “the result [of sexual selection] is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but 
few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous than natural selection. 
Generally, the most vigorous males, those which are best fitted for their places in nature, 
will leave the most progeny” (Origin 73). While feminist scholars have often critiqued 
the gender biases inherent in sexual selection theory, this theory, like natural selection, 
could be used for either anti-feminist or feminist ends. To the free lovers, the 
interpretation that males must make themselves worthy of females gave a rationale for 
female choice in sexual relationships.  
 Darwin himself did note that this process of sexual selection seems to be reversed 
in human beings, with the males given the agency of choice. Free love feminists would 
agree with this interpretation of choice: “As far as sexual selection is concerned, all that 
is required is that choice should be exerted before the parents unite, and it signifies little 
whether the unions last for life or only for a season” (Darwin, Descent 360). Darwin’s 
claims, then, presented an impetus for arguments concerning the practices of human 
sexuality and its regulation in the marriage system.  
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One key argument of the free lovers was that the current marriage system was at 
odds with the natural progression of humanity. They differentiated between natural 
instincts and socially-imposed regulations of society. Woodhull argues that marriage has 
“outlived its day of usefulness” (Tried as by Fire 5) and that marriage “stands directly in 
the way of any improvement in the race” (Tried as by Fire 7). The warrant that nature is 
hindered by social customs is clear in her definition of marriage as “an assumption by the 
community that it can regulate the sexual instincts of individuals” (Tried as by Fire 7). 
Thus, the limits set by society on individuals’ choice in sexual relations stand in the way 
of natural evolutionary progression. 
Similarly, in Social Freedom: The Most Important Factor in Human Evolution 
(c1890), which was originally a speech she was asked to give by the Social Science 
League of Chicago, later published in the radical periodical Lucifer, the Light Bearer and 
in pamphlet form, Hulda Potter-Loomis22 argues that human beings have advanced past 
the stifling institution of marriage and that choosing partners and sexual conditions in 
freedom, without the standards set by human society, will help them advance further, 
both morally and intellectually. She says, “No one can be happy while chafing under the 
restrictions which society now enforces upon the strongest and, without doubt, the best 
instincts of our nature, namely, that which manifests itself through the affections” (7). 
Her positioning of sexuality as the “strongest instinct in our nature” echoes the Darwinian 
discourse of the survival of the fittest instinct. Thus, embracing natural sexuality will 
conform to natural laws. Potter-Loomis then argues that man has controlled nature and 
hindered progress when she says, “Thus, unconsciously does man overreach himself 
 
22 Nothing is known of the background of Hulda Potter-Loomis, whose works are part of Moses Harman’s 
collection. 
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when he presumes to set up limitations to nature, for nature knows no limitation and will 
not be restrained without causing much havoc and destruction” (8). Her argument is 
illustrated through a comparison with a tree growing free on its own, but restrained and 
fighting for light while in the forest: She writes, “There the tree is forced to conform to its 
environment and the limitations placed upon it by its surrounding companions” (13). The 
tree is “forced to modify its natural habit” because of its surroundings. She concludes, 
“The tree, however, has less power to choose or reject its own environment than we 
have” (13). This metaphor linking freedom of choice in mates with freedom in growth 
then illustrates how the natural instincts of humans are restricted by community 
standards, like marriage.  
Thus, as Potter-Loomis notes, human beings have the power to change their 
environment and become agents to aid evolution. Her extended metaphor of sexuality as 
the tree, which carries throughout her work, exemplifies her claim that social freedom is 
the most important factor in human evolution; women are restrained unless they can 
express their sexuality in a healthy way. Those who survive will be the ones who express 
their natural sexual instincts. This rhetoric was intended to counter the notions that 
women who expressed their sexuality were “vulgar” and that marriage was the only place 
where such sexuality could be expressed. 
 In free love discourse, agency is divided between nature and those who can steer 
nature in the right direction. Echoing Social Darwinism, Woodhull argues that it is 
humanity’s job to aid evolution (Rapid Multiplication 19), and she decrees that the law of 
nature is higher than the law of government (And the Truth 19). Similarly, Waisbrooker 
argues that nature must be aided by the external conditions of freedom (Eugenics 8-9). 
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Woodhull says, “When a limit is placed upon anything that by nature is free, its actions 
become perverted” (Tried as by Fire 23). In addition, Dora Forster23 notes that “Sex 
problems begin in false custom” (46). Thus, this discourse resolves the problematic agent 
in Darwin’s theory: only when humanity shrugs off its false customs and limits will 
natural evolutionary progress occur. 
 The role of nature as the agent then gives free love advocates backing for their 
claims that women are restricted from their natural progression. In free love discourse, 
naming men as “Legal owners of their wives’ sexual organs”24 emphasized the 
unnaturalness of such a marriage system. The natural world then gave them a basis for 
comparison. In fact, Potter-Loomis calls Mother Nature “a better source” for her 
arguments than man-made law. Woodhull also presents marriage as “at variance with 
everything in nature”; everywhere but among humans “the female has supreme authority 
in domain of sex” (Tried as by Fire 39). Thus, Darwin’s writings were used in 
idealizations of the “natural world” as the place where progress can be seen unhindered. 
In using evolutionary theories as the basis for their arguments for women’s sexual 
freedom, these women place humans as the agent; this emphasis is not present in 
Darwin’s works, but is present in some of the adaptations of Darwin, such as Herbert 
Spencer’s. In Darwin, the activity of natural selection is privileged over the agent, but in 
these women’s arguments, the agent is privileged over the act (Burke).  Woodhull’s claim 
also uses the evolutionary hierarchy as its warrant: if other species give women this right 
of “supreme authority,” then why don’t humans?  
23 I have also been unable to find much biography of Forster, who is part of the anarchist free love 
movement. 
24 A phrase used by many free love advocates, including Woodhull and Potter-Loomis. 
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Looking to the animal kingdom, many free love feminists found justifications for 
equality since humans are higher in the evolutionary scale than these animals. Woodhull 
argues that there are no analogies in nature to the marriage system; therefore, marriage is 
not a natural condition (And the Truth Shall Make You Free 14). Lois Waisbrooker’s 
arguments also use the evolutionary scale as their warrant in her claims that the 
subjugation of the wife to the husband violates the laws of nature. For example, she 
proclaims, “The evils under which we suffer are rooted in the unbalanced conditions of 
creative life as manifested in the relative position of man and woman—in the subjection 
of woman to man…” and adds, “Does Nature—does evolutionary law so change its 
methods on its upward course?” (Eugenics 4). Thus, her warrant shows that since the 
females in the animal kingdom are not subjected to the same suppression as human 
females, the condition of wives is unnatural, especially since men are considered higher 
than animals both intellectually and spiritually (Waisbrooker, Fountain of Life 83).  
 Darwin’s discussions of sexual selection in Origin and Descent also gave free 
love theory backing for the role of female choice. Woodhull notes, “Sexual selection has 
very little scope in our conventional system” since women often marry for the wrong 
reasons, such as economic necessity or social pressure (Rapid Multiplication 20). 
Waisbrooker also uses the warrant of “female choice” to argue, “Nature has given to 
every woman the inherent right to decide when she will bear a child and who shall be its 
father” (Eugenics 5). Using this line of argument, the free love theories relied on the 
authority of sexual selection: if females in the animal kingdom can choose amongst the 
most appealing males, women should certainly be given a similar choice, rather than 
pressured into relationships based on social class, the need for a provider, or the desire to 
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be married, regardless of love. Sexual selection theory, then, proves the “right of woman 
to rule in the domain of affections” (Woodhull, Elixir 22). 
 Darwin left his mark on the nineteenth-century rhetoric of science and its link to 
social reform, and his discourse was accommodated and applied in different ways by free 
love feminists. However, Darwin’s was not the only scientific theory that lent weight to 
claims for women’s sexual rights. Reading their claims through the lenses of physiology, 
bacteriology, embryology, and heredity sheds more light on the free lovers’ rhetorical 
strategies, which will be elaborated in the chapters of this dissertation. Reading sexual 
reform discourse in a new context, alongside the growing cultural authority of science in 
the nineteenth century, reveals new dimensions and brings out different features in 
women’s rights arguments.  
Physiology
The first lens with which to view nineteenth-century feminist discourse is 
physiology, the study of the body and its functions and processes. Chapter 2 shows how 
the discourses associated with physiology helped free love advocates argue for the 
importance of sexual freedom and sexual pleasure to women’s health. Physiology seemed 
to be an architechtonic discipline in nineteenth-century science, especially in the medical 
schools. Yet, “physiology” came to mean more than just the scientific study of the body. 
It also became associated with hygiene and with sexual knowledge.  
Nineteenth-century physiology did not yield new knowledge of sexuality but 
applied Enlightenment philosophies of the body to lifestyle decisions. Nineteenth-century 
discourses on sexual physiology were affected by debates between mechanists and 
vitalists, those who viewed the body as a machine versus those who viewed the body as 
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affected by a “vital” force. Ideas on the nervous system, the relationship between the 
mind and the body, and the law of conservation of energy also affected the nineteenth-
century discourse of sexual physiology. Physiology was the discipline used most clearly 
by physicians attempting to limit women’s rights because of their bodies. However, 
Chapter 2 explores how physicians attempted both to limit and to liberate women’s 
bodies. It also shows how free love feminists could rely on both feminist and anti-
feminist (such as the ideas of women being controlled by their sexual organs) medical 
discourses to argue for free love as a valuable tool in securing women’s health. The 
warrant that medical science had established--that the health of women was tied to their 
sexual organs--actually became the means for free love feminists to argue that women 
should be given “control” of their sexual organs and should experience sexual pleasure in 
order to maintain health. 
Bacteriology
Chapter 3 examines the far-reaching impact of the central medical breakthroughs 
in nineteenth-century bacteriology. Though many of the more practical applications of 
this new science in the form of vaccines and cures would not come until later, the 
discovery itself reconfigured attitudes towards disease and its transmission. Now there 
was an external agent of disease to fight, rather than an uncontrollable dysfunction of the 
body.  
In addition to the discovery of bacteria as causal agents in disease, bacteriology 
produced other important shifts. Even before bacteria were recognized, the 1837 
differentiation between gonorrhea and syphilis, previously conceived as the same disease, 
enabled more accurate diagnoses and more specific research in the late nineteenth 
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century. In addition, scientists began to understand the stages of these diseases, producing 
important new knowledge about the latency period of gonorrhea. The explanation of the 
latency period showed the public that women and men could be carriers of these diseases 
without outright symptoms, thus perpetuating their spread. Finally, understanding the 
later stages and the effects of venereal diseases on the reproductive organs, which often 
led to sterility, magnified the urgency to speak about women’s sexuality and understand 
sexual practices, creating a crisis for reforms in marriage laws and sex education. 
Prior to the discovery of bacteria as a cause of disease, ideas circulated positing 
the inherent nature of venereal disease in women. Bacteriology, then, provided an outside 
cause to a “social problem,” one that could be fought with reforms. Furthermore, the 
presence of venereal disease explained the illnesses and weaknesses many women 
suffered, previously attributed to their weaker physiology. The absence of sexual desire 
was also attributed to venereal disease. Thus, bacteriology provided explanations that 
physiology could not. It changed the discourse surrounding venereal disease from one of 
morality to a discourse of public health. 
Science established the warrant that venereal disease was caused by bacteria 
transferred during sexual intercourse and showed that such diseases were also frequent in 
marriages. Thus, free love and social purity advocates could argue for reforms in the 
marriage system on the basis that marriage was not a safe haven from venereal disease. 
Reading their arguments for reform through the lens of bacteriology shows how the 
discoveries of science literalized the metaphors of marriage as a diseased institution. The 
scientific study of disease also helped to promote urgency for sexual reforms. 
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Embryology
While physiology and bacteriology illuminated the causes of disease, different 
problems of causation vexed scientists in the discipline of embryology. The focus on 
evolutionary theory marked a new beginning for embryology, as Darwin attempted to use 
embryology as evidence for natural selection (Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought 469). 
Studying the similarities and differences between embryos in different species helped 
scientists to plot the stages of evolution and human development. It is also from this 
discipline that knowledge of fertilization and embryonic development was gained.  
Nineteenth-century embryology saw the end of the preformation versus 
epigenesis debates, debates over whether generations had been preformed centuries 
before they were born or whether they went through a series of developmental stages 
after fertilization. Thus, once the belief that the characteristics of a person were not 
preformed generations before birth had been defeated, the possibility for influence on the 
embryo was refreshed. These new beliefs in embryonic development were recruited to 
cover women’s rights because of women’s influence as the housing of the embryo. 
Embryology, aided by cell theory, was also able to confirm that both males and females 
equally contributed characteristics to the new being. The knowledge of this elite science, 
conveyed in both textual and visual arguments, became integral to free love arguments. 
Chapter 4 traces how embryology produced warrants based on development, 
which free lovers could then use in their arguments placing women as agents of 
evolution. This chapter also explains how scientific discoveries in this field “refreshed” 
older ideas on the influence of women on the growing embryo, which free love and racial 
uplift advocates used to argue for why women should have rights. 
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Heredity
Scientific discussions of heredity also saw major changes in the nineteenth 
century due to the theories of Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, and Mendel. The idea that 
“like begets like” proliferated throughout the century, explaining all manner of human 
behavior, from propensity toward crime, to intelligence. While nineteenth-century 
scientists did not have a science of genetics to draw from, they did produce important 
findings in the field of heredity.  
For much of the century, Lamarckian views that characteristics an organism 
acquired during life could then be passed on to future generations persisted, even after 
Weismann refuted these ideas in 1883. Lamarckian theories of inheritance were attractive 
to reformers, since they could argue for changes, such as education in the name of “race 
improvement.” Weismann’s and Mendel’s work, which created the “germ plasm” theory 
of inheritance and refuted the inheritance of acquired characteristics, helped to instigate 
the shift towards advocacy of eugenics in the early twentieth century. Yet, nineteenth-
century feminists promoted the ideas behind eugenics even before it was given a name. 
The eugenic ideals that free love, social purity, and racial uplift advocates supported, 
though, were based more in Lamarckian science, giving a different spin to the theory of 
eugenics than the modern Mendelian view. 
The final chapter traces the ideas of nineteenth-century hereditarian science 
through the theories of these scientists and the social sciences of Thomas Malthus, 
Herbert Spencer, and Frances Galton, through medical popularizations, and finally to the 
more eugenic arguments of late nineteenth-century feminists. The warrant that a new 
being received the characteristics of both the mother and father led to a “mothers of the 
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race” discourse in feminist texts. They could argue for rights on the basis that women’s 
betterment would be passed on to their children. The discourses of heredity often 
provided the strongest argument for sexual freedom through a new emphasis on women’s 
status as “mothers of the race.” 
Scientific Discourse in the Popular Sphere
The many new ideas in these sciences needed a mode of transmission to wider 
publics. Scientific and medical societies flourished in the nineteenth century, and journals 
discussing these issues became more widespread. However, a key development was the 
availability of scientific information in the public sphere. Medical advice books written 
by physicians to audiences of women fostered the spread of scientific theories and 
discourses. The dissemination of theories of evolution and the germ theory of disease 
illustrate the tremendous role of popularization in the success of these theories. Lay 
people used scientific discourse and implemented reforms based on scientific theories in 
various areas. Thanks to popularization, science permeated so many areas of social life 
that it became almost a common language. It became popular to evoke science in general 
periodicals and other public discourses (Cantor and Shuttleworth 2). Historian Nancy 
Tomes (1998) reconceptualizes popularization when she says, 
I prefer to think of popularization not as a hierarchical, top-down process 
where the focus is on what the public gets “right” or “wrong,” but as a 
dynamic where ideas and images are traded among different audiences, 
including laboratory scientists, practicing physicians, hygiene reformers, 
and interested lay people. Instead of treating popular views as merely pale, 
distorted images of the “real” knowledge generated by “real” scientists, 
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such a model allows for ideas to travel in more than one direction, to 
accommodate, for example, the influence of sanitarian thought on early 
formulations of the germ theory. This approach also helps to describe what 
interests me most, that is, how scientific precepts become a part…of 
everyday life. (Gospel 13-14) 
Thus, medical popularizers and feminist reformers could mold and shape science to meet 
their ends. 
Clearly, the debate over sexuality occurring in the free love and social purity 
discourse communities could not have thrived without the knowledge they drew from the 
scientific community. Just as the line is blurry between the public and private spheres, the 
line is blurry between what I am deeming the professional and popular spheres. Scientists 
were affected by popular values in return, particularly in nineteenth-century discourses 
surrounding race, gender, and sexuality, just as much as rhetors in the popular sphere 
were affected by scientific values and theories. Thus, a more inclusive definition of the 
rhetoric of science, one that acknowledges how women participated in scientific 
discourses in reform movements, is needed. 
Women’s Involvement in Science
However, the division between the scientific and reformist spheres is not along 
gender lines. The nineteenth century saw more women entering scientific and medical 
fields than previous centuries. Some of these fields were “feminized,” thus making them 
more acceptable for women. Regina Morantz-Sanchez’s work (1985; 1992; 1999) shows 
how women won the battle to be trained as physicians in the nineteenth century by 
appealing to the idea that women had more “sympathy” for female patients. 
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Anthropology also became an acceptable field for women since they could study women 
and children better than men could (Rossiter 61), which even prompted a backlash 
against female anthropologists in the 1880s because there were too many of them 
(Rossiter 63). The fields of “home economics” and hygiene also encouraged the 
participation of women (64). Medical schools opened to women and women also became 
involved in sanitary reform work. Critic Perry Williams (1991) broadens the definition of 
medical practice to include women sanitary reformers, midwives, and nurses, especially 
since sanitary reformers often incorporated the principles of preventative medicine (61-
63). “Sanitary science,” the medical reform movement advocating social reforms as the 
means to checking the spread of disease, even became a discipline including both male 
and female physicians who focused on how scientific knowledge could yield social 
changes (Morantz-Sanchez, “Feminist Theory” 58). Thus, women were practicing 
science in new and different ways, from the formalized disciplines to practical and 
socially-applicable fields. 
 The growth of scientific discourses in lay fields also incorporated women as both 
writers and audiences. Elizabeth Fee (1978) notes that popular science journals often 
espoused more feminist ideologies because of women writers and subscribers (iii). In 
addition, Susan Wells’s work (2001) has documented the participation of women in 
physiological societies interested in “seeing what was hidden” (202). Women, then, 
found more access to scientific principles, practices, and discourse throughout the 
century, whether they were employed in more professional or popular activities. Thus 
free love reformers were not unique among nineteenth-century women in their new focus 
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on studying the body. The impact of science in the popular realm made these discourses 
accessible to laywomen.   
Explanation of Methodology 
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation, divided by scientific discipline, are 
arranged by first reviewing the discoveries in a distinct scientific field, then analyzing 
their explanations in medical popularizations, and finally analyzing the reformist 
discourse informed by the science. To discuss medical popularizations, I chose the texts 
that seemed to have the clearest influence on the reformist discourse. These texts were in 
some cases read and quoted by reformers. Other popular science texts were chosen 
because they explicitly align themselves with social reform goals.  
This dissertation focuses on the questions: how do new scientific understandings 
change the rhetorical situation of speaking about sex, and what is science’s role in 
defining such a situation? Lloyd Bitzer’s concept of rhetorical situation concentrates on 
the three components of exigence, audience, and constraints.25 As the discourse on 
sexuality traveled from scientific communities to popularizations to free love reformers, 
these components altered. All three of these discourse communities used the exigence of 
“new knowledge” and “new discoveries,” but did so in different ways. For the scientific 
community, the constraints depended on which theories of the body their audiences 
subscribed to, and what these audiences defined as an “imperfection,” or component of 
the situation requiring modification. Rhetors working in science had to contend not only 
with the audience’s position on scientific developments, but also with their social values 
 
25 For Bitzer, situations are rhetorical if they have these three components. He uses the term “exigence” to 
refer to the reason for the text or the importance of the text. One way rhetors exploit exigence is by finding 
an “imperfection” that requires “positive modification.” 
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about sexuality. For the accommodators in the medical community who wrote to lay 
audiences, science provided its own authority, yet the constraints in dealing with 
preconceived ideas on sexuality were the same. In addition, they not only contended with 
the exigence of new scientific knowledge, but also with the exigence of conversations 
about sexuality circulating in the public sphere. Finally, the reform communities, 
especially the free love movement, saw multiple “imperfections” to address, and the 
presence of women as rhetors was an additional constraint. Thus, science allowed 
nineteenth-century women to construct the exigence and authority to speak on the 
“taboo” topic of sex, and their rhetorical strategies engaged in multi-layered exigencies. 
Beyond Bitzer’s interpretation of the situation, though, the rhetorical situation was 
also affected by the constraints of the genre. While each discourse community recounted 
scientific advancements and applied them to social problems, they privileged different 
aspects of these theories. Burke’s pentad is useful in analyzing the additional components 
of the situation, as we look at the ways science and reform communities differently 
conceive of act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. What did each discourse community 
give presence to and why? Does the privileging of one component of the pentad change 
as the discourse travels among different communities?  
Finally, analysis of these traveling discourses includes an interrogation of how 
warrants are established and then applied to reform goals. The scientific community gave 
reform communities warrants, or major premises and assumptions, for their arguments 
for change. For example, in the reform community the theory of evolution became a 
warrant for arguments that marriage was restraining progress. Similarly, reformers 
claiming that women should have the right “to rule in the domain of affections” 
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(Woodhull, Elixir 22) were warranted by Darwin’s theory of female choice in sexual 
selection. I also introduce the idea that scientific warrants can “refresh” older arguments; 
that is, a claim that a reformer had previously asserted becomes revitalized by a warrant 
based in a recent scientific finding. For example, the free lovers claim that marriage is a 
“diseased” institution was given new life by the finding that venereal diseases were 
prevalent in marriages (see Chapter 3). 
Thus, each chapter of this dissertation is arranged by first explaining the scientific 
theories and discourses of the professional field, then looking at how this information was 
conveyed to the public in popular works by scientists and medical practitioners, and 
finally by showing how these popularized theories inform the discourses on sexuality in 
the social movements. Each chapter looks at the changes that can occur when science is 
accommodated to feminist ends.    
Each chapter of this dissertation contains a timeline in an appendix that tracks the 
scientific discoveries in that particular discipline. The following chart integrates that 
information with the timeline of free love feminist texts: 
Comparative Timeline 
 
Year Scientific Milestone Year Free Love Publication 
1801 Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichat, 
vitalist theory of tissue systems 
1809 Jean Baptiste Lamarck, 
Philosophie Zoologique 
1821 Johann Friedrich Meckel, 
recapitulation theory 
 
1827 Carl Ernst von Baer, On the 
Origin of the Mammalian and 
Human Ovum 
1828 Von Baer, The Developmental 
History of Animals 
1837 Phillipe Ricord, difference 
between gonorrhea and 
syphilis, previously conceived 
as the same disease 
 
55
1843 Embryologists, observation of 
sperm within the egg 
 
1844 Robert Chambers, Vestiges of 
the Natural History of 
Creation 
1846 Mary Gove, Lectures to Women on Anatomy 
and Physiology 
1853 Mary Gove Nichols and Thomas L. Nichols, 
Nichols’ Journal of Health, Water-Cure, and 
Human Progress 
1854 Mary Gove Nichols and Thomas L. Nichols, 
Marriage: Its History, Character, and 
Results; its Sanctities, and its Profanities; its 
Science and its Facts. Demonstrating its 
Influence, as a Civilized Institution, of the 
Happiness of the Individual and the Progress 
of the Race 
1855 Robert Remak, cells form by 
division 
1855 Mary Gove Nichols, Mary Lyndon 
1859 Charles Darwin, On the Origin 
of Species 
1859 Louis Pasteur, “germ theory” 
of disease 
 
1860s Wilhelm His, three-
dimensional models of 
embryos 
 
1864 Herbert Spencer, “survival of 
the fittest” 
 
1865 Gregor Mendel, theory of 
hybridization 
 
1866 Ernst Haeckel, theory of 
recapitulation 
 
1869 Francis Galton, Hereditary 
Genius: An Inquiry into its 
Laws and Consequences 
1870 Victoria Woodhull and Tennesee Claflin, 
Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly 
1871 Charles Darwin, The Descent 
of Man and Selection in 
Relation to Sex 
1871 Woodhull, “And the Truth Shall Make You 
Free:” A Speech on the Principles of Social 
Freedom 
1872 Emil Noeggerath, “latency 
period” of gonorrhea 
1872 Ezra Heywood and Angela Heywood, The 
Word 
1873 Victoria Woodhull, The Elixir of Life, or, Why 
Do We Die? 
1874 Victoria Woodhull, Tried as by Fire; Or, The 
True and the False Socially 
1876 Robert Koch, anthrax 
bacillicus 
1876 Juliet Severance, A Lecture on the Philosophy 
of Disease, and How to Cure the Sick Without 
Drugs, with an Explanation of Magnetic Laws 
1876- Oscar Hertwig and Hermann   
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1877 Fol, examination of how sperm 
penetrates the egg and how the 
cell to form a new organism 
comes out of two nuclei 
1879 Albert Neisser, gonococcus 1879 Lois Waisbrooker, From Generation to 
Regeneration, or The Plain Guide to 
Naturalism 
1880 Lois Waisbrooker, Foundation Principles  
1881 Juliet Severance, A Lecture on Life and 
Health, or How to Live a Century 
Juliet Severance, A Lecture on Religious, 
Political, and Social Freedom 
1882 Robert Koch, microbe for 
tuberculosis 
 
1883 August Weismann, refutation 
of inheritance of acquired 
characteristics 
1883 Moses Harman, Lucifer, the Light Bearer 
1885 Louis Pasteur, rabies vaccine   
1886 Francis Galton, term 
“eugenics” 
 
1888 Victoria Woodhull, Stirpiculture; or, The 
Scientific Propagation of the Human Race 
1889 August Weismann, Essays 
Upon Heredity 
c1890 Hulda Potter-Loomis, Social Freedom: The 
Most Important Factor in Human Evolution 
1890 Victoria Woodhull, Humanitarian 
Government 
1891 Juliet Severance, A Discussion of the Social 
Question between Juliet H. Severance, M.D. 
and David Jones, Editor of the “Olive 
Branch.” 
1891 Victoria Woodhull, The Rapid Multiplication 
of the Unfit 
1893 Lois Waisbrooker, The Fountain of Life, or 
the Threefold Power of Sex 
1900 Gregor Mendel, work 
rediscovered 
1900 Lois Waisbrooker, Clothed With the Sun 
1901 Juliet Severance, Marriage 
1904 Prince Albert Morrow, Social 
Diseases and Marriage 
1905 Dora Forster, Sex Radicalism as seen by an 
Emancipated Woman of the New Time 
1907 Moses Harman, The American Journal of 
Eugenics (changed from Lucifer, The Light 
Bearer)
1907 Lois Waisbrooker, Eugenics; or, Race Culture 
Lessons 
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Looking at the dates side by side reveals how free love discourse became more prolific 
after important scientific discoveries. We also see the importance of reading free love 
discourse against the background of contemporary science. We would not read the 
discourse of the suffrage movement without looking at the larger issues occurring in the 
social sphere. Likewise, we should not read the discourse of sexuality in the free love 
movement without being aware of the scientific discoveries impacting their rhetorical 
strategies. 
Conclusion 
 In examining “the way in which sex is ‘put into discourse’” (History of Sexuality 
1.11), Michel Foucault argues that a society “speaks verbosely of its own silence” (1.8) 
and that discourse itself helps to shape our experiences of sexuality. In contrast to a 
“Victorian” view of discussions of sexuality, we see that sexuality was discussed, and 
discussed at length, drawing on the discourses of science, in many different discourse 
communities in the nineteenth century, though in different ways than we do today. The 
debates in nineteenth-century scientific communities gave women an exigence and a 
language for critiquing sexual practices. Free love rhetors capitalized on the opportunity 
to enter such discourses. 
 When Darwin said, “The season of love is that of battle” (Darwin, The Descent of 
Man 48), he referred to the battle among males to compete for females, a key component 
of his sexual selection theory. Reform discourses concerning sexuality in the nineteenth 
century turned this battle into an ideological and rhetorical battle. They showed that the 
realm of the private sphere contained a battle between the sexes for the right of women to 
“own and control” her sexual organs. They revealed the battle between social values and 
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the actual lived experiences of women. They positioned marriage as a battleground where 
the scientific and the personal met. Their speech created a battle over what was sexual 
knowledge and what was obscenity. Reformers battled for changes that would protect, 
honor, and free women from the constraints and repression of the marriage system and 




To sum up the best conditions for health and long life which all can now 
attain: First: prospective fathers and mothers should be in perfect health 
from right living, not only as regards diet, exercise, rest, personal 
cleanliness, cheerfulness and all hygienic conditions, but also in regard to 
their relations with the other. The mother should maintain the control of 
her own person under an intelligent comprehension of sexual science.  
(Severance, A Lecture on Life and Health 29-30) 
When early twenty-first century women need their “embarrassing questions” 
answered, they go to The Oprah Winfrey Show to hear Dr. Oz explain the inner workings 
of the body using computer-generated visual aids, give advice on personal hygiene and 
diet, and answer questions such as how much sun-tanning is harmful, what constitutes a 
healthy bowel movement, and how often women should douche. When the latter topic is 
raised, Oprah sympathizes with the male guests in the audience who feel uncomfortable 
in the presence of discussion of such topics. When early nineteenth-century women 
wanted to know more about the body, they went to lectures hosted by ladies’ 
physiological societies to hear Dr. Mary Gove explain the inner workings of the body 
using her own unique visual aids, such as mannequins and a corset placed over her 
clothes to demonstrate the harms of tight lacing (Passet 22), give advice on personal 
hygiene and diet, and address issues of how much exercise women should get, whether 
masturbation is harmful, and how to maintain the health of the sexual and reproductive 
organs. When topics particular to women were raised, there was no uncomfortable male 
presence; these lectures were led by women and for women only. Ladies’ physiological 
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societies did not need a male Dr. Oz to answer their questions; they had Mary Gove with 
her medical knowledge, credentials as a physician, and appropriate gender. Physician 
Sylvester Graham and reformer William Alcott were deemed inappropriate to lecture 
about anatomy and physiology to female audiences, so they invited Gove to lecture 
instead, beginning a prolific lecturing career for this female physician and reformer in the 
1830s that stretched into the 1850s (Passet 22). Her lectures sponsored by the Ladies’ 
Physiological Society of Boston and the Ladies’ Physiological Society of New York 
(Silver-Isenstadt 35-40), among others, drew large crowds from 400-500 listeners per 
lecture (Silver-Isenstadt 38). The numbers of women gathering to hear Mary Gove’s 
lectures on anatomy, physiology, and hygiene speak to the intense public interest in these 
topics. Throughout the nineteenth century, lectures on physiology drew crowds, and 
popular health manuals by physicians explaining the body became bestsellers. Physiology 
became the central discipline of the medical schools, as well as a prominent discipline in 
many women’s colleges.  
In popular discourses, however, physiology became integral to arguments for 
women’s rights. Explanations of physiology often became opportunities to argue for 
women’s rights as a natural extension of the topic. For Mary Gove, explaining the parts 
of the body was not enough; she also had to explain how these body parts could be 
harmed, not only by restrictions on women, such as sedentary lifestyles and tight lacing, 
but also by the inequalities in the marriage system. Similar to Gove’s message with its 
reformist agenda, Lillian Welch’s physiology lectures at Goucher College urged the need 
for women’s vote “as a tool for securing conditions in the community favorable to 
health” (qtd. in Appel 312). The marriage reforms advocated by free lovers, then, became 
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connected with women’s health through these discourses on physiology. As the quotation 
above by physician and free love advocate Juliet Severance illustrates, diet, exercise, and 
“control of her own person”--all became interconnected with and central to securing and 
maintaining women’s health. Discourses on the inner workings of the body provided 
warrants for women’s rights. This chapter shows how reading the claims of the free love 
advocates in light of the larger conversations on physiology in the scientific and medical 
communities reveals the basis of these arguments grounding sexual freedom in women’s 
health. 
Twentieth-century critics have often focused on the darker side of these 
nineteenth-century conversations over women’s physiology. Historians such as Carol 
Smith-Rosenberg (1985) and Cynthia Eagle Russet (1989) have revealed how literature 
from the medical community resulted in defining women as “diseased,” “hysteric,” and 
controlled by their physiology, particularly their reproductive organs. Historian Nancy 
Cott (1979) has examined the “passionless” ideology, one endorsed by many physicians 
throughout the century, that denied that women’s physiology provided any sexual 
feelings. In addition, Cott, Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg (1973), and others have 
analyzed how medical discourse was shaped by positions on women’s social roles. 
Defining women as “diseased” served to limit their civic participation and keep them 
dependent on men. Furthermore, as Elizabeth Fee (1978) points out, the treatment of 
female disorders formed a large and lucrative component of many physicians’ practices 
(197).  
This traditional view of women, health, and sexuality has also been challenged, 
notably by Carl Degler, whose article “What Ought to be and What Was: Women’s 
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Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century” (1974), surveys the medical literature on women’s 
sexuality written for both professional and popular audiences and written by many 
different factions of the medical community. He finds arguments on both sides of the 
spectrum within the different factions, concluding that there was not a unified consensus 
concerning women’s sexuality in the medical community. Similarly, Helen Lefkowitz 
Horowitz’s (2002) study of sexual mores in the nineteenth century reveals a more 
complicated debate than do past studies asserting a “Victorian” mindset on sexuality. In 
fact, critics reading the same texts have often found differing views within the same text, 
depending on what ideology of “Victorian sexuality” their research is supporting. For 
example, Ronald Walters’ text Primers for Prudery: Sexual Advice to Victorian America 
(1974; 2000) uses some of the same physiology texts that I examine in this dissertation, 
such as Russell Trall’s and John Cowan’s texts. While he finds evidence supporting a 
view of Victorian prudery, my analysis shows that liberating views of women’s sexuality 
that were later used by reformers to support women’s rights originated in these medical 
“primers.” Readings of Elizabeth Blackwell’s views on women’s physiology and 
sexuality, examined in this chapter, also demonstrate contradictions between the views of 
women as sexual or “passionless.” Thus, we can see that nineteenth-century discourse on 
women’s physiology and sexuality in both medical and reform circles was more 
complicated than the traditional view of Victorian sexual ideology would have us believe. 
Rhetorical analysis of these texts confirms that the debate over women’s sexual 
physiology in the nineteenth century was multi-voiced and multi-faceted. 
This chapter analyzes how the nineteenth-century discourse of physiology 
provided a basis for feminist arguments for free love as a means to secure women’s 
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health. This chapter first reviews the foundation of nineteenth-century physiology in 
classical and Enlightenment philosophies of the body in order to explain nineteenth-
century discourses on physiology. It then shows how the discipline of physiology in 
medicine turned to the importance of hygiene based on these understandings of the body 
and its processes. Next, analyzing the arguments in popular medical textbooks and 
lectures, it examines how medical writers moved from explaining physiology into a 
discourse of women’s rights, which free love reformers then exploited. Finally, this 
chapter reads the claims of the free love movement on the importance of women’s 
sexuality to women’s health against the background of the nineteenth-century discourse 
on physiology. 
The Science of Nineteenth-Century Physiology 
What was known as physiology in the nineteenth century is often unrecognizable 
from the perspective of contemporary twentieth-century physiology since it often 
combined different studies of the body. However, the modern discipline of physiology, 
which views the body as a series of chemical processes, developed in the late nineteenth 
century as a result of the turn towards the mechanist view of the body and the new 
experimental methods focused on findings in a laboratory. The relevance of physiology 
to women’s rights, though, did not come out of a laboratory, but out of a rethinking of the 
body that began to occur in the eighteenth century. Philosophies of the body as a 
machine, of the centrality of the nervous system, and of the conservation of energy 
emerged in eighteenth-century science and played a large role in how sexuality was 
conceived during the nineteenth century. What was new about nineteenth-century 
physiology, though, was not the knowledge itself, but the new ways these conceptions of 
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the body were applied to ideas about hygiene and lifestyle choices. This section surveys 
these philosophies of the body and explains how they came to affect nineteenth-century 
ideas on sexuality in the separation of sexuality from reproduction and the construction of 
a gendered, female sexuality. 
Enlightenment Philosophies of the Body
One prominent debate during the Enlightenment that spilled over into nineteenth-
century physiology was the debate between mechanism, also known as materialism, and 
vitalism. Mechanists viewed the body as a machine, with each part working to aid the 
body’s processes. For vitalists, the body’s inner workings were affected by a “life” force 
(Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought 114). Proponents of both mechanism and 
vitalism focused on classifying the body’s organs and their functions (Bowler and Morus 
170). However, they differed in their conceptions of the “laws” that produced bodily 
processes. For vitalists, such as Albrecht von Haller writing in 1747 and Juliet Severance 
writing in 1876, disease was defined as an absence of “vital action” or “abnormal vital 
action” (Severance, A Lecture on the Philosophy of Disease 4). By the end of the 
nineteenth century, these beliefs would, of course, be refuted, with the discovery of 
outside agents of disease, like bacteria. Even before this discovery, however, vitalism was 
becoming less popular, as many physicians and scientists turned towards mechanist views 
and to physics and chemistry to explain the body’s processes (Bowler and Morus 181). 
However, as we will see through analysis of the texts discussed in this chapter, both 
mechanist and vitalist philosophies played a role in nineteenth-century medical and 
popular debates over the physiology of women’s sexuality. 
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Another important influence on nineteenth-century physiology came from 
competing conceptions of the relationship of mind and body. Under Enlightenment 
materialist views, there was little distinction between the psychological and the 
physiological: the body “became the seat of sensation and so the source of 
consciousness….touch was the prime sense” (Porter and Hall 20). This idea of 
“sensibility” would play a large role in discussions of sexuality. Others discussing the 
body sought to distinguish between the sensations of the body.  In 1747, Swiss biologist 
Albrecht von Haller published First Lines in Physiology, which promoted a new view of 
the distinction between the “parts of the body that are irritable (contract when touched) 
and those that are sensible (transmit sensations through the nerves to the brain)” (Bowler 
and Morus 174-175). Combined with Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichat’s views of the 
systems of tissues, wherein different tissues had specific “vital functions,” published in 
Anatomie Generale in 1801 (Bowler and Morus 175), sexuality became associated 
primarily with the nervous system. The nervous system, associated with sensibility, 
produced sexuality. That is, Enlightenment views of sexuality connected sexuality with 
an organism’s sensibility that was a product of its nervous system, ruled in turn by the 
mind. Therefore, eighteenth and nineteenth-century thinkers emphasized the mind’s 
power in producing sexual feelings in the body (Porter and Hall 108). This idea of the 
power of the mind over sexuality became integral to nineteenth-century arguments that 
refuted the “passionless” ideology, such as Elizabeth Blackwell’s. The idea of sexuality 
as a function of the nervous system led to anti-feminist ideas, such as the “diseased,” 
“nervous,” and “hysteric” notions of female sexuality in the nineteenth century. But, by 
situating sexuality within the nervous system, it was also associated with the system that 
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enabled the body to perform as an organized whole (Jordanova 171). Later free love ideas 
accentuated the role of sexuality to the individual, exploiting this association of sexuality 
with the nervous system coming out of the Enlightenment. 
Connected to both the mechanist/vitalist debate and the association of sexuality 
with the nervous system was the law of conservation of energy, which emerged in the late 
eighteenth century. It was then applied to sexuality during the nineteenth century: fears of 
men losing energy through ejaculation and fears of excessive sexual activity causing 
“nervous disorders” resulted from a combination of the law of conservation of energy, 
vitalist views, and the association of sexuality with the nervous system. These fears were 
famously extended to cover women’s menstrual cycles, notably by physician Edward 
Clarke. Under his logic, women’s menstruation was a loss of energy. Clarke used this 
notion as support for limiting the education of females in his bestselling 1873 book, Sex 
in Education: A Fair Chance for Girls. He argued that educating females in the same 
manner as males would harm their reproductive organs, since energy would be drawn 
from the activity of menstruation to intellectual activity in the brain. These ideas persisted 
throughout the late nineteenth century, but they were also contested.  
While these three philosophies of the body originated prior to the nineteenth 
century, their influence is clear in what became the field of physiology and the 
nineteenth-century discourse of sexuality. Although nineteenth-century physiology 
became a more experimental science towards the end of the century, Enlightenment 
philosophies of the body persisted in ideas on the relationship between the different 
functions of the body and on the sexual organs. The following section reviews how 
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women’s organs and women’s sexuality were conceived prior to the nineteenth century to 
show the basis of nineteenth-century discussions of physiology and hygiene. 
“One Sex” or “Two Sex”?
In addition to philosophies of the body, Enlightenment thinkers also contributed 
integral ideas on the anatomy and physiology of the female body to later ideologies. The 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the shift from what historian Thomas Laqueur 
(1992) has called the “one-sex model” to the “two sex model.” Based on classical ideas, 
the “one-sex model” posited one sex, with the female as a less perfect version of the 
male. In fact, female organs were seen as the exact inverse of the male anatomy, an idea 
going back to Aristotle and Galen that was particularly endorsed by Renaissance thinkers. 
This model is illustrated by Galen’s explanation of the female organs as the inverse of the 
male’s:  
Think first, please, of the man’s [external genitalia] turned in and 
extending inward between the rectum and the bladder. If this should 
happen, the scrotum would necessarily take the place of the uterus with 
the testes lying outside, next to it on either side….Think too, please, 
of…the uterus turned outward and projecting. Would not the testes 
[ovaries] then necessarily be inside it? Would it not contain them like a 
scrotum? Would not the neck [the cervix and vagina], hitherto concealed 
inside the perineum but now pendant, be made into the male member? (qtd 
in Laqueur 25-26; Laqueur’s notes explaining what organ Galen is 
referring to appear in brackets).  
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Laqueur points out that prior to the demise of the “one-sex model,” female organs shared 
names with males. The advent of the two-sex model gave names to female organs that 
had shared names with male organs, such as ovaries and testicles, and provided new 
names to organs that previously had none, such as the vagina. Consequently, the body 
became gendered, as even skeletons and nervous systems were distinguished as male or 
female (Laqueur 149-150). What had been one sex, with the female organs viewed as the 
inverse of the male’s, became distinguished as two different sexes, not by findings in 
science, Laqueur argues, but by cultural and political causes (152).  
The Renaissance had produced more knowledge of female anatomy, with 
Renaldus Columbus and Gabriel Fallopius (whose name was given to the fallopian tubes) 
arguing over who “discovered” the clitoris, but these findings had still been used to 
support the “one-sex model” (Laqueur 64-65). The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
saw the rise of knowledge about the womb, fallopian tubes, and testicles, brought on in 
part by investigation into venereal diseases (Porter and Hall 67). Embryological debates 
prompted by arguments between “ovists” and “spermists” (see Chapter 4), and Harvey’s 
theory of the egg as the origin of life also produced new knowledge of anatomy (Porter 
and Hall 67). As Laqueur notes, it took some time for these findings to cause the 
downfall of the “one-sex model.”26 
Enlightenment thinkers had differing views of female sexuality. Eighteenth-
century French writer Roussel, who disavowed the “one-sex model,” maintained, “The 
 
26 Laqueur believes the fall of the “one-sex model” to be primarily political rather than scientific, but I 
think we can see the emergence of the “two-sex model” as a production of both scientific and political 
circumstances, rather than mainly political, as Laqueur insists. The knowledge of the previous centuries’ 
investigations into anatomy was refreshed by the new political circumstances of the Enlightenment, which, 
combined, produced the “two-sex model.” The downfall of the “one-sex model” can be seen as a result of 
rhetorical situation. The politics of the time period provided the exigence for rethinking the previous 
centuries’ knowledge of anatomy and physiology and producing the “two-sex model,” much as I am 
arguing that the science of the nineteenth century refreshed the arguments for free love. 
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exterior parts of men carry a character of sensible utility; those of women seem to be 
nothing other than simple organs of pleasure” (qtd in Wellman 269). Rousseau differed, 
viewing female sex organs as designed specifically to attract men (Wellman 270). These 
thinkers illustrate the conflicting perceptions of female sexuality: were women slaves to 
pleasure because of the structure of their organs, as classical views had maintained, or 
were they merely passively attracting men? By the nineteenth century, scientific and 
medical thinkers continued to debate the nature of female sexuality (Connell and Hunt 
26), producing similarly contrasting ideas of women’s sexuality. 
One question vexing medical science was the nature of female pleasure and 
orgasm. Earlier thinkers maintained that female orgasm was required for conception, an 
idea that dates back to classical sources and persisted in sex manuals such as Aristotle’s 
Master-piece (1684) and Nicolas Venette’s Tableau de L’amour Conjugal (1686). It was 
towards the end of the Enlightenment that medical science converted to the view that 
female orgasm was not required for conception (Laqueur 3). In the 1820s, one physician 
noted females who conceived from rape as clear evidence that orgasm was not required, a 
finding that required revision of the laws concerning rape (Laqueur 162).27 Many in 
medical communities accepted that female orgasm was not required for conception by 
this time.  
However, because earlier theorists had defined female orgasm as, like men’s, a 
discharge, questions over whether women could even achieve orgasm became central in 
nineteenth-century discussions of sexuality.  The rise of the “passionless” ideology was 
of course tied to social and economic factors in the nineteenth century, as has been well-
 
27 Laqueur includes several examples of narratives that illustrate these changing ideas, as well as how rape 
laws often incorporated these views of orgasm and conception: it was not rape if the female conceived. See 
pages 1-4, and 161-162, for example. 
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documented. Many historians deny that nineteenth-century physicians believed that 
women could achieve orgasm or have sexual feelings. As we will see in the next section, 
however, this debate was more complex, with proponents on both sides of the question. 
Women in the medical and reform fields also weighed in--they even argued that while 
orgasm was not necessary to conception, it was necessary to women’s overall health, and, 
as we will see in later chapters, a requirement not for conceiving any offspring, but for 
conceiving “superior” offspring.  It would be the Enlightenment philosophies of the body 
surveyed here and the new divisions of the body that would serve as their support for 
these claims. 
Into the Nineteenth Century
By the nineteenth century, much was known about female anatomy, though this 
knowledge could not be detached from cultural ideologies about female sexuality. 
Nineteenth-century medical scientists did not have clear knowledge of the exact 
processes of ovulation and generation--these would come later from the findings of 
disciplines like embryology and endocrinology. But they did understand the structure of 
the organs of the reproductive system and how these organs were affected by disease. 
Nineteenth-century physiology, while moving towards experimental methods towards the 
end of the century, did not produce new discoveries pertaining to sexuality,28 but rather 
relied on older ideas. What was new about nineteenth-century sexual physiology was its 
application to lifestyle decisions and its presentation to the public through lectures and 
advice books.  
 
28 The study of physiology in the nineteenth century did produce much new knowledge on processes like 
respiration and other biochemical processes of the body. See Bowler and Morus (2005) and Coleman 
(1977). 
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A Public Knowledge: The Scientific and the Social in Medical Discourse on 
Women’s Bodies 
Discourses on physiology entered several different arenas in the nineteenth 
century as physiology became the primary discipline in medical schools, the subject of 
popular courses in women’s colleges, and a key area of popular interest. Many reformers 
were especially interested in this discipline because understanding the female body gave 
them backing for arguments for women’s rights. A wealth of resources responding to this 
interest arose, including lectures to popular audiences and to women’s societies, 
textbooks and marriage manuals, and pamphlets advocating what was then called “reform 
physiology.” These texts, written by physicians, both informed their audiences about the 
body and exhorted audiences to advocate women’s rights. These discourses influenced 
many reformers, particularly free love and social purity reformers, who believed that 
knowledge of sexual physiology would help to free women from constricting ideologies 
about women’s roles and also create specific reforms for the marriage system and sexual 
behavior.  
The nineteenth-century discourses on physiology confirm that scientific values 
impacted social ideologies just as much as social values impacted scientific ideologies. 
Physicians, aware of new audiences for their texts, accommodated physiological 
information for lay persons, often adding specific reform purposes in these texts, and thus 
creating hybrid texts. While the discipline of physiology itself did not revolutionize 
scientific understandings of the body, the rhetoric employed in this discipline led to new 
ways of applying this knowledge for specific reform purposes and helped to alter the 
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ways the public conceptualized sexuality. This section will first examine how the term 
“physiology” was used in the nineteenth century in order to provide a basis for the 
subsequent analysis of medical discourse about women’s bodies in advice books and 
lectures by physicians. 
“Physiology” and its Uses
The term “physiology” itself came to have multiple meanings throughout the 
nineteenth century, most of them associated with discussions of gender and sexuality. 
The term “physiology” had both scientific and cultural currency, and it often carried 
associations of reform ideology. Placed side by side with “anatomy,” particularly in 
medical texts, the term denoted the study of the body and how it works. But writers and 
lecturers also used “physiology” synonymously with “hygiene” and sometimes with the 
“natural.” It was even employed in some contexts as sexual knowledge itself. Finally, 
more spurious uses of the term are revealed within justifications for obscenity.  
In both popular use and in many women’s colleges, “physiology” was 
synonymous with “hygiene.” Toby Appel (1994) has documented how a “women’s 
subculture” in physiology arose in women’s colleges, such as Mount Holyoke, Vassar, 
Smith, Wellesley, and Goucher, in the 1860s, continuing into the early 1900s. The 
courses offered in these colleges gradually blended the meanings of physiology as 
“hygiene” with physiology as a biomedical science. Physiology entered women’s 
colleges as hygiene and health reform that encompassed both knowledge of the human 
body’s organs and functions and how these functions produced health (Appel 307). 
Significantly, the most popular topics in these physiology and hygiene classes were sex 
and reproduction (Appel 307), showing how the study of physiology and hygiene seemed 
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primarily concerned with sexual matters. The use of “physiology” as hygiene is also 
evident in many medical reformers’ texts, such as physician Russell Trall’s (1866)29 
admonition that there will be no need for abortions or “unnatural”30 birth control methods 
“when people will live physiologically” (213), connoting a specific way of living. The 
conflation of these two terms, “physiology” and “hygiene,” shows that many believed 
that the discipline of physiology went hand-in-hand with prescriptive rules for living, and 
there was little distinction between the study of the body and the study of “rules” for 
hygienic living (Appel 307). Thus, evoking “physiology” often meant offering advice on 
specific behaviors, as evidenced in the title of reformer Robert Dale Owen’s 1859 book 
Moral Physiology, which deals with both sexual behavior and birth control. 
Often, “physiology” seems to be used as a synonym for “natural” in nineteenth-
century texts, in order to reveal the social constructions that affect ideologies of sex and 
the body. For example, when Mary Gove (1846) railed against the fashion of tight lacing, 
she urged that fashions needed to change “in accordance with the physiological laws of 
our nature” (Lectures to Women 70), emphasizing the unnaturalness of these fashions. In 
addition, Dr. John M. Scudder’s On the Reproductive Organs, and the Venereal (1873) 
asserts that physiology is a “better guide than religion” on sexual matters (20). These uses 
of the term echo those of the social reformers who juxtaposed “natural” with “unnatural” 
effects on sexuality imposed by laws and the church. To live “physiologically” in this 
context was to acknowledge the body’s needs without interference from church 
guidelines that limited the body’s needs or from constricting popular practices, such as 
 
29 Russell Trall was a water-cure physician who also advocated women’s rights. See below for biography. 
30 He advocated what is now known as the rhythm method as a “natural” method of birth control, though 
his advice is wrong about the timing, since more knowledge of ovarian cycles was not available until the 
early twentieth century.  
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fashion. Emphasizing “physiology” as the guide to a natural way of living then supported 
specific lifestyle choices with science. 
Not all writers on physiology, however, necessarily had the same meaning when 
they advocated “physiological” behavior. Edward Clarke’s famous argument in 1873 that 
educating women in the same manner as men would cause debilitating effects on their 
reproductive system and overall health employs the term “physiology” in several ways, 
using it as a noun, adjective, and adverb. When he introduces the problem of sex in 
education, he advocates consulting “physiology” rather than ethics (12), evoking the 
meanings of “physiology” as the science of the body, and as a way of living. His uses of 
the term also suggest the “natural,” as when he protests against “un-physiological work” 
(103). “Physiology” is almost personified in his text, as when he insists that “physiology 
protests against” co-education (127) and in his conclusion when he writes, “Physiology 
condemns the identical and pleads for the appropriate education of the sexes” (181). 
Clarke’s uses of the term show that “physiology” could be employed to justify a specific 
way to live, which in his case meant conforming to specific gender roles. He evokes 
several meanings of “physiology”: that of “physiology” as a science when he explains 
how the body works, “physiology” as hygiene when he advocates “a strict physiological 
regimen during a girl’s student life” (133), and “physiology” as a natural way of living, 
which would prevent actions that are deemed “unfit” for women or actions that would 
harm the body. To Clarke, to live “physiologically” would also mean “natural behavior”--
conforming to what the body needs--which he defines much differently than Gove and 
Trall. Thus, the different factions in the debate over physiology employed the term in 
similar ways, but with different purposes. 
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The term “physiology” was also associated with a specific genre of writing 
popular at mid-century, that of “reform physiology.” Here the term seemed to mean 
knowledge of sexual matters itself (Lefkowitz Horowitz 86). Trall’s 1866 advice to live 
“physiologically” evokes this meaning, because he is advising his readers to acquaint 
themselves with knowledge of physiology for purposes of birth control and family 
planning. After describing several methods of birth control, he then defends his 
dissemination of this information:  
Let it be distinctly understood that I do not approve any method for 
preventing pregnancy except that of abstinence, nor any means for 
producing abortion, on the ground that is or can be in any sense [sic]
physiological. It is only the least of two evils. When people will live 
physiologically, as will be seen in the succeeding chapter, there will be no 
need of preventative measures, nor will there then be any need for works 
of this kind.31 (Trall 213) 
Trall’s first use of the term seems to connote the “natural” meaning; he is calling certain 
methods of birth control “unnatural.” In the second, adverbial use, he could be saying that 
sexual knowledge will lead to a reduction of these practices, a statement that would 
associate his work with “reform physiology.” The “reform physiology” genre offered 
specific lifestyle guidelines, such as advice on family planning and timing of sexual 
activity, as well as advice on diet and dress. Thus, using the term “physiology” pointed to 
specific reforms. When physician Mary Gove urges that teachers of young children 
should be “physiologists” (Lectures to Women 46), she is also evoking the meaning of 
“physiology” as sexual knowledge so that teachers can guide their students on the best 
 
31 Trall often qualifies his advice on birth control. 
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way to live. The conflation of “physiology” with sexual knowledge then made it possible 
for many writers to disseminate information about birth control in the guise of “reform 
physiology.” 
However, as the debate over dissemination of sexual knowledge became more 
heated, “physiology” often became linked with “obscenity.” Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz 
(2002) points out that some writers even marketed erotic literature by claiming that their 
work was “physiology,” not obscenity (272). Some medical writers were also marketing 
advice on birth control as scientific discussions of physiology, which drew the attention 
of lawmakers concerned about obscenity (Lefkowitz Horowitz 272). Texts by reform 
physiologists often critiqued the traditional marriage system and sometimes even 
endorsed free love; they consequently became threats to the status quo and challenged 
“obscenity” laws. Physician Frederick Hollick even went on trial in 1846 for obscenity 
because of his frank discussion of sexuality in his books and lectures. Since Hollick also 
advocated women’s right to express their sexuality, his trial illustrates how the 
conversation over sexuality escalated. The key focus of his trial was distinguishing illicit 
sexual speech from scientific medical information about the body (Haynes 557). In some 
cases, it seems to be the political rights they were advocating, such as rights to birth 
control, rather than the physiologic information they were conveying, that landed the 
“reform physiologists” in hot water. Since some of these “reform physiologists,” such as 
Thomas and Mary Gove Nichols, also advocated free love ideologies, “physiology” could 
then suggest a different meaning, one associated with radical ideals and persons. 
The changing meanings of “physiology” in different contexts illustrate the 
rhetorical intersections between science and social reform. While it may seem that the 
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popular context for physiology differs from the scientific one found in the medical 
schools, they are actually similar. The writers and lecturers evoking “physiology” as a 
way of living, or hygiene, were taking the knowledge of medical science and anatomy 
and applying it to social questions of women’s rights. While the knowledge of physiology 
they disseminated was not particularly new to the nineteenth century, the rhetorical uses 
of this knowledge spurred an alliance between the scientific and the social discourse 
communities that began in the discourses of physiology in popular lectures and advice 
books.  
Physiology in Medical Advice Books and Lectures
During the nineteenth century, physicians conveyed physiological information 
and reform ideologies through both lectures and advice books. The advice book was not a 
new genre, but it did undergo a new incarnation during the nineteenth century. Older 
advice books dating back to the seventeenth century, such as Aristotle’s Master-piece 
first published in 1684, and Nicolas Venette’s Tableau de L’amour Conjugal, first 
published in 1686 and later translated as Conjugal Love, or the Pleasures of the Marriage 
Bed in the 1780s, were still widely circulated in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
though they were edited to reflect the values of the time.32 Aristotle’s Master-piece, not
written by Aristotle of course, but by an anonymous compiler, was a sex manual, but it 
did not contain the kind of advice popular in nineteenth-century sexual advice books 
since it had no advice about “proper” sexual behavior, but treated sex as the means to 
generation (Porter and Hall 39 and 49). Venette’s text, like Aristotle’s Master-piece, was 
less concerned with the moral dimensions of sexuality than the structure and functions of 
 
32 Note, for example, how Venette’s text acquires the distinction of the “marriage bed” in its later 
translations. 
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the sexual organs (Porter and Hall 69), including new knowledge of reproductive organs, 
such as the fallopian tubes identified by Gabriele Falloppio in the 1500s. Venette, 
however, looked at the connection between sex and love, which foreshadows the kind of 
text produced by nineteenth-century physicians that both explained the reproductive 
organs and stressed the mental and emotional components of sex. Venette’s text also 
reflected the attitudes of his time period, such as a belief in the similarity in the sexual 
appetites of males and females (Porter and Hall 76), and it even advised women on how 
to fake virginity (80-81). These two texts were still circulated in the nineteenth century, 
and for the first few decades of the century, Aristotle’s Master-piece was widely held as 
the authoritative text on sexual matters (Porter and Hall 126). These two texts also 
preview the genre produced by physicians, but the nineteenth-century versions added a 
new component: advice on sexual behavior, hygiene, and lifestyle choices, as well as 
birth control in some texts. 
Nineteenth-century medical discourse directed at public audiences often 
combined genres. Reform arguments seem to be a part of all of these texts, and the 
distinction between scientific and social ideologies often seems less clear, though it 
becomes more distinct in the more specialized sciences explored in future chapters. 
Nineteenth-century medical textbooks and advice books, such as those by physicians 
Russell Trall (1866), John M. Scudder (1873), and John Cowan (1889), often included 
sections on women’s rights in their discussions of female physiology. While most of 
these physiology texts are primarily centered in the fact and definition stases,33 claiming 
their “sole purpose is to instruct the masses of the people on those subjects which have 
 
33 Stasis theory comes from classical rhetorical theory, enabling a rhetor to analyze what is at issue in a 
given situation. The stases of fact and definition ask what the problem is and how it should be 
characterized, while the stasis of action asks what should be done. 
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hitherto been to them as a sealed book” (Trall iv), the action stasis also plays a prominent 
role in the purpose of these texts; physicians writing on physiology for lay audiences 
expected not only to change perceptions of sexuality, but also to change sexual behaviors.  
The sexual physiology texts also participated in the growing debate over the 
existence and nature of women’s sexuality. While many in the dominant medical culture 
denied the sexuality of women--such as physician William Acton, whose statement that 
women do not have sexual feelings is often reprinted in contemporary criticism--the 
debate was complicated by many in the more reformist medical sects, such as those 
advocating water cure34 and eclecticism.35 These homeopathic movements36 worked to 
distinguish themselves from the “allopaths,”37 who promoted harsher drugs and surgeries; 
the homeopaths offered more natural remedies and advice on prevention. These 
homeopathic physicians also tended to “naturalize” women’s bodies and functions in 
contrast to the images of women as “diseased” and “defective.” Changing attitudes 
towards sexuality also differentiate these texts from the pre-Enlightenment sex manuals.  
The following section analyzes the strategies used in nineteenth-century popular 
health lectures and advice books by physicians who can be identified as reform 
physiologists. It first interrogates the exigencies and constraints upon these texts in order 
to provide an analysis of the basis of their rhetoric, which affects the rhetoric of reform 
 
34 Water cure was named for this particular sect’s emphasis on drinking water and bathing as a means to 
maintain health. Trall, Gove Nichols, and Severance were all water cure physicians. The water cure 
philosophy defined women's bodies as healthy, in contrast to some of the definitions of women's bodies as 
diseased and hysteric. See Weiss and Kemble (1967), and Cayleff (1987) for more on this medical 
movement. 
35 Eclecticism combined the philosophies of allopathic and homeopathic medicines, though they seem to be 
associated more with homeopathic theories because of the use of small portions of drugs to relieve illness. 
See Nichols, “The Eclectic Medical System” (1895), and Haller, A Profile in Alternative Medicine: The 
Eclectic Medical College of Cincinnati, 1845-1942 (1999).  
36 Homeopathic movements such as water cure and eclecticism had their own medical schools. 
37 The term used by homeopathic physicians to describe the dominant medical culture, or the non-
homeopathic medical sects, though the “allopathic” physicians did not seem to use this name for 
themselves. 
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examined later in this chapter. It then looks at the texts of four physicians: Mary Gove 
Nichols, Russell Trall, Elizabeth Blackwell, and Clelia Mosher. Examining how each text 
conceives the body in its discussions of physiology, how each text defines women’s 
health, and how each text positions women’s sexuality shows the progression of 
nineteenth-century medical rhetorics of sexuality and reform. 
The Rhetorical Situation of Nineteenth-Century Popular Health Texts 
Popular medical texts in the nineteenth-century faced the constraints of a growing 
divisiveness in the medical profession caused by the increasing professionalization of the 
discipline as well as pressures exerted by the government on the dissemination of sexual 
knowledge.  As medicine became more professionalized, requiring licenses by the end of 
the century, many physicians in the homeopathic sects and many female physicians were 
viewed with wariness by the new dominant medical profession. In particular, the 
“allopaths” criticized the increasing popularity of medical texts available to the public 
that not only provided information on physiology, but also empowered patients by giving 
them medical knowledge and encouraging them to treat themselves. In his address to the 
Annual Meeting of the Association of Medical Editors, on May 1, 1871, Dr. Horatio 
Storer, a pioneer in the field of gynecology, reacted against the increasing trends towards 
popularization, noting that “We would not advise every man to be his own physician” 
(357), as many water cure practitioners did, and that “the present extreme tendency to 
popularize, upon the part of our more prominent professional writers, may bring dignity 
and permanence of standing into jeopardy” (356). Storer’s backlash shows that 
popularized medical theories were gaining cultural prominence, and were seen as a threat. 
Water cure physicians reacted to such criticism with a rhetoric of public rights, such as 
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Dr. Juliet Severance’s argument in “The Medical Monopoly” (1901), where she 
advocates the right of the public to choose their own physicians and methods of healing, 
in the face of new laws restricting certain medical practices (Marriage 36).  Governments 
also put pressure on medical popularizers, as in the 1846 trial of physician Frederick 
Hollick and in the laws instituted by Anthony Comstock in 1873 that prohibited 
“obscene” materials from being sent through the mail. Physicians then defended their 
right to disseminate such knowledge in their texts. 
For example, John Scudder’s38 preface to his medical textbook On the 
Reproductive Organs, and the Venereal (1873) defends making information available to 
the public. A proponent of the eclectic school of medicine that combined the methods of 
allopathic and homeopathic medicine (or the use of surgery and drugs with the use of 
natural remedies) Scudder believed, like the homeopaths, in the power of physicians as 
teachers of the public and disseminators of physiological information. He advised his 
audience of medical students to promote these aims. He addresses the constraints against 
his purpose in the first few lines of this work:  
The author begs leave to introduce this work to the reader as a plain 
statement of facts which deserve careful consideration. It may shock the 
modesty of some, but it is to be hoped that the majority may see the 
necessity and the great good which may grow out of this study. Physicians 
have manifested a degree of mock modesty with reference to diseases of 
the reproductive function, which has prevented their investigation, and 
turned the many sufferers over to the hands of advertising quacks and 
 
38 A physician promoting and practicing eclecticism, whose medical textbook, On the Reproductive 
Organs, and the Venereal, is quoted by Victoria Woodhull. See Chapter 3 for biography. 
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charlatans. There may be some excuse for this in the “innate” modesty of 
man, but the time has now come when an intelligent knowledge is 
demanded. (v; emphasis in original) 
The call for the reader to shrug off his or her modesty seems to be a trope in many of 
these texts, one that seems more based in the writers’ interpretation of the reader than the 
actual readers; texts on “reform physiology” were often bestsellers. Scudder also asserts a 
kind of Bitzerian “imperfection” exigence by claiming that many physicians are not 
equipped to deal with problems of the sexual function and, thus, he stresses the timeliness 
of his work, especially in the face of increasing numbers of persons suffering from 
sexually-transmitted diseases. This appeal evokes a kind of “public good” exigence. In 
addition, recognizing some of the controversy over publishing works about sex in his 
insistence that his book is a “plain statement of facts,” he constructs his audience as the 
intelligent factions of the medical community who would not call his book “obscene” 
because of false modesty, a charge leveled at many books, especially in the 1870s under 
the watchful eye of Anthony Comstock39 and his obscenity laws. Scudder would be 
aware of physicians who put forth the kind of information contained in his text and went 
on trial for obscenity, such as Frederick Hollick, who asserted more liberating views of 
sexuality in his popular marriage guides and lectures.40 Scudder, whose vivid descriptions 
and pictures of the sexual organs may have raised the ire of the obscenity watchdogs, and 
whom one historian notes as the “author of two of the most sexually explicit books ever 
 
39 Comstock was a United States Postal Inspector who had the power to arrest those who broke the 1873 
obscenity law he instituted.  
40 In her study of the Hollick trial, April Haynes  (2003) points out, “Hollick argued that frequent sexual 
pleasure constituted a physiological necessity for all post pubescent human beings, regardless of gender or 
marital status, a stance that he insisted was medical but that his enemies deemed obscene” (543; emphasis 
in original). 
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to go to press in the nineteenth century” (Leach 62), constructs his audience as intelligent 
in contrast to those like Anthony Comstock who would call such work obscene. 
Comstock, however, seemed to most frequently attack works that were too specific in 
their descriptions of birth control methods, so it may not be the sexual material itself that 
led him to label a book “obscene.” 
Thus, these advice books and lectures held constraints even for men who authored 
them. With women physicians as authors, these constraints increased.41 However, the 
genre of the physiology lecture or advice book provided an opportunity these physicians 
could not pass up--the opportunity to recruit the public in their campaign for health. 
Many of these texts also promoted differing views of women’s sexuality to combat 
dominant ideologies, using physiology and Enlightenment conceptions of the body as 
support.  
Mary Gove (Nichols) 
Mary Gove, later Mary Gove Nichols, practiced medicine and lectured on health 
throughout the mid-nineteenth century. After frequent bouts of illness during her first 
marriage, she discovered the “water cure” 42 philosophy advocated by Sylvester Graham, 
and after recovering her health, she became one of its most ardent proponents. Trained as 
a water cure physician, she promoted natural healing and prevention (see Chapter 1 for 
biography). Thus, in her lectures to audiences of women, where she often used her own 
life as an example, many of her explanations of how to maintain health included 
arguments for specific lifestyle decisions, such as how to dress and eat. She promoted a 
 
41 Carolyn Skinner’s work has analyzed the ethos of female physicians writing in this genre, who used 
methods similar to Scudder’s in order to make their work acceptable. 
42 For more on “water cure” and its connections with women’s rights, see Cayleff (1987). 
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women’s rights agenda and urged women to take control of their own health and well-
being. Her Lectures to Women on Anatomy and Physiology, published in 1846 and based 
on lectures she delivered to women’s physiological societies in the 1830s and 1840s, 
argued for causes such as dress reform, healthy diet, education for girls, (particularly 
physical education) and the importance of exercise. Her advice on how to live a healthy 
lifestyle was intertwined with a women’s rights agenda.  
Each lecture is divided by parts of the body: she lectures on the formation of the 
bones, on muscles, and on the nervous system, where she places her discussion of 
sexuality. Her first lecture begins with the importance of the study of anatomy and 
physiology, which she later elaborates to show how mothers in particular need to be 
abreast of this science. She begins her first lecture with, “Whoever shall convince 
mankind of the necessity and importance of the study of Anatomy and Physiology, and 
those laws which govern life and health, will do more toward promoting the general good 
and happiness of our species than he would if he gave us priceless gems and gold without 
measure” (13). The exigence she constructs in the lectures concerns the lack of 
knowledge that many women have about their bodies. Gove begins her first lecture by 
explaining that children are falling ill due to their mothers’ lack of understanding of 
physiology and hygiene, and that their poor diet and ill health can be passed on to their 
children through breastfeeding. Gove then presents herself as one who can give them the 
knowledge they lack in order to improve both their children’s health and their own 
health. She says, “The end at which physiologists aim is prevention. We should live in 
such a manner as not to need medicine of any kind” (22), reflecting her homeopathic 
ideals.  
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Within each section of the lectures, Gove explains parts of the body and how they 
work, but each section also has a reform purpose buried within it. Thus, her arguments 
may seem less explicit than later physiology texts that argue for women’s rights. For 
example, in the section on bones, she tells stories of quacks who can injure broken bones 
even more. However, she notes that women who are educated on the bones of the arm, 
for example, would be able to tell when a person was setting them wrong. She then 
moves from an argument that women should know how the bones work to an argument 
for women’s rights: “Let woman use her energies, let her attain that moral and 
intellectual elevation which is her right. Let her attain that height where men cannot look 
down upon her, if they would…Let her nobly resolve that she will have science, that she 
will be no longer a plaything…When woman thus arises in the greatness of her 
intellectual strength, then there will be a new era in the history of our world.” (49-50). In 
this manner, Gove’s arguments for women’s rights are often thrown into sections dealing 
with medical explanations of the body. She thus accommodates the genre of the 
physiology lecture or advice book to her women’s rights agenda. 
Gove often downplays her ethos as an expert and invites audience participation in 
her argument, which conforms to her agenda to have women take responsibility for their 
own health. Several times, she strategically underplays her role in order to let the 
evidence speak for itself, suggesting, “I need not attempt to demonstrate to you the truth 
of this assertion; your own good sense will lead you to assent to its truth at once” (15).  
When she provides drawings of the natural female chest to compare with a compressed 
one to support an argument for dress reform, she says that she will allow the drawings to 
speak for themselves (88). These gaps in the argument that she leaves the audience to fill 
86
show that she empowers her audience, and thus strengthens her ethos in positioning 
herself as a collaborator with her audience. 
In her lectures, Gove counters the idea that women are naturally weak, showing 
that women’s physiology does not have to restrict them if they make the right choices. 
Instead of attributing diseases and weakness to differences in physiology, she attributes 
female illnesses to habits and atmosphere, arguing that women should have fresh air, 
exercise, and stimulation. This connection between environment and physiology was 
particularly emphasized during the Enlightenment, when the environment’s impact on the 
body was intensely studied (Jordanova 162). Gove, like other nineteenth-century 
physicians, saw poor habits and environment as factors in ill health. She writes, “Females 
are more particularly victims [of disease] than males, as the customs of society deny them 
out-door exercise and make them, in many instances, mere dolls and pretty things” (26).  
Here, Gove is countering notions of women as naturally weaker, attributing illness to 
“customs of society” rather than to nature. Thus, for Gove ill health is something women 
do have control over. Her rhetoric stresses the role of the audience in making the right 
choices.   
Using the same logic employed by physicians writing more anti-feminist 
arguments about physiology, Gove attempts to define the “natural” condition as a 
“healthy” one to make women view their bodies’ functions as natural rather that “sick” or 
“weak.” She asserts:  
The science of health is based upon a sound physiology--a study of nature 
and the laws of life…but the conditions of health and the causes of disease 
are simple and easily understood: health is a natural condition; disease 
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unnatural. Health is simple; disease complex and difficult. Health is the 
result of the regular and orderly performance of the functions of life, and 
gives vigor and enjoyment; disease is disorder, exhaustion, and the effort 
of nature to overcome evil (A Woman’s Work in Water Cure 14). 
Gove Nichols’s argument here relies on scientific warrants and refutes arguments that 
women are inherently “diseased.” Her use of figures here reverses the idea that women’s 
bodies are naturally unhealthy. Defining health as the natural state and juxtaposing it with 
disease as the unnatural state, she counters arguments that women’s weaknesses and 
sicknesses are natural conditions because of their physiology. Her rhetoric here also 
recalls and refutes arguments that women should be restricted from certain activities 
because of their physiology. She defines the state of health as incorporating “vigor,” so 
women who believe that they should be naturally weak and exhausted have an alternative 
definition. Disease here is positioned as an outside force rather than an innate state, 
joining together a more “vitalist” philosophy with the increasing focus on environment in 
medical texts. In contrasting the terms “disease” and “health,” Gove reverses the 
dichotomy attempted by some physicians.  
Gove also attempts to reverse misconceptions about women’s sexuality in 
Lectures to Women on Anatomy and Physiology. Her discussions of sexuality within 
explanations of the nervous system reflect the time: she is concerned about masturbation 
leading to ill health and other nervous conditions.43 Her later texts, though, are more 
explicit in their discussions of sexuality. In her novels, articles in medical journals, and 
treatises on marriage, Gove enumerates the harms inflicted on women within the 
 
43 Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz (2000) has examined the “anti-masturbation” genre of texts more closely. 
Gove often published texts in this genre aimed at both men and women. It is not until the time of Dora 
Forster, discussed below, that some of the stigma is removed from masturbation. 
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marriage system, a result of having to submit to husbands’ demands and being unable to 
control the conceiving of children.  She also notes the effects of ill health on sexuality, 
stating that a “healthy woman” will have strong sexual passion (Marriage 202). Her 
discussions of sexuality, and later discussions of free love, are less radical than some of 
the reformers examined later in this chapter, but Gove Nichols’ ideas were very radical 
for her time and status as a physician. In fact, later arguments by radicals like Victoria 
Woodhull clearly owe much to Gove’s rhetorical strategies in rethinking the health and 
sexuality of women.    
Russell Trall 
Russell Trall (1812-1877) was also a water cure physician, and is often identified 
as an adversary of Gove Nichols,44 probably because they operated competing water cure 
medical schools. Born in Vernon, Connecticut, Trall earned his medical degree at Albany 
Medical College and practiced medicine in New York City (Garraty and Carnes 21.800). 
He promoted temperance, vegetarianism, dress reform, and education of women as 
physicians, similar to Gove and to Sylvester Graham. Trall opened the second water cure 
establishment in the United States in 1844, and he also founded several water cure 
medical schools that gave degrees to women (21.801). Trall’s water cure philosophy 
emphasized the naturalness of women’s bodies, and he became a mentor of free love 
reformer Juliet Severance in her water cure medical practice (Passet 126), though not in 
her free love ideologies—Trall condemned free love and used Mary Gove Nichols’ 
advocacy of it against her. However, Trall’s ideas on women’s physiology are similar to 
Gove Nichols’.  
 
44 See Passet (2003) and Silver-Isenstadt (2002). 
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In his bestselling advice book, Sexual Physiology: A Scientific and Popular 
Exposition of the Fundamental Problems in Sociology, first published in 1866, Trall 
endorses a view of women’s physiology as natural rather than “diseased” or “hysteric.” 
Trall positions himself as a mediator between the scientific medical community and the 
public, seeing his work as filling a gap in the public’s knowledge of sexual physiology. 
He claims that his book is, to his knowledge, the “first attempt to popularize, in a 
scientific work, the subject of Sexual Physiology” (iv). His early chapters explain 
anatomy and physiology, with drawings of the sex organs, while his later chapters offer 
more practical advice on sexual behavior and birth control, also critiquing sexual 
behavior as it is practiced within institutional marriage, as well as within Mormonism, 
Shakerism, and free love. Furthermore, a rhetoric of women’s rights and of female 
empowerment can be found in his text. 
As many historians have noted, the nineteenth century saw a rise in diagnoses of 
“hysteria,” which was often associated with sexuality.45 Some physicians saw women as 
naturally weak and prone to diseases, and defined them by their physiology, particularly 
their reproductive organs. Trall rejects such a definition, repeatedly emphasizing the 
naturalness of women’s health, such as when he clarifies that pregnancy is not a 
“pathological condition” (133). He also espouses more liberating views in his discussion 
of women’s orgasm. He recognizes that orgasm is not necessary for conception since 
women can conceive from rape (69), but adds that orgasm, while not necessary, is a 
benefit to women’s health. If women cannot achieve orgasm or do not have sexual 
 
45 In Rachel Maines’s (1999) study of the use of electricity and the vibrator to treat “hysteria,” she asserts, 
“When marital sex was unsatisfying and masturbation discouraged or forbidden, female sexuality, I 
suggest, asserted itself through one of the few acceptable outlets: the symptoms of hysteroneurasthenic 
disorders” (5). Her conclusions link the rise in diagnoses of “hysteria” with prescriptive ideologies of 
women’s sexuality.  
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desires, there must be something wrong with them. His views are in contrast to those who 
positioned sexual desires and orgasms in women as abnormal. He specifies, “The normal 
condition and exercise of the sexual organs, so far from diminishing sexual pleasure or 
gratification, would actually augment it” (Trall xiii; emphasis mine). He also says, “It is 
true that sexual orgasm on the part of the female is just as normal as on the part of the 
male” (69; emphasis mine). In both quotations, the normality of women’s sexual feelings 
and orgasm is stressed, in contrast to views of the “passionless” woman. Trall also notes 
that women can achieve multiple orgasms. For example, when critiquing Mormonism 
and polygamy in later chapters, he notes that women are “constitutionally better adapted” 
for polygamy than men because of repetition of orgasm (239-240). Thus, Trall’s premise 
is the naturalization of women’s bodies, which extends to their sexual organs and sexual 
feelings.  
Trall’s manual also illustrates how these physiology textbooks advocated specific 
reforms as they informed the public about sexual functions. Trall’s insistence that the 
female should have “supreme control of her own person” aligns him with the arguments 
of the free love movement (xi), which used the same phrasing to show that women hold 
the power of deciding when and how sexual acts should occur. He also provides advice 
on birth control, though he specifies that he is against “unnatural” or “unphysiological” 
methods of birth control. However, his women’s rights agenda once again is apparent, 
since he, like free love advocates Victoria Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin, views birth 
control as an unfortunate necessity for a woman who does not have “supreme control of 
her own person.” 
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Trall’s text is limited by the physiological knowledge of the time. He does not 
know the exact timing of the menstrual cycle, resulting in misleading advice on birth 
control, and he does not know about hormones--this knowledge would not come until the 
twentieth century. It is also not clear how sex and reproduction are differentiated by him, 
other than his comment that sex is not only for procreation but also a “love act” (206). 
The advice on sexual behavior he gives also reflects his era: sex should be a temperate 
indulgence, since like other behaviors, overindulgence can lead to poor health. In his 
social views, he acknowledges that women suffer under institutional marriage, but he 
does not think radical philosophies like free love will ease their suffering. His text 
responds, then, to several situations: the public’s need to know more about the sexual 
organs and their functions, the mistaken view of women’s bodies as “diseased” and 
“hysteric,” the prevalence of “nervous disorders,” and the public awareness of more 
radical philosophies, like free love. While he does not endorse their views on the 
solution, Trall does acknowledge that the free love advocates are right in their 
identification of a problem within institutional marriage--the inequality of women. To 
Trall, true equality for women will enable them to live more “physiologically.” 
Interestingly enough, Trall’s Sexual Physiology is one of the books often 
mentioned in Ronald Walters’ Primers for Prudery: Sexual Advice to Victorian America 
(1974; 2000). Walters picks out the quotations from Trall that would seem to support the 
traditional view of “Victorian repression.” However, while Trall does advocate 
“temperate sexual indulgence” (232), not much else in his book supports such a reading. 
For example, while advocating “temperate sexual indulgence,” Trall also says that 
abstinence is not always the best option for birth control since sex is also a “love act” 
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(206). Furthermore, his advice that women should achieve orgasm as a natural result of 
the sex act also counters the “prudish” reading. That the same book can be read in two 
very different ways (mine and Walters) shows the complexity in “Victorian” ideas about 
sexuality, as well as how we can find what we are looking for in many of these texts, 
whether we want to support a reading of “Victorian prudery” or a reading that 
emphasizes the more liberating views of women’s sexuality. Elizabeth Blackwell’s 
discussions of female sexuality have also produced contradictory readings. 
Elizabeth Blackwell 
Elizabeth Blackwell has always interested modern critics as the first woman to 
achieve prominence as a physician (see Chapter 1),46 but her rhetoric of sexuality has also 
produced contradictory readings. As a member of the social purity movement, she is 
often read as anti-sexuality.47 In “Sexual Ideology and Sexual Physiology in the 
Discourses of Sex Advice Literature,” Connell and Hunt (2006) group Blackwell’s ideas 
on female sexuality together with physician William Acton’s, who believed that women 
had no sexual feelings (Connell and Hunt 27). However, not all critics have taken this 
view of Blackwell’s feelings on women’s sexuality. Margaret Jackson’s 1994 study, The 
Real Facts of Life: Feminism and the Politics of Sexuality c 1850-1940, confirms my own 
reading of Blackwell’s rhetoric: Jackson credits Blackwell with creating a feminist model 
of sexuality (61). Blackwell’s discourse of female sexuality is most apparent in her 1894 
book The Human Element in Sex:  Being a Medical Inquiry into the Relation of Sexual 
Physiology to Christian Morality by Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell.
46 I would not, however, call her the first woman physician--many women were practicing water cure 
before she entered medical school. 
47 See Engs (2000) and Connell and Hunt (2006), for example. 
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Countering ideas that the sexual woman is unnatural, or in some cases even 
pathological, Blackwell argues for the presence of female sexuality, using an 
evolutionary perspective to define what constitutes “natural” female sexuality. Written 
from “the standpoint of the Christian physiologist” (3), her essay argues that women are 
sexual beings. The reason that they do not outwardly appear as sexual as men, she argues, 
is a result of their more evolved morality concerning sexuality, a key feature of the 
arguments of social purity reformers who argued for the moralizing power of women’s 
sexuality. Like Gove Nichols and Trall, Blackwell attempted to invert the popular 
associations of what was natural and unnatural in terms of women’s sexuality (Jackson 
64).  
Far from deeming women non-sexual beings, she refutes the idea that women 
have less sexual feeling than men by connecting the body with the mind. First 
establishing the evolutionary chain, she distinguishes the sexuality of humans from 
animals because of humans’ more highly-evolved mental powers. Blackwell also 
incorporates the new physiological focus on the relationship between the mental and 
physical aspects of sex, a result of the Enlightenment association of sexuality with the 
nervous system. She asserts that women’s mentalities about sex are affected by the 
sentimental along with the physiological and that ideas of romance often develop stronger 
sexual instincts in the human female (49). She claims, however, that it is difficult to 
ascertain the similarity or difference in the physical responses of women and men: “Any 
attempt at a comparison of absolute sexual power between men and women will be found 
to be equally futile. The varying manifestations of the sexual faculties, as exhibited in 
their male and female phases, make the relative measurement of this vital force in men 
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and women quite impossible” (48). Consequently, she includes an analysis of the impact 
of the mental on the physical as her proof for the existence of sexuality in the human 
female.  
Blackwell establishes that “the eagerness for romance” develops earlier and 
remains longer in the female than in the male (49).  Furthermore, she points out that 
because of social factors, “Physical sex is a larger factor in the life of the woman, 
unmarried or married, than in the man” (49-50). The underlying logic here supposes that 
since men have more options open to them in terms of what occupies their daily lives, 
women think about sex more and their experiences of sex shape their experiences of life 
more fully. Her argument relies on both the theory of evolution and on the theory that 
connected feelings of sexuality to the mind. Though her purpose in defining sexuality as 
part of the evolutionary chain differs from the free lovers’ intentions, in positioning 
women’s sexuality as a moral force, she does not discount the presence of that sexuality 
entirely. She further highlights the causes of women who do not feel the same force of 
sexual instincts as men.   
 Blackwell and others enumerate possible causes for why women may feel 
diminished sexual desire or pleasure, and, in doing so, reiterate that sexual feeling in 
women is not unnatural. Excessive childbearing and demanding husbands were two such 
causes asserted by Blackwell, Trall, and Gove Nichols, a refutation argument picked up 
by the free love reformers to validate their critiques of sexual relations within marriage. 
Blackwell also points out the role of the mental condition in the experience of sexual 
pleasure: “Pleasure in sexual congress is an incident depending largely on mental 
constitution” (The Human Element 18). Thus, if women do not feel sexual pleasure, it 
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must be because the environment of the marriage system has made them mentally unable 
to achieve sexual pleasure. Finally, Blackwell highlights venereal disease as a factor 
potentially reducing the sexual desires of women (Blackwell, Essays 90-91). 
Blackwell’s refutation of the idea of the “passionless” woman does not rely on 
knowledge of anatomy because she does not need to--the functions of the sexual organs 
are understood by her audience. It does, however, rely on other ideas incorporated under 
the rubric of physiology: the relationship of mind and body, the positioning of sexuality 
within the nervous system, and the role of the mind in feelings of sexual desire and 
pleasure. Her refutation comes in three parts: first, that women are as sexual as men, but 
just more evolved to control their sexual feelings; second, that women can actually be 
perceived as more sexual than men since social conditions have forced them to place 
more weight on romantic feelings; and third, that if women do not have sexual feelings, it 
is a result of excessive childbearing, the oppression of the double-standard, and venereal 
diseases. Blackwell’s text differs from Gove’s and Trall’s since the idea that disease 
comes from bad habits and “nervous conditions” is not present--Blackwell writes after 
the discovery of the role of bacteria in disease. Consequently, she pays less attention to 
the argument that humans should observe “temperance” in sexual indulgence because of 
diseased nerves; instead, she argues, temperance is a natural condition as a result of the 
higher evolution of humanity. Her text then combines ideas on sexual physiology with 
evolution and other concerns of her later era. 
Clelia Mosher 
Another reformer, writing eighty years after Gove, was physician Clelia Mosher. 
Her texts, while later than previous texts, are important in understanding the changing 
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discourse of physiology and the changing methods of medicine towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Mosher’s texts are also focused on refuting constricting ideologies on 
women, but her texts differ from the earlier ones in incorporating a new scientific focus 
on laboratory results as evidence. In comparing her texts to those of Gove and Blackwell, 
we can see how Mosher was a product of the more scientific medical training of the late 
nineteenth century. Mosher received medical degrees from Stanford and Johns Hopkins 
University. Physicians trained at Johns Hopkins during this time period were particularly 
committed to doing research that would aid in social reforms (Taylor 1).  Mosher 
conducted several studies on respiration, as well as a never-published study on the sexual 
attitudes and behaviors of forty-five women, conducted during the late nineteenth 
century, a study that used the type of questionnaires that Kinsey would later become 
famous for (see Chapter 1). While she never published her findings, she did use them as a 
basis for her theories of women’s health.  Her texts combine the “physiology as hygiene” 
discipline that Toby Appel (1999) has identified with a new physiology as a biomedical 
science discipline. Her discourse on women’s bodies and abilities also runs counter to the 
kind of ideas offered by physicians like Edward Clarke, who sought to restrict women 
due to their physiology. Within her medical arguments and hygienic arguments on the 
importance of diet, exercise, and dress reform, her texts had a more explicit women’s 
rights agenda, as well as richer scientific evidence.  
 Mosher’s 1923 text, Woman’s Physical Freedom, shares similarities with Gove’s 
earlier 1840s text with its emphasis on prevention and health, but Mosher’s arguments go 
even further into the realm of women’s rights than Gove’s, even advocating equal pay. 
Reflecting the concerns of her later era, Mosher begins her advice book by noting the 
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contributions to the work force that women made during World War I and how 
physiologic knowledge has freed women by stressing the importance of diet and exercise. 
Her chief purpose, though, is to show that women are physically capable of equality in 
the workforce. Countering the idea that women’s physiology justifies their inequality 
with men, she points out that what is holding women back from achieving true equality is 
the monthly pain they endure from menstruation:  
The time has passed when a woman may rest on her traditional periodic 
incapacity and be an invalid one week out of four. The present stirring 
times demand women at maximum capacity for work every day in the 
month--fit for any work at any time; and as increased knowledge 
demonstrates that her periodic incapacity may be laid aside, the world 
recognizes that the woman may be racially fit and at the same time 
economically efficient. (2)  
Mosher details how many women complain of painful menstruation and explains that 
what they need is more knowledge about how to prevent these painful periods. She 
argues that menstruation and menopause, long employed as justifications to keep women 
from actively engaging in the workforce and other areas, are not naturally painful, and 
that lifestyle choices cause these natural bodily functions to become painful. Like many 
“reform physiologists” of the nineteenth century, she establishes that knowledge of 
physiology will help to free women, but her arguments rely on the evidence she has 
collected through her studies. 
 Instead of burying her reform purpose within sections that explain the parts of the 
body, as earlier texts had done, Mosher includes chapters on the “Changing Status of 
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Women” before presenting the scientific crux of her argument, the sections on 
menstruation. The deferential tone of earlier physiology texts by women is also gone. 
Unlike Gove, who had the medical expertise but modestly presented her role as bringing 
“the opinions of the best recent physiologists before my sisters” (Lectures to Women164), 
Mosher accommodates her audience by relying on her own authority as a physician and 
the research she has conducted: 
What I am about to say in regard to the function of menstruation is based 
on the study of more than 2,000 women during 12,000 menstrual periods. 
The observations and work in physiologic and hygiene laboratories have 
extended over a period of 30 years. May I ask you, therefore, to discard all 
your preconceived ideas, your sex traditions, and your individual 
experience, and consider judicially the statements I am about to present? 
(19) 
Mosher’s emphasis on numbers here reflects the status of medical research at the time 
and the increasing professionalization of medicine in the late nineteenth century. Thus, 
her arguments that blame women’s lifestyle choices rather than innate weaknesses for 
health problems would be especially effective for her early twentieth-century audience, 
since she both asserts her ethos as a medical researcher and explains her research 
methods. She needs to counter notions that women’s physiology justifies their inequality. 
Consequently, she needs to produce figures to show that women can lead productive lives 
and take control of their bodies’ functions. 
 Like Gove, Trall, and Blackwell, Mosher refutes the ideas of inherent feminine 
weakness, saying “Is it not possible that at least some of women’s physical 
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disqualifications as well, have been owing to surrounding conditions rather than inherent 
in her sex?” (16). Like Gove eighty years earlier, she attributes illness to “constrictive 
dress and inactivity” (29). Using a chart to demonstrate her ideas, she compares fashion 
trends to instances of women’s illness: “An extraordinarily close correlation was found 
between the fashion of dress and the menstrual disability of women. As the skirt grew 
shorter and narrower and the waist grew larger, the functional health of women 
improved….We should rejoice in the freedom of the modern girl with her large normal 
waist” (30-31). Mosher, like Gove and Trall, urges women to take responsibility for their 
own health and well-being, since her research shows that “many of the disabilities of 
menstruation and the change of life are due to removable and preventable causes, viz., 
bad hygiene” (50). Mosher argues that women cannot achieve equal pay with men until 
they are shown capable of equal work. Consequently, she says, “Equal pay for women 
means equal work; unnecessary menstrual absences mean less than full work” (39). Thus, 
she reinforces the idea that women are capable and that their physiology does not have to 
restrict them. Her text serves as a representation of how the rhetoric of women’s 
physiology evolved. 
Some of Mosher’s arguments can be seen as a direct response to the ideas of past 
physicians who attempted to limit women’s activities, and some of her arguments even 
recall those of Edward Clarke: 
Only yesterday women went to college at great personal sacrifice. And 
dire were the predictions of the evil results to her health and to the race. 
Characterized as “hermaphrodite in mind,” and “divested of her sex,” the 
college woman failed to develop the anticipated evils. She was found to be 
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rather healthier than her sisters who did not go to college, to marry as 
other women of her class, and to bear a rather larger number of healthy 
children. (14) 
She also quotes several students from Vassar College, where Clarke had reportedly 
drawn the subjects of his study. Mosher had published several articles in the decades after 
Clarke’s 1873 book that dealt with similar subjects. By quoting women from Vassar 
College who say that they do not experience pain during menstruation unless they do not 
exercise enough, Mosher recalls Clarke’s conclusions from his study. Though she does 
not refute him and his ideas explicitly, some of her rhetorical strategies--such as 
emphasizing the role of educated women and quoting college graduates who did not 
experience ill health from their education, mentioning Vassar, and mentioning the 
number of women in her study--are a direct response to Clarke, whose study, by the way, 
included a very small number of participants.48 Consequently, Mosher’s arguments for 
women’s physical capabilities and rights sum up the lengthy debates about women’s 
physiology and their social roles throughout the nineteenth century. 
In addition to refuting the idea that women were controlled and therefore 
restricted by their physiology, and proposing that women’s natural state was health, 
Mosher’s work is important to understanding the growing study of women’s sexuality. 
Her survey of women on their beliefs about sex and their sexual practices, begun in the 
nineteenth century, is used as evidence by Carl Degler (1974) to show that “Victorian” 
ideas of sexuality were much more complicated than the standard “prudery” reading. In 
this study, Mosher asked about the knowledge these women had about sexual physiology 
 
48 British physician Elizabeth Garrett Anderson also challenged the depth of  Clarke’s research in The 
Fortnightly Review's ongoing discussion of Clarke’s work in 1874. 
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before marriage and where they had learned it: many replied with names of sexual 
physiology texts, like Trall’s. She also asked what they felt the chief purpose of sex was 
and whether/how often they achieved “venereal orgasm” (The Mosher Study). While she 
did not publish any conclusions from her study, the questions themselves reveal the status 
of ideas on women’s sexuality: she assumed that women had knowledge of sexual 
physiology at this point; she acknowledged that there was a difference of opinion on the 
primary purpose of sex, whether it was procreation, an expression of love, or a means to 
pleasure--which shows that sexual ideologies had gone beyond merely viewing sex as a 
means to generation; and she distinguishes between “venereal orgasm” and simple 
“orgasm.” Thus Mosher’s text shows a more complex understanding of women’s 
physiology and her research proves that physicians were beginning to view sex as a 
subject worthy of study for its own sake.49 
Physicians’ Advice on Sex
The physiology texts examined here show how women’s health and women’s 
sexuality were often intertwined. They also offer differing advice on sexuality: most urge 
temperate indulgence in sex, but they also validate the role of women’s pleasure in the 
sexual act. Physicians were becoming the authority on sexual matters, replacing the moral 
authority of the church (Gordon 171). As physician John Scudder notes in the section of 
his sex textbook entitled “Physiology a Better Guide than Religion,”  
Physiology is the best guide to a correct understanding of this subject. If 
we can understand clearly the demand made by the reproductive instincts, 
how they may be exercised for the good of the individual and the species, 
 
49 See Vern Bullough’s (1994) work on the development of “sexology” in the early twentieth century. 
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how they may be controlled by calling into action other functions of the 
body and mind, we will be in a better position to guide and control them. 
(20) 
When they read the physiological works of Gove, Trall, Scudder, and Blackwell, 
nineteenth-century free love reformers saw their experiences as valid to the scientific 
study of sex. Reformers also relied less on moral guidelines for sexual activity and 
instead used the language of this physiology discourse. However, it is important to note 
that their participation in discourses of physiology is not uni-directional. For example, 
many physicians also responded to the ideas raised by the free love reformers, such as 
Trall who sees free love as a theory “agitating the public mind” (x), and who then uses 
these new theories as an exigence to provide a more medical discussion of physiology in 
his text. Furthermore, historians have noted that more liberating ideas of female sexuality 
emerged at mid-century (Kern 95), the same time that free love ideology gained 
prominence. Thus, reading popularizations of physiology and free love arguments 
alongside each other shows the multi-faceted nature of the conversations over sexuality 
and offers insight into the specific rhetorical strategies based in science used in free love 
arguments for sexual choice and pleasure as vital to women’s health. 
Free Love as the Answer: The Argument for Women’s Sexuality and Women’s 
Health 
Reading the rhetoric of the free love movement in light of the discussions of 
sexual physiology occurring in the medical community, we can see how science provided 
the basis for their arguments that free love can help to secure women’s health. Writers 
and lecturers on free love often capitalized on the cultural currency of medical science to 
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support their arguments for women’s sexual freedom and increased sex education. 
Recognizing that the medical community was the authority on sexual matters, they often 
aligned themselves with such discourse, either implicitly or explicitly. Implicitly, the 
warrants for some of their arguments about women’s sexuality were based on the 
scientific discussions of the body occurring in the medical community. Explicitly, they 
often filled the gaps left in the arguments of the medical community and positioned 
themselves in a reciprocal relationship with this other discourse community; they not 
only refuted some of the more constricting ideas about women’s physiology, but also 
based some of their arguments on evidence and warrants produced by physiology texts. 
Free love rhetors thus have a unique role in the transfer of medical information to the 
public because they also used popularized scientific arguments for their radical reforms.  
While some historians have been baffled by what seems to be the unique rhetoric 
of the free love movement, we can see that they situated themselves within the discourses 
on sexual physiology occurring at the time. Mary Gove Nichols’ treatise on marriage, 
Victoria Woodhull’s 1873 and 1874 speeches on free love, Hulda Potter-Loomis’s 1890s 
pamphlet on social freedom, and Dora Forster’s 1905 treatise on sex radicalism converse 
with the medical community’s arguments on women’s sexuality as they argue for 
women’s rights. In arguments for sex education and for the role of women’s sexual 
pleasure to women’s health and women’s rights, these texts rely on the discourses created 
by “reform physiology.” 
Mary Gove Nichols
As both a physician lecturing and writing on women’s physiology and a free love 
advocate, Mary Gove Nichols asserted a strong ethos to speak about sexual matters, 
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which she did in several genres: medical lectures, articles in water cure journals, novels, 
and free love treatises. While my previous analysis focused on her arguments in the 
medical genre, this section will focus on her writings on marriage and free love. As a 
novelist, Gove Nichols critiqued the institution of marriage and its effects on the health of 
women in a fictionalized, yet highly autobiographical novel, Mary Lyndon (1855).50 This 
novel traces the life of a heroine who suffers under the constraints of the marriage 
system, and whose ill health is a result not of her “weaker” physiology, but of a system 
that keeps her confined to the home in a sedentary lifestyle and that views her body as her 
husband’s property. Gove Nichols espouses similar ideas in her 1854 treatise on 
Marriage: Its History, Character, and Results; its Sanctities, and its Profanities; its 
Science and its Facts. Demonstrating its Influence, as a Civilized Institution, of the 
Happiness of the Individual and the Progress of the Race, written in collaboration with 
her second husband Thomas L. Nichols, though her contributions are clearly 
distinguished from his. In her sections she often uses narratives from her own life and 
from her patients’ lives to illustrate the harms done to women under the marriage system. 
The solution, she argues, is a more active lifestyle, sex education, and woman’s 
“ownership” of her own body through free love rather than marriage. 
Gove Nichols blames the marital institution for the “obliteration of the maternal 
and sexual instincts in woman” (“Murders” 304). In her argument, she invokes the image 
of “diseased nerves” in a woman, brought on by the “enslaved and unhealthy condition in 
which she lives” (304). For Gove Nichols, the “slavery” of the marriage system leads to 
depravities, one of which is masturbation, a connection that aligns her with many in the 
 
50 For a more in-depth reading of Gove Nichols’ novel, see Keetley (2000), who connects the themes in the 
novel to Gove Nichols’ medical and free love writing. 
105
medical profession who posit masturbation as a cause of “diseased nerves,” coming out 
of the link between the nervous system and sexuality. However, she argues that healthy 
nerves will lead to a healthy sexual life and overall healthy body: “The truth is that 
healthy nerves give pleasure in the ultimates of love with no respect to sex; and the same 
exhausted and diseased nerves, that deny to woman the pleasures of love, give her the 
dreadful pangs of childbirth” (304). She is careful to emphasize here that “diseased 
nerves” can affect either sex and that both sexes have the capacity to experience pleasure 
if they have “healthy nerves.” Thus, she participates in the growing dialogue on the 
capacity for pleasure in women, showing that healthy women can achieve such pleasure. 
In addition, Gove Nichols attacks the standard of “purity” that would have women 
believe that sexual desires and pleasures are abnormal. She attributes such falsity to 
clergy and physicians who perpetuate such a stereotype, relating the story of a woman 
with a “nervous” condition caused by “solitary vice,” or masturbation: “Her standard of 
purity was that unconsciously adopted by the Church and the world, that a woman should 
be ‘chaste as ice’; that there should be no attraction felt by her, or, at least, manifested for 
the masculine principle; that all such attraction derogates from feminine purity and 
propriety. This lady, as hundreds of others have done, brought her disease and false virtue 
to me” (“Murders” 305). This argument previews later free love arguments, such as 
Victoria Woodhull’s, which redefine “purity” and “virtue” and posit the lack of sexual 
feelings and pleasure as “disease.” 
Finally, Gove Nichols also counters some of the ideas of the dominant medical 
culture, such as William Acton’s, that women’s desire for sex springs out of maternal 
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desire, rather than a desire for pleasure. She differentiates between sexuality and 
reproduction: 
There is an idea prevalent, that the ultimation [sic] of love in the sexual 
union, is intended solely for the production of offspring. There is no 
physiological foundation for this belief. The desire for the sexual union, is 
not adapted to, or governed by, this result in man or in woman…. In 
woman the maternal function ceases at the age of forty-five or fifty, but 
the desire to love, and the faculty of enjoying the sexual embrace 
continues to a much later period.  (Marriage 365).  
Gove Nichols’ logic here, though not using women’s anatomy for support, is based on 
physiologic ideas dating from the Enlightenment and reinforced in nineteenth-century 
discussions of physiology. She uses simple logic, showing that women who can no longer 
have children still desire sex. Her argument on the importance of love to sexuality in 
women, a result of the nineteenth-century focus on the companionate marriage, previews 
Elizabeth Blackwell’s later logic. By placing love at the center of sexuality and as the 
basis for sexual union between men and women, Gove Nichols supports an argument for 
free love. Without this love between partners, in addition to knowledge of sex and 
ownership of her own body, marriage will continue to have ill effects on women’s health. 
This argument for free love as the “physiological” or natural state continues in Victoria 
Woodhull’s later, and much more radical, rhetoric. 
Victoria Woodhull
Victoria Woodhull is more specific both in enumerating the values of increased 
sex education and in using the benefits to women’s health as an argument for free love. 
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Her 1873 speech The Elixir of Life; Or, Why Do We Die, given to an audience of 
spiritualists, and her 1874 speech Tried as by Fire: or, The True and the False Socially,
given on a lecture tour to various audiences, elaborate her free love philosophy. Her 
arguments for sex education and for free love owe much to the debates over women’s 
physiology--even the anti-feminist views in that discourse. Woodhull takes the logic of 
women’s “diseased” and “nervous” conditions perpetuated by anti-feminist medical 
practitioners to support an argument for the importance of sexual pleasure and free love 
to women’s health. 
Woodhull’s sex education arguments are indebted to the rhetoric the “reform 
physiologists” used in defending their texts. She advocates sexual education starting in 
childhood, ensuring that children will be knowledgeable about sex before their sexuality 
awakens (Tried as by Fire 16).  She would have this education extend into adulthood, as 
she blames ignorance of their bodies for many of the trials women suffer in the institution 
of marriage. Listing the tragedies that result from women’s ignorance of their bodies, her 
argument focuses on the consequences of this lack of knowledge to child-bearing, and 
she recounts the increasing number of deaths of infants and infertility caused by sexual 
diseases (Tried as by Fire 32-33).  In the 1870s, her argument that increased sex 
education is needed had timely and urgent exigence (see Chapter 3). Woodhull also links 
sexual knowledge to sexual pleasure, explaining that women who know more about their 
bodies will achieve increased sexual pleasure (Tried as by Fire 15 and 43). Both 
Woodhull and Mary Gove Nichols use similar strategies in positioning lack of sexual 
knowledge as dangerous, not the knowledge itself. Their arguments not only reflect the 
exigence for their discussion of sexual matters, but also pick up on a recurring trope in 
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many “reform physiology” texts. Both the “reform physiology” texts and free love texts 
envisioned a public unaware of sexual physiology, an ignorance that resulted in 
propensity for disease. Both communities aimed to present sexual knowledge to the 
public, a subject that has “hitherto been to them as a sealed book” (Trall iv). Imagining 
their purpose as a civic duty, both medical and lay authors constructed a public ignorant 
of scientific sexuality in their rhetoric, an ignorance resulting from “false modesty,” a 
phrase used by both physician John M. Scudder and Victoria Woodhull.    
Woodhull shames the “newspapers,” “preachers, teachers, and doctors” for the 
ignorance of sexuality that many women have (Elixir and Tried), but she does not 
repudiate all doctors. She singles out Scudder, whose works she clearly read, as a “large-
hearted man and widely-experienced physician” (Tried 43). Her strategy is similar to 
other sex radicals who attempt to chastise physicians for certain ignorant practices but 
also try to build a bridge to them. For Woodhull, sex education should be under the 
provenance of doctors, but doctors’ inability to move beyond “false modesty” 
necessitates reformers’ discourses on the topic. Indeed, speeches on free love often 
overlapped in phrasing and strategies with “reform physiology” texts.  
Woodhull’s use of medical discourse is apparent in her Tried as by Fire speech, 
as she quotes Scudder directly and even endorses his book as one that every woman 
should read. The influence of medical discourses in general can be seen in some of the 
phrases she uses, such as “mock modesty,” but also in her argument that marriage 
restricts the sexual instincts of individuals. Whether or not Scudder himself explicitly 
engaged in conversation with her and other sex radicals is not known, but his book does 
invoke rhetoric often used by sex radicals even before the time of its publication. In Tried 
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as by Fire, Woodhull uses a quotation from Scudder’s medical text to tie together her 
three main arguments towards the end of the speech: that relationships between men and 
women should be based on mutual love and desire rather than economic security, should 
involve women who are knowledgeable about their own bodies and sexuality, and should 
allow women ownership and control of their sexual organs.  Woodhull argues that the 
problems women experience under the control of their husbands will be remedied by this 
“free love” system. Woodhull quotes Scudder saying, “The wife should not lose control 
of her person in marriage.  It is hers to rule supreme in this regard.  This is a law of life, 
and is violated in no species except in man” (Scudder 62; qtd in Woodhull, Tried, 43). 
Her quotation gives medio-scientific authority to her argument that the woman should 
have “ownership and control of her sexual organs.” 
The feminist theories of sexuality as related to overall health also draw on some 
of the debates in the medical community over women’s sexuality. In The Elixir of Life; 
Or, Why Do We Die (1873), Woodhull employs a similar rhetorical tactic to the medical 
community in positioning sexuality as a natural sign of health: “It is an axiom in the 
medical profession that the patient who experiences sexual desire is not dangerously ill; 
and also that the patient who has been dangerously ill is convalescent when sexual desire 
returns. Thus it is held that the presence of the sexual appetite is a symptom of health” (5-
6). Here, she emphasizes that sexual desire is normal and natural in women, and echoes 
the logic of Trall, Blackwell, and Gove Nichols in showing that those without sexual 
desires must be suffering from ill health. 
Woodhull also appropriates some of the logic of the physicians who find a 
correlation between sexuality and “hysteria” or other nervous conditions when she says 
110
that “If health depends upon proper sexuality, it follows that disease follows from 
improper sexuality” (Elixir of Life 6). She, however, takes this logic even further, 
attributing all disease to sexual conditions (6). Such logic takes its start in the medical 
profession, but then changes to support more radical feminist arguments. For example, 
the arguments from the medical community that women’s health was based in their 
sexual and reproductive organs were then used in free love texts as the warrant for why 
women should have pleasurable sex. If their sexual and reproductive organs rule their 
physiology, free love feminists like Woodhull contend that more attention should be paid 
to exercising and stimulating those organs to prevent negative consequences to health.   
Furthermore, the type of argument employed by physician John M. Scudder is 
extended in these free love arguments, such as when he argues that  
If the act is complete, so that both body and mind are satisfied, no disease 
arises, though there be frequent repetitions; but if the act be incomplete, 
the organs being irritated merely, and the mind not satisfied, then disease 
will surely follow.  There  is no doubt that the proper gratification of 
the function is conducive to health and longevity; or that its abuse leads to 
disease and shortens life. (42-43) 
This passage is quoted by Woodhull as support for free love in her Tried as by Fire 
(1874) speech. Thus, while Woodhull’s arguments that unsatisfying sex leads to disease 
may seem unusual, they actually repeat arguments made in medical writing of the time. 
Therefore, the argument that women are controlled by their physiology could be used for 
feminist ends, as well as the anti-feminist end usually noted. 
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Woodhull claims a firm scientific basis for her argument that women are entitled 
to sexual pleasure because the lack of such pleasure will lead to ill health.  For example, 
she reprimands husbands who ignore their wives’ pleasure and connects their 
indifference with the poor health of women: 
I need not explain to any woman the effects of unconsummated 
intercourse though she may attempt to deceive herself about it; but every 
man needs to have it thundered in his ears until he wakes to the fact that he 
is not the only party to the act, and that the other party demands a return 
for all that he receives; demands that shall not be enriched at her expense; 
demands that he shall not, either from ignorance or selfish desire, carry her 
impulse forward on its mission only to cast it backward with the mission 
unfulfilled, to prostrate the impelling power to breed nervous disorder or 
irritability and sexual demoralization, and to sow the seeds of disease 
broadcast among humanity. (Elixir 7)
While Woodhull begins this diatribe with a kind of legal language, she ends by evoking 
arguments that unsatisfied sexuality breeds nervous disabilities. She seems to be entering 
the gap found in the contradictions that ran rampant in the medical community over 
women and “nervous” disorders to fulfill her own agenda. In the same speech, she later 
speaks of her conversation with a member of the New York College of Physicians, who 
agrees on the harmful effects for women who do not experience pleasure during sex. 
While in this particular speech and some others, she merely reports that she has consulted 
physicians who agree with her propositions, she also quotes directly from physicians’ 
theories as backing in her other arguments. 
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Woodhull’s often flamboyant rhetoric has clear connections with the discourses 
on “reform physiology”: she exploits the focus on informing the public of sexual 
physiology to argue for her own brand of sex education; she relies on the connection 
between sexuality and the nervous system in positioning sex as integral to women’s 
health; she quotes specific doctors who see women’s health as a women’s rights issue; 
and she turns sexual pleasure into a right of women. Thus, she offers free love, where 
women are free to choose partners and sexual conditions, as the answer to many of the 
problems befalling women in the marriage system and to much of the ill health of 
women.  
Hulda Potter-Loomis
Like Woodhull, Hulda Potter-Loomis uses her 1890s pamphlet on Social 
Freedom:  The Most Important Factor in Human Evolution to argue for free love as the 
answer to the problem of the higher evolution of the species, and within this treatise, she 
advocates more open discussion of sex, taking a physiological point of view in her 
repudiation of the “false teaching” of the church on sexuality (3). Originally a speech she 
was asked to give by the Social Science League of Chicago and then revised for 
publication in the free love periodical Lucifer, The Light-Bearer and in pamphlet form, 
this treatise aims for a more scientific study of the question of sexuality to refute the 
“custom of institutional marriage with all of the false ideas connected with it” (4). Like 
physician John Scudder, she views medical science as the antidote to the “false” morality 
perpetuated by church and state. 
One impediment to correcting “false” ideas of sex, Potter-Loomis contends, is the 
lack of knowledge many have about sex. Since sex is not discussed openly and 
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“scientifically,” this lack of knowledge will continue. She argues, instead, open 
discussion of sexuality from an early age would help society advance “because each 
individual would be taught from childhood that the sex organs were not vile and unclean 
and that they were worthy of all respect and considerations” (17). She urges people to 
talk as freely about the sex organs as they do about the heart and the liver (17). This 
comparison between sexual organs and other, less “secret” parts of the body was popular 
within free love discourse, leading into arguments connecting sexual appetite with an 
appetite for food. For example, Potter-Loomis states that human desire should govern 
choices in sex, just as appetite determines choices of food (14). Thus, both appetites are 
positioned as “natural” ones requiring gratification.  
Potter-Loomis is also indebted to the “reform physiologists” for promoting open 
discussion of sexuality and enabling an understanding of the body and its processes. Like 
Woodhull, Potter-Loomis exploits the connection between sexuality and overall health 
that were most often put to anti-feminist uses. She points out that physicians and 
scientists find a correlation between insanity and “restrained or restricted” sexual desire 
(6). These arguments are based on the connection of sexuality with the nervous system 
and also on the knowledge that healthy women do have strong sexual desires. She also 
makes seemingly self-evident statements, --i.e., “the sex organs are wisely intended for 
use other than merely to propagate the species” (3) that assume the understanding the sex 
organs achieved by nineteenth-century physiologists and by physicians who noted that 
reproduction is an end, but not necessarily the sole purpose of sexual unions (Scudder 
35). The proliferation of texts explaining how the body works then gave support to 
arguments for free love. Knowledge of how women achieved sexual pleasure and how 
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these functions remained after the ability to reproduce ends gave free love arguments a 
firm scientific warrant, and free love reformers like Potter-Loomis then took these 
arguments even further into the realm of reform than the medical writers on physiology 
had. Potter-Loomis, like Dora Forster, found a gap in the medical discourse--the question 
of women’s lived experiences--and entered it with the solution of free love.    
Dora Forster
Dora Forster’s51 call for free love reform in her 1905 treatise, Sex Radicalism as 
seen by an Emancipated Woman of the New Time has a stronger scientific bias. Forster 
calls for an alliance between physicians and free love thinkers. She begins by critiquing 
some physicians in her chapter entitled “Who Are Our Teachers,” but also tries not to 
blame physicians for their focus on disease rather than health: “Sex radicals must study 
their subject for themselves. On the physiological side of the sex problem, I believe 
medical men can and will be our friends as soon as we encourage them to do so. The 
public will have health-doctors, instead of, or as well as, disease doctors, just as soon as it 
genuinely desires them; and those who want sex-science will get it” (Forster 9). This 
statement is a call for more explicit collaboration with physicians. Forster, like Gove 
Nichols and others before her, sees the radical free lovers as “students of the facts of sex” 
(Forster 13), with physiologists and other medical scientists as their teachers.  Forster 
points out that many questions have gone unanswered about sex and sexual feelings, and 
she hopes that women and medical scientists can work together to discover the “truth” 
about sexuality. 
 
51 I was unable to find any biographical information on Forster, whose work appears in files with other 
texts published by Moses Harman, the editor of the free love periodical Lucifer, The Light Bearer.
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Forster calls for such an alliance between science and women because women 
have the everyday experiences that can then be analyzed with “the highest reasoning and 
the most careful deductions of science” (6). Like the free love advocates before her, she 
urges training in science for lay people rather than training in religion in order to fully 
understand sexuality (8). Thus, she advocates the approach popular with physicians like 
John M. Scudder that “physiology [is] a better guide than religion” on sexual practices. 
She confirms Linda Gordon’s (1977) theory that science was replacing the church as the 
authority on sexual matters (171) in her statement that “thoughtful people are earnestly 
desiring a science of sex as a guide to conduct” (Forster 38).  In terms of “What Must We 
Learn in Health Science,” the heading of her next chapter after “Who Are Our Teachers,” 
she critiques the “Puritan sex system” that has distorted the natural forms of sexual 
expression and influenced physicians writing on the topic (10-11). She mentions Thomas 
Nichols’ and Alice Stockham’s52 sexual physiology texts, saying that information has 
been made available to the public, but that much of the information is too influenced by 
social mores (10). Instead, she says, students of physiology need to inquire more about 
the facts of sex, such as at what age sexual feelings are developed, and cease calling the 
“natural” habit of masturbation the “solitary vice,” which she deems an “unscientific” 
term employed by many in the medical profession (11-12). These views were also 
endorsed by physician Havelock Ellis, writing at the same time as Forster. 
Finally, Forster argues that science will show the public the “evils of celibacy” 
(23) and teach that both men and women should have freedom, choice, and pleasure in 
sexual relations. In making this argument, she must address the question of women’s 
 
52 A physician who advocated continence, or refrain from orgasm, for both males and females in her 
treatise on sex. 
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sexual feelings. She picks up on the type of argument made by Mary Gove Nichols when 
she refutes a “maternal instinct,” saying, “This feeling is never experienced at the same 
moment as sex passion, though exceptionally strong manifestations of passion may 
indicate to the reasoning woman a favorable period for propagation” (41). She attempts to 
refute the notion that sexual desires are connected with maternal feelings, using the same 
logic as Gove Nichols: that the sex drive lasts longer than “procreative power” (Forster 
41). While it would be some time before sexuality and reproduction were divorced in 
many medical discourses, reformers employed simple logic to accomplish this task, a 
necessity to arguing for sexual freedom for women. 
Free Love and Physiology
The medical community contained adherents of feminist and anti-feminist views 
of women’s physiology, but the discourse of free love reformers shows that both the anti-
feminist and the feminist discourse of medical writers could be put to feminist ends. The 
focus on what women were capable of, and how their reproductive and sexual organs 
controlled their physiology, then became a reason why women should practice free love--
for better health. The recommendations for sex education and sexual pleasure in 
physiology texts also became a primary tenet of free love ideology. Finally, their ideas on 
the relationship of sexuality to the individual, the effects of sex on the mind and on the 
body, and the causes of disease as an outside energy or force wreaking havoc on the 
nerves show the influence of Enlightenment ideas on sexuality that were also influential 
to the medical discourses on sex at the time. These medical discourses provided the 
exigence and the warrants enabling women to participate in the debate over their 
sexuality and asserting sexual rights for women. As Juliet Severance, whose quotation 
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opens this chapter, shows, a healthy, sexual, and equal relationship between partners was 
seen as one of the qualifications for good hygiene that will maintain the body’s 
physiology.  
Conclusion 
 The conversations and debates over physiology throughout the nineteenth century 
represent the first step in the quest for the “truth” about sexuality in various discourse 
communities. In his History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault (1978) notes that in the 
nineteenth-century discourses on sex, “sex was constituted as a problem of truth” (1.56). 
The way that some physicians and reformers discussed physiology as a problem of 
“nature” or of “truth” supports this view. Trall, for instance, contends that the various 
factions discussing sex prove that “the problem of the true sexual relations is not yet fully 
understood” (x). Similarly, physician and free love advocate Juliet Severance (1891) 
urges that discussions of sex should take a scientific approach in both method and 
viewpoint: “Then let this and all other subjects receive careful, thorough, and impartial 
discussion and analysis. In this way we will show ourselves scientific investigators 
instead of bigoted ignoramuses” (A Discussion 11). By situating sex as a problem of 
scientific investigation, both the medical and activist discourse communities aimed to 
bridge experience, or lifestyles, with science. The discussions in the discourse of 
physiology illustrate this tendency, as they applied knowledge about the body to lifestyle 
decisions as the first step in creating a science of sexuality.  
Foucault identifies the “confession” (or “case study” as we would now call it) as a 
scientific method in medicine of the nineteenth century. Mosher attempted to let the 
female subjects of her sex study speak for themselves, and used the nineteenth-century 
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female physicians’ popular practice of collecting the “heart history” of patients (Wells 
28-34). Feminist reformers thought that they had something to offer to the discussion 
over physiology, and the medical profession’s practice of patient observations and 
histories validated these tendencies. In the discourse of physiology, knowledge of the 
body was the first step to understanding women’s sexuality in arguing for specific 
lifestyles; likewise, the discussion over lifestyles also added to the conversation over 
physiology. The relationship between the medical and lay writers on physiology was then 
reciprocal, but this relationship changed as scientific understandings of the body changed 
in other disciplines. While physiology was the site for the questions about sexuality 
throughout the early and mid-nineteenth century, scientific discoveries would make these 
questions more specialized in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, the 
“sex-science” called for by free love advocates was eventually achieved, but was it the 




I have been ‘the thing called a wife,’ having no individuality, no 
spontaneity. I have suffered a degradation that the Church and the world 
call purity and virtue. I have borne children in torture that the rack could 
no more than equal. I have had abortions and miscarriages that were as 
truly murders as if my infants had been strangled, or had had their brains 
beaten out, by a brutal father. I have had my life drained away by uterine 
hemorrhage, and worse than all, I have had the canker of utter loathing 
and abhorrence forever eating in my heart, and for one who was, like the 
frogs of Egypt, sharing my bedroom and spoiling my food. And yet he too 
was a victim of a system, and a diseased brain and body. He believed that 
a wife should obey her husband, and his morbid impulses forced him to 
ask a deathly obedience. (Nichols, Marriage 265)
When free love advocate and physician Mary Gove Nichols critiqued the 
institution of marriage in 1854, she invoked the metaphor of a diseased institution, and 
blamed the marriage system for many of the illnesses befalling women. By the late 
nineteenth century, many in the medical and sexual reform movements would agree with 
her critique, but their arguments would be refreshed, set in a new rhetorical situation 
created by new warrants from science, giving new meaning to the characterization of 
marriage as a source of disease for women. Major breakthroughs in the scientific 
community in the late nineteenth century reconfigured the rhetoric on marriage and 
sexuality. One of these breakthroughs was the discovery of bacteria and their relationship 
to disease causation.  This new knowledge produced new discourses and images in the 
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scientific, medical, and private spheres: soap advertisements with militaristic metaphors 
to describe the act of washing; “A Course in Scientific Shopping” in the pages of Good 
Housekeeping; advertisements for household products and “home protection”; the 
rounding up of prostitutes to check for disease; and the crowds of immigrants examined 
at Ellis Island. From the man of science bending over his microscope in the laboratory, to 
the housewife making her kitchen germ free, to the reformer promoting sex education, 
the discourse of bacteriology traveled through many different communities in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
One of these discourse communities was the sexual reform movement. Once 
bacteria were determined as the causal agent of venereal diseases, a shift occurred in how 
women’s sexuality was conceived by the medical and lay reform communities. Old 
myths were dispelled. No longer were women considered inherently diseased or given the 
sole blame for the transmission of venereal disease. And no longer was marriage 
considered a safe haven from venereal disease. The usefulness of the science of 
bacteriology in social purity and free love discourse illustrates how nineteenth-century 
scientific discourses were applied to feminist ends and shows how science could produce 
positive reforms for women.  
For social purists, such as Elizabeth Blackwell and Frances Willard, who argued 
for the elimination of a double standard that repressed female sexuality but encouraged 
male sexual license, the findings in science provided the warrant that the responsibility 
for venereal disease was shared. For free love advocates, such as Hulda Potter-Loomis, 
Victoria Woodhull, and Angela Heywood, who argued against marriage as an institution 
that degrades women and for the abolition of institutional marriage, the findings in 
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bacteriology proved that marriage could not protect women and that the institution itself 
fostered disease. Finally, for birth control advocates, such as Margaret Sanger, the 
findings in science provided the exigence for sex education reform goals and justified 
giving information to young women that had previously been kept from them.  
While in some of these cases the involvement of science was less explicit, looking 
at the social movements’ rhetorical strategies against the backdrop of science shows how 
bacteriology helped to create a specific rhetorical situation and warrants for discussions 
of sexuality. The discourse surrounding venereal disease transformed from a discourse of 
morality to a discourse of public health, emphasizing human agency in stopping the 
spread of disease. This “rhetoric of responsibility” that emerged in feminist discourse 
based in scientific and medical discoveries literalized the metaphors of the clean body 
and the “diseased” institution of marriage. This chapter elaborates the key role of these 
new sources of argument in the discourses traveling from scientists, to medical writers, to 
feminist reformers.   
This chapter first examines the new knowledge created by the sciences and how 
bacteriology helped to eliminate older ideas about venereal disease in particular. It then 
analyzes the discourse of venereal disease in three medical texts aimed at broader 
audiences to show the progression from the older ideas to the new discourse. These 
medical texts helped to generate the reform discourses also found in feminist texts. Next, 
the chapter reviews the social implications of the germ theory of disease and how public 
reception of bacteriology implied a new rhetoric of agency and responsibility, leading to 
reforms in the name of protecting women. It then analyzes the discourses of sexuality 
deployed by feminist advocates for social purity and free love and how these discourses 
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were influenced by the new dimensions of the rhetorical situation created by scientific 
discoveries. Finally, it examines a later text from the birth control movement in order to 
show the concrete influence of science to the more recent early twentieth-century 
discourses of disease. 
The Warrant Established: Bacterial Agents of Venereal Disease 
While most applications of the germ theory, such as vaccinations for multiple 
diseases and pharmaceutical cures, would not be developed until the twentieth century, 
the germ theory altered both health practices and the discourse of disease in the late 
nineteenth century. Older ideas of disease posited no single cause, and many physicians 
believed that people could catch the same disease from different causes (Waller 3). 
Everything from humoral theory, to heredity, to physiological weaknesses, to poor habits, 
to contaminated air and water were blamed for disease. As the previous chapter shows, 
many nineteenth-century physicians focused on diseases as a fault of the nervous system 
or a lack of “vital” energy. By the late nineteenth century, however, not all diseases were 
considered a fault of the body--germ theory provided an external agent to fight. Venereal 
diseases, in particular, once conceived as punishment for immorality, became linked to 
the germ theory of disease. 
The Making of A New Science
The history of bacteriology begins earlier than the nineteenth century, as far back 
as the seventeenth century, when Anthony van Leeuwenhoek observed what he called 
“little animals” in his microscope. His work was followed by Lazzaro Spallanzani’s, who 
proved that these “little animals” could not survive boiling water (de Kruif 35). Both of 
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these men laid the groundwork for later findings. Scientists were now aware of these 
microscopic organisms, but had yet to connect them with diseases. Louis Pasteur’s work 
would be integral to producing a new generation of “microbe hunters.” 
Pasteur (1822-1895) is one of many scientists whose early life did not forecast the 
valuable contributions he would make to science. Not a strong student but a good painter 
and orator, Pasteur had intended a career in the fine arts (Porter and Ogilvie 746). While 
studying at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, he became interested in chemistry, 
and received his doctorate in chemistry in 1847. During his tenure at Lille University in 
1863, Pasteur was asked by local merchants to research the process of fermentation to 
solve their problems in wine and beer making. Pasteur then discovered the importance of 
yeast to the process of fermentation and showed how specific yeasts were needed for 
specific wines. It was during this time that he also developed the process called 
“Pasteurization,” or the heating process used to kill the yeast organisms (Porter and 
Ogilvie 746-747). In noting the effects of microorganisms on substances, Pasteur then 
began to associate these microbes with disease causation. Pasteur’s 1859 paper theorizing 
germs as the cause of disease resonated with many in the scientific community, 
prompting scientists to try to isolate the germs responsible for certain diseases.  
Another request from the merchant community led Pasteur to his next important 
study. In the 1860s, he was asked by the government to investigate the disease killing 
silkworms that was wreaking havoc on the silk industry (Porter and Ogilvie 747). In 
1868, he announced his discovery of the parasite causing this disease in silkworms, 
which prompted him to pursue further investigations into disease-causing agents. 
Meanwhile, Pasteur’s work was already beginning to produce reforms in the medical 
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community. For example, surgeon Joseph Lister took note of Pasteur’s findings, and 
began using an antiseptic to prevent post-operative infections.  
Pasteur, though, did not stop his groundbreaking research with his proposal of the 
germ theory of disease and his identification of the specific microorganism attacking 
silkworms. In 1882, he began research on rabies, and in 1885, this research led him to use 
a vaccine on a young boy who had been bitten by a rabid dog--and it worked. He was one 
of the leading figures attempting to link specific bacteria with specific diseases, and 
attempting to then create vaccines and cures for these diseases.  
Robert Koch (1843-1910) was also a pivotal “microbe hunter.” Koch had been an 
army surgeon for Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War after earning his medical 
degree in 1866. In 1872, he became a district medical officer in Wollstein and later 
became a town medical officer in Breslau (Porter and Ogilvie 565). These positions did 
not offer well-equipped facilities for research, but he was given a microscope by his wife 
that allowed him to begin his investigations into anthrax (565). His wife would also be 
influential in his laboratory techniques--it was her fruit jelly recipe that he used to 
develop the plate culture technique that allowed him to isolate specific types of 
microorganisms (Otis 3). After developing techniques to stain bacteria to make them 
easier to observe under the microscope (Porter and Ogilvie 565), he was able to identify 
the anthrax bacillicus microbe in 1876, which was the first success in associating a 
specific microbe with a specific disease. In 1882, Koch also identified the microbe 
responsible for tuberculosis. 
Koch spent his later career concerned with public health. In 1883, he traveled to 
the Nile delta to work with cholera victims and traced the bacteria from patients suffering 
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from cholera to the bacteria in the intestinal walls of dead victims. He also found the 
same bacteria in the drinking water in Calcutta. This experience led him to propose 
checks on the water supply when he returned to Berlin (Porter and Ogilvie 565). He 
became the Director of the Institute for Infectious Diseases in 1891, and continued to 
advise foreign countries on disease prevention and treatment (565). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, scientists had identified the bacteria 
responsible for typhoid, scarlet fever, and gonorrhea. Koch’s techniques and the famous 
postulates53 he developed allowed scientists to test whether a specific microbe was 
causing a specific disease. These methods aided Albert Neisser in his important 
identification of the gonococcus germ. 
The Shifting Knowledge of Venereal Diseases
New knowledge of venereal diseases also began to emerge in the early nineteenth 
century even before bacterial agents were identified. Medical scientists at this time knew 
that venereal diseases affected the sexual organs and that they were spread through sexual 
contact. However, physicians tended to conflate these diseases, not recognizing, for 
example, the differences between gonorrhea and syphilis. French venereologist Phillipe 
Ricord remedied this misconception in 1837 through his study of syphilitic chancres, 
which enabled him to differentiate between gonorrhea and syphilis. His study also 
enabled him to speculate about the stages of the infection (Brandt 9). These findings 
would be important to later scientists searching for causal agents.  
 
53 Researcher Arnold Levine summarizes these famous postulates: “(1) the organism must be regularly 
found in the lesions of the disease, (2) the organism must be isolated in a pure culture (hence the need for 
sterile techniques, (3) inoculation of such a culture of pure organisms into the host should initiate the 
disease, and (4) the organism must be recovered once again from the lesions of this host” (qtd in 
Fahnestock, Rhetorical Figures 162).  
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While bacteria’s role in infections had many scientists “converting” to the germ 
theory of disease, older ideas of venereal diseases still persisted. Unaware of the causal 
agent, physicians had theorized that excessive sexual contact would lead to these diseases 
(Brandt 10). Other theories posited that all women carried gonorrhea without exhibiting 
any symptoms of it, and thus all women were inherently diseased (Brandt 10).54 It wasn’t 
until 1879, when a German dermatologist named Albert Neisser identified the 
gonococcus microbe causing gonorrhea, one of the first microbes to linked to a specific 
disease, that the new science of bacteriology began to impact the study of venereal 
diseases.  
Like Pasteur, Neisser (1855-1916) did not show early aptitude for scientific 
discovery. In fact, he had to repeat the chemistry test before qualifying for his medical 
degree in 1877. During his studies, he learned staining techniques to observe bacteria and 
the smear test to identify them, both developed by Koch. He then came to the field of 
dermatology by accident; he had wanted to specialize in internal medicine but turned to 
dermatology because of a job opening (Gillispie 17). At this dermatology clinic, he was 
able to put into practice what he had learned, and with the aid of a newer-model 
microscope, he successfully identified the gonococcus microbe in 1879, before his 
twenty-fifth birthday. 
Neisser devoted the rest of his career to bacteriology, though it was not without 
controversy. He and Norwegian bacteriologist G.H.A. Hansen both found the bacteria 
responsible for leprosy and they clashed over who would receive the credit. In the end, 
Hansen was given credit for identifying the specific microbe but Neisser was given credit 
 
54 Mary Spongberg’s 1997 study of venereal disease and prostitution in medical discourse details many of 
the myths about women as inherently infected with venereal disease. 
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for discovering its significance as the cause of leprosy (Gillispie 18). Neisser would face 
an even greater scandal in his investigations of syphilis. He was accused of infecting 
innocent people with the disease in his search for an inoculation method for syphilis (18). 
He spent his later career directing a prominent dermatology clinic, studying the causes of 
syphilis and lupus, and advocating education on venereal diseases, prostitution 
regulations, and other public health measures (18). He also became the teacher of many 
later pioneers in the field.  
Meanwhile, scientists were also beginning to further understand the stages of 
infection in venereal diseases. Before Neisser’s discovery, in 1872, American physician 
Emil Noeggerath proposed a “latency period” for gonorrhea to show that people could 
still be carriers and transmit the disease during intercourse, even without any visible 
symptoms. Later discoveries also tracked the progress of venereal diseases, showing how 
gonorrhea could result in arthritis, meningitis, and infections of the urinary tract, cervix, 
and fallopian tubes (Brandt 10). In tracking the progression of gonorrhea, physicians also 
showed how the disease affected men and women differently. Finally, late nineteenth-
century physicians noted the key role of venereal diseases in sterility. These scientific 
findings would be central to arguments for social reforms concerning venereal diseases. 
The New Discourse of Disease
While most treatments for diseases caused by bacteria were not developed until 
later, the discovery of these disease agents changed the way both physicians and social 
reformers discussed venereal disease. The main findings in the scientific community--
including germs as causal agents of disease, the existence of a latency period, the 
possibility of an unknowing transmitter, and the stages and later effects of the disease--
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led to a new discourse on these diseases that emphasized human agency. Bacteriology 
lessened the view that venereal diseases were punishment for immorality and eliminated 
the view that diseases were a failing of the body. Thus, the new discourse emphasized 
human agency in the body’s protection from an outside force, the agent of the “germ,”55 
causing many to urge treating venereal diseases like other infectious diseases.  
Consequently, through discourse on venereal diseases, reformers gained a way to discuss 
sexuality and argue for social changes on the basis of disease prevention.  
The Situation Exploited: Medical Writers and the Discourse of Disease 
The popularity of the medical advice book was escalating towards the end of the 
nineteenth century (see Chapter 2) when these new advances in bacteriology were made, 
and more physicians addressed these new audiences. Like the earlier physiology texts, 
these new texts both explained the causes of disease and argued for specific lifestyle 
choices. Whether physicians endorsed or rejected the germ theory of disease, the findings 
of bacteriology played a part in their discourses. In medical discourses, bacteriology 
seems to have promoted a shift from emphasizing treatment to emphasizing prevention. 
Thus, physicians writing such texts noted the importance of lifestyle practices in 
preventing the spread of venereal disease, replacing older superstitions with practical 
information, and shifting the discourse of disease from questions of morality to questions 
of public health. According to Linda Gordon (1977), physicians replaced the church as 
the authority on sexual practices, and a shift in language occurred that produced a 
 
55 The Oxford English Dictionary notes one use of “germ” as associated with a “virus” in an 1803 medical 
journal. “Germ” as synonymous with “bacteria” began in the 1870s (The Oxford English Dictionary 
documents the use of “germ” by Tyndall as synonymous with “bacteria”). 
129
“translation of ecclesiastical into medical language. What had been sin became physically 
injurious” (171).  
Physicians John Scudder, Elizabeth Blackwell, and another key popularizer, 
Prince Albert Morrow, illustrate the shift in the discourse of disease as well as the 
application of medical discourse to social reform. Each of the medical texts analyzed here 
shows how physicians used the findings on venereal disease to promote specific reforms. 
Their rhetoric had a clear influence on the social reformers discussed later. Scudder’s text 
was cited by free love advocate Victoria Woodhull because of his condemnation of the 
treatment of women within institutional marriage. Elizabeth Blackwell’s discourse of 
disease aligned her with social purity goals in her critique of the double-standard as 
fostering the spread of disease. Finally, Prince Albert Morrow, who worked directly with 
reform societies in the early twentieth century to institute sex education, influenced both 
the social purity and the birth control movements’ discussion of venereal disease through 
his evaluation of the increasing instances of “social diseases” in married couples. These 
three writers, from 1874 to 1904, illustrate the different stages of scientific knowledge of 
venereal disease as well as the evolution of the discourse into social reform goals. 
John Scudder
Physician John M. Scudder participated in scientific, medical, and social 
conversations on disease in his 1873 medical textbook. Scudder (1829-1894) born in 
Harrison, Ohio, had worked as a cabinet maker, like his father who died when he was 
eight. He turned to the study of medicine after the deaths of his three infant children 
(Garraty and Carnes 19.541-542). Scudder studied under Milton Thomas at the Eclectic 
Medical Institute in Cincinnati, where he later became a professor after graduating in 
130
1856 (19.542). Drawn to the eclectic practice of medicine because of the choices it 
allowed for physicians, Scudder defined the eclectic practice as “the right to choose or 
select from all other systems of medicine whatever [physicians] may deem true and best 
adapted to the relief and cure of the sick” (qtd in Garraty and Carnes 19.542). Three of 
Scudder’s sons later followed in his footsteps, becoming eclectic practitioners (19.543). 
Scudder wrote many textbooks for his students on the eclectic practice of medicine, as 
well as on the diseases of women and children. 
Scudder’s On the Reproductive Organs, and the Venereal, a medical textbook 
first published in 1873 and in its third edition by 1890,56 serves as a bridge text between 
the old and the new discourses of venereal disease. The older theories focused on 
physiological causes and hygienic rules for prevention. The new theories also stressed 
such hygienic rules, but described bacteriological causes. Scudder’s textbook was written 
in 1874 when this shift was just beginning to occur. Although the association of bacteria 
with venereal diseases is not a prominent feature of his text, Scudder does take advantage 
of the other discoveries concerning venereal diseases: the differentiation between these 
diseases and the discovery of the latency period.  
One piece of scientific knowledge that Scudder applies is the differentiation 
between venereal diseases, established by Ricord in 1837. Scudder also hints at germ 
theory with his statement that different diseases are produced by different “viruses”57:
“Each of these has its peculiar virus, is propogated by direct contact, and produces its 
own specific poison. The gonorrhoel virus always produces gonorrheoea, and never 
chancre or chancroid; chancroid produces chancroid and never gonorrhoea or true 
 
56 First editions of his textbook are rare. I am referencing its third edition. Even the Library of Congress has 
lost its copy. 
57 Scudder uses “virus” to refer to a small particle. 
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chancre; and true chancre reproduces itself, and never either of these diseases.” (218). 
Since many people had blamed the spread of venereal disease on everything from 
heredity to “marked bodies,” and may even have believed that they could catch different 
diseases from the same germ, Scudder’s clarification here is important in eliminating 
myths about such diseases. The language here is also significant, naming “viral” causes; 
the discovery of the microbe causing gonorrhea did not occur until 1879, after Scudder’s 
text was published. Thus, his text is incorporating the knowledge of the specific moment, 
when researchers had accepted germ theory, but were still working towards identifying 
the agents of specific diseases. 
Scudder also spends considerable time enumerating the stages of venereal disease, 
which physicians had just begun to understand more fully. He describes the symptoms of 
each stage in order to aid physicians in diagnosis and treatment. Scudder’s book also 
offers unique visual aids, and contains several colored illustrations of syphilis that would 
help physicians identify the stages of the disease. These illustrations, noted on the title 
page of the book, were a “selling point” for the text. Scudder, then, incorporates verbal 
and visual rhetoric in his explanations of disease. Scudder’s explanations also show that 
people with the same disease could have varying symptoms, depending on its stage. 
These explanations become increasingly important when discussing the early stages of a 
venereal disease, since sufferers could unknowingly transmit it. 
Scholarship by Allan Brandt (1985) and Vern Bullough (1994) proposes that it 
was the discovery of the latency period that provoked action on the part of physicians. 
Latency was a new discovery at the time Scudder wrote his first edition of his book in 
1873. His discussion of the latency period foretells the kind of rhetoric that physicians 
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would later employ: they emphasized the victim status of those who contracted a venereal 
disease unknowingly from someone in whom the disease was latent. In fact, discussions 
of the latency period evoke a new image--that of the unknowing transmitter. Scudder 
depicts this risk: 
A man will frequently disease his wife with gonorrhea before he has felt 
the first symptom of urethral infection, or feel it first or immediately after 
such intercourse. He may transmit a soft chancre from a sore not noticed, 
or that seems little more than an erosion; and true syphilis from the 
secretion of the diseased membrane before the chancre has formed. In 
woman, these unconscious sources of disease are far more common, for it 
may lurk in her genitalia, without producing sensible irritation, the 
secretion being but little if any changed. She may convey the contagion in 
this way for months, without being aware that there is anything wrong. 
(220-221) 
The images of this unknowing transmitter with the disease “lurking” in the genitals 
correspond with many of the metaphors later produced by germ theory: that of germs as 
invaders, lurking in “unclean” crevices. The discovery of the latency period provoked 
urgency on the part of physicians and reformers: they needed to understand the early 
symptoms to prevent unknowing transmission. 
Scudder not only examines the scientific causes of disease, but also the social 
causes. He devotes time to interrogating the practice of prostitution and critiquing how 
church and state dictate sexual practices in passages which echo free love discourse.58 
Some of his theories express feminist principles, as he highlights the double standard 
 
58 Mary Gove Nichols (1854) and Victoria Woodhull (1873; 1874) make similar claims. 
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between men and women as a cause of prostitution. Like feminist reformers, he 
condemns the practices that lead to the “vice” of prostitution. He also observes that 
society has not adhered to natural laws, such as Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, 
which emphasizes the role of female choice in the animal kingdom. Many commentators 
on sexual selection theory, including Darwin himself, note that the process is reversed in 
humanity, with males given the agency of choice or with economic or social pressures 
forcing women into marriages (Woodhull, Rapid Multiplication 20). Since human 
females do not have the choice they should have in a mate, thereby instigating a 
competition among males, the natural order is not observed, which leads to prostitution, 
by Scudder’s logic (Scudder 62). Finally, he condemns the marginalization of women as 
a factor contributing to the spread of disease, such as when he notes that women not 
working and not being honored for their domestic work also leads to prostitution (67). 
Thus, in equating the spread of venereal disease with these social problems and with 
women’s status, Scudder offers a link between scientific insights and social consequences 
requiring reform.  
Scudder also enters the age-old argument about legalization and regulation, 
insisting that since prostitution is criminalized, it breeds the conditions for disease. He 
posits that when prostitutes are able to observe hygienic laws, these women are more 
effective in checking the spread of disease. He clarifies that while diseases are high 
among prostitutes, it is “illicit intercourse,” and not necessarily prostitution, that is 
precipitating the spread of disease: “These contagions may be and are found outside of 
prostitution, but outside of prostitution there is very little danger. It is illicit intercourse 
with unknown persons that usually transmits the disease, for even the confirmed 
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prostitute will be careful not to endanger her personal friends, if she is aware of the 
disease” (219). Thus, Scudder attacks the social causes of disease, but rather than 
condemning the prostitute, he condemns the inequality between men and women that 
nurtures prostitution. 
Scudder also offers views on whether prostitution is a cause of venereal disease. 
Refuting the older assumptions about such women, he notes that not all prostitutes are 
diseased: “Prostitutes who lead regular lives do not suffer in health as many imagine” 
(65). Yet, he also says, “disease[s] of the reproductive organs are frequent among 
prostitutes” (66). His comments here counter more traditional views of prostitutes as 
inherently diseased, since he insists that social conditions, not the women themselves, 
spread disease, an argument also expressed by free love reformers. The same 
characterizations and appeals are also apparent in the writing of physician and social 
purist Elizabeth Blackwell. 
Elizabeth Blackwell
Like Scudder, Elizabeth Blackwell wrote to a more professional than lay 
audience, but her texts were more widely circulated than Scudder’s. In Essays in Medical 
Sociology (1902), Blackwell includes two essays that deal primarily with venereal 
disease: “Rescue Work in Relation to Prostitution and Disease: An Address Given at the 
Conference of Rescue Workers held in London, June, 1881,”  and “Medical 
Responsibility in Relation to the Contagious Diseases Act: An Address Given to a 
Meeting of Medical Women in London, April 27, 1897,” the former of which was 
probably directed to a popular audience rather than a professional one, most likely an 
audience of sanitary workers. In both texts, Blackwell uses her ethos as a physician and 
135
the new knowledge about disease transmission to promote hygiene reform. Blackwell’s 
texts are particularly interesting since she was an opponent of the germ theory of disease, 
but her text still shows its influence. She often opposed germ theory as an explanation for 
all diseases, believing instead that both social and bacteriological causes should be 
attacked. However, her call for reform is still based on the new scientific knowledge of 
venereal disease. Blackwell embraces a more holistic view that hypothesizes the multiple 
social causes of disease, including human behavior, in addition to bacteriological causes. 
 Blackwell was actually wary of the changes in medical practices caused by germ 
theory.  Having promoted sanitary education and advocated that physicians build 
relationships with their patients in essays such as “The Religion of Health” (1871) and 
“The Influence of Women in the Profession of Medicine” (1889), Blackwell feared that 
the new science would promote a shift away from these goals (Morantz-Sanchez, 
“Feminist Theory”). The latency period of gonorrhea, in particular, tended to discourage 
the belief in germ theory (because no symptoms were present) and fueled Blackwell’s 
skepticism. Blackwell includes in “Medical Responsibility” an appendix from 
gynecologist T. Gaillard Thomas,59 who discusses the latency period. Like other 
physicians, she expressed fear that men would infect their unwitting wives with venereal 
disease, such as when she says, “sufferers are often a source of danger to innocent 
people” (“Medical Responsibility” 88). Thus, the scientific knowledge of the latency 
period of gonorrhea provides Blackwell the exigence to urge sex education reform. 
Like other physicians, Blackwell targets social ideologies that foster the spread of 
venereal disease. Countering popular myths, she refutes the idea that men need sex in 
 
59 This appendix does mention gonococcus as the cause of gonorrhea, indicating the influence of germ 
theory.  
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order to protect their health: “We must ourselves recognise the truth, and instruct parents, 
that it is a physiological untruth to suppose that sexual congress is indispensable to male 
health” (103). Late nineteenth-century physicians often tried to refute this idea in treatises 
such as Instead of Wild Oats by physician Winfield Scott (Brandt 26). Scott’s argument is 
similar to Blackwell’s since he endorsed eliminating the double-standard in sexual 
practices for men and women. Many physicians urged continence and refuted the idea 
that men who did not have their sexual urges satisfied suffered ill health. Blackwell 
participates in this conversation in order to strengthen her argument against the double 
standard. Since she urges changes in education and personal practices as steps toward 
eliminating the spread of venereal disease, she must also refute the behaviors and theories 
that the public holds dear, such as a belief in the overpowering sexual appetites of men. 
 However, Blackwell is not anti-sexuality. She clarifies, “The fact of the powerful 
sexual attraction necessarily existent and dominating in woman, as mother of the race, 
seems to be quite overlooked…..although it may exhibit itself in less spasmodic form 
than in men” (92-93). It is important to note that she does not deny women’s sexuality, 
nor does she position women as asexual victims, especially in light of readings by 
scholars of the social purity movement as anti-sexuality, such as Ruth Engs’s (142).  
 Blackwell’s “Medical Responsibility” also stresses the importance of prevention 
when she argues that physicians need to look at the links between bacterial and social 
causes of venereal disease. She uses comparison here to emphasize her point: “We may 
as well expect to cure typhoid fever whilst allowing sewer gas to permeate the house, or 
cholera whilst bad drinking-water is being taken, as try to cure venereal disease whilst its 
chief cause remains unchecked” (91-92). The idea that germs could be spread through 
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sewer gas and drinking-water seems like a combination of sanitary science with germ 
theory, and one that would appeal to audiences who would accept this comparison.60 
Thus, her arguments for reform to check the spread of disease combine the scientific and 
social causes of disease. The science gave new urgency to older social solutions. 
Physicians often looked to governments to aid in their goals to check the spread of 
disease. The British government’s response, however, caused more of an uproar than the 
spread of disease itself. The Contagious Disease Acts passed in Britain in 1864, 1866, 
and 1869, which arose in an effort to check the high rates of venereal disease among 
British soldiers, decreed that prostitutes could be quarantined if found to have venereal 
disease; women had to register with police and undergo forced medical exams, often 
without cause--just suspicion of prostitution could land a woman in hospitals undergoing 
tests and therapies that often resulted in brutal treatment (McElroy, “Contagious Disease 
Acts”). Blackwell and other social purity advocates, such as Josephine Butler, were 
angered by these acts since they targeted prostitutes, but did not target the men who 
frequented them. Thus, Blackwell and other social purity advocates show that the new 
legislation would not be effective in checking the spread of venereal disease. Blackwell’s 
speeches, instead, emphasize education as a means for combating vice, and she draws 
attention to the double standard that exists between men and women in “Rescue Work”: 
Inequality between the sexes in the law of divorce, tolerance of seduction 
of minors, the attempt to check sexual disease by the inspection of vicious 
women, whilst equally vicious men are untouched—all these striking 
examples of the unjust and immoral attitude of legislation will serve to 
 
60 Historian Nancy Tomes (1998) notes how many of the reforms in sewage systems and plumbing were 
prompted by the advent of germ theory. 
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show how law may become a powerful agent in producing prostitution 
through its direct attitude towards licentiousness. (121) 
Like Scudder, Blackwell uses her position as a physician to point out the inequalities that 
exist in society’s structure, and like the social purity advocates with whom she aligns 
herself, she focuses on how the attitudes inherent in the laws produce a double standard. 
Social purity advocates do not argue that women should be granted the sexual license that 
men have, but that the laws should take away that license granted to men, which would 
ensure that men and women are treated equally. Their reform efforts often focused on 
changes in divorce laws, age of consent laws, and prostitution regulations, all noted by 
Blackwell. While Blackwell judges the prostitutes with the phrase “vicious women,” she 
points out that the men who frequent prostitutes should also be held accountable for their 
actions. 
Blackwell’s rhetoric also illustrates the shift toward human agency in preventing 
the spread of venereal disease. Based on the premise that transmission of a germ can be 
prevented, she urges, “Whilst on the one hand you legislate, on the other hand you 
educate” (118). She shows the trend among medical professionals towards urging laws to 
aid their preventative campaign. She advocates reforms that will educate on sexual 
practices, particularly education for soldiers spreading venereal disease (“Medical 
Responsibility”). Her advocacy of these reforms results from the new rhetorical situation 
created by bacteriology on how to combat and prevent germ transmission.  
Prince Albert Morrow
Another physician heavily involved in public health campaigns was Prince Albert 
Morrow (1846-1913). An American physician, born in Kentucky and educated at 
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Princeton and in Europe, Morrow worked in dermatology and studied syphilis in New 
York City beginning in 1874 (Brandt 14). He was a great admirer of the French 
researcher Alfred Fournier, and in 1880 published his translation of Fournier’s important 
text, Syphilis and Marriage, for American audiences (Brandt 11). While practicing as a 
physician in New York City, Morrow became interested in the rates of venereal diseases 
among married couples, and after attending a conference in Brussels on the frequency 
and effects of venereal disease, Morrow returned to America, intent on forming societies 
to help check the spread of venereal disease and on writing a treatise that would expose 
the danger of venereal disease to families (Brandt 14). He formed societies such as the 
National Vigilant Committee in 1906 (which became the American Social Hygiene 
Association in 1913), which included physicians, academics, and hygiene reformers. 
These societies were instrumental in initiating sex education programs in the schools 
(Engs 145-146). But first, Morrow awakened the public to the prevalence of transmission 
of venereal diseases in marriage with his 1904 textbook Social Diseases and Marriage.  
Morrow’s textbook illustrates the culmination of the findings of nineteenth-
century bacteriology. It targets a professional audience to accommodate the new 
knowledge of venereal disease transmission and treatment, but a reformist audience is 
also addressed, because one of Morrow’s goals is to urge reform in two directions: 
education and preventative legislation. Morrow exploits the specific moment when more 
knowledge both of the science of venereal disease and its prevalence in married couples 
clearly calls for a response. Morrow is especially concerned with the rates of venereal 
disease in married women because of the dangers posed to women’s health and to future 
offspring.  
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Morrow specifically references the science and the scientists in his explanations 
of venereal disease. In the first few pages, he mentions important advances, specifically 
French physician Alfred Fournier’s 1880 book on syphilis and Neisser’s 1879 discovery 
of the gonococcus germ as the cause agent of gonorrhea. Morrow highlights that through 
knowledge of the causal agent, physicians are able to create more accurate tests, leading 
to more accurate diagnoses. His heading of a chapter reads, “If Gonococci are Present, 
there is Danger of Infection; if Absent, there is None” (xi), which shows an awareness of 
Koch’s postulates. This emphasis shows how physicians refuted older ideas of disease 
causation by highlighting the effects of scientific discoveries. Morrow uses these 
discoveries to discuss who should and should not get married, based on their “risks of 
contagion” (38), which can now be more accurately diagnosed.    
Moreover, the new knowledge of the stages of venereal diseases and their long-
term effects contributes to Morrow’s use of scientific knowledge to support reform goals. 
That gonorrhea and syphilis can lead to sterility and birth defects is also new knowledge 
from the sciences, which Morrow reports: “A percentage variously estimated at from 40 
to 80 per cent. of endometritis, mesometritis, and perimetritis is of gonorrhoel origin and 
a cause of sterility in women. Noeggerath found in 81 gonorrhoel women 49 entirely 
sterile. In 80 sterile marriages, Kehrer found 45 caused by inflammatory and other 
changes--all of gonorrhoeal origin” (30). Such findings created more urgency for 
discussion of the effect of sexual diseases on women’s health. His figures also helped to 
refute the charges of “race suicide”61 aimed at women, because they offered another 
explanation to the rates of sterility in marriage (Spongberg 165). Morrow not only 
 
61 This term was often leveled at women who decided to have smaller families. Theodore Roosevelt 
famously accused such women of “race suicide” in 1907. 
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capitalizes on the exigence created by scientific discoveries, but he also creates a new 
exigence based on what was now known at the end of the nineteenth century about the 
prevalence and effects of venereal disease. Together, these exigencies created a new 
rhetorical situation of reform. 
 In addition to the discoveries of the laboratory, Morrow relies on the work of 
sanitarians who study the frequency of venereal disease in the population. For example, 
the “Report of the Committee of Seven on the Prophylaxis of Venereal Disease in New 
York City,” to which Morrow was appointed, found that thirty percent of women infected 
with venereal disease caught it from their husbands (Morrow 25). Morrow cites other 
statistics, as well, such as Noeggerath’s finding that “of every thousand men married in 
New York eight hundred have or have had gonorrhea, from which the great majority of 
the wives have been infected” (26). Morrow attributes this prevalence to the many 
sufferers who have been untreated and undiagnosed (26). He further adds, “My own 
observations at the New York Hospital extending over a period of several years would 
indicate that fully 70 per cent. of all women who come there for treatment were 
respectable married women who had been infected by their husbands” (26-27). As we 
will see later, Margaret Sanger’s call for reform was based on Morrow’s conclusions. 
Morrow’s statistics characterize the marriage system as a place that shelters and transmits 
disease. 
 Most interesting is how Morrow illustrates the shift in the language used to 
discuss venereal disease, reflecting how scientific discoveries were impacting the rhetoric 
of medicine and reform. Morrow notes at the end of his preface, “As regards the title 
chosen for this work [Social Diseases and Marriage], it may be said that the term ‘social 
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evil’ has been generally accepted and sanctioned by common usage, and it would seem 
appropriate that the diseases which are peculiarly the appanage of this evil should be 
classed as ‘social diseases’” (vi). Morrow prefers the term “disease” to the references to 
“the social evil” found in many medical and reformist texts. He is proposing a language 
shift from the discourse of morality in the use of “social evil” to the new discourse of 
public health--“social disease.” This shift removes the older connotations of these 
conditions as punishment for promiscuity, turning instead to the language of health and 
disease. 
 Once he has accomplished the shift in how disease is discussed and related the 
new knowledge of cause, transmission, and prevalence regarding venereal disease, 
Morrow has a solid basis for his reform arguments. His last few chapters are titled, 
respectively, “Educational Measures,” “Administrative Measures,” and “Sanitary 
Measures.” Like many of the physicians of the early twentieth century, he places high 
value on education as a means of preventing disease, and his reform societies were 
eventually successful in instituting sex education curricula (Engs 145-146). In terms of 
legislation, Morrow points out that the more liberal divorce laws instituted as a result of 
the high rates of infection between married couples will not solve the problem since the 
disease has already been transmitted (35). He therefore supported marriage laws that 
refused marriage licenses to men infected with a venereal disease.62 Finally, new sanitary 
measures would combine the goals of the educational and legislative measures to reduce 
the rates of infection. In this section, he equates venereal diseases with other infectious 
diseases and suggests a similar strategy to that “adopted in the warfare against 
 
62 Such a law was passed in Michigan in 1899 (Brandt 19-20), and by 1922, thirteen states had laws 
restricting marriage licenses to men infected with venereal diseases (Engs 146).  
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tuberculosis” (xxi and 385-387). Like other medical writers, Morrow notes the stigma 
attached to venereal diseases, but shows how, by equating them with other infectious 
diseases caused by germs, the war against these germs can be won. 
The Situation Transformed: Opportunities for Social Applications and the Alliance 
of the Scientific, the Medical, and the Domestic 
Physicians were not the only ones waging a war against germs. Thanks to the 
immense popular reception of germ theory, sanitary workers, marketers, and even 
domestic workers instituted reforms aimed at combating germs. When it came to sexual 
diseases, these reforms would have even more impact on discussions of sexuality. 
Many medical historians have noted that the popular reception for the germ theory 
of disease was often stronger than the reception it gained in the scientific and medical 
communities. In an 1885 article in Popular Science Monthly, Henry Thompson summed 
up the American public’s reception of germ theory: 
The germ theory appeals to the average mind: it is something tangible; it 
may be hunted down, captured, colored, and looked at through a 
microscope, then in all its varieties, it can be held directly responsible for 
so much damage. There is scarcely a farmer in the country who has not 
read of the germ theory. A cowboy in Arizona was shot dead in the saddle 
recently by a comrade for the insult implied by calling him a ‘d----d 
microbe.’ (qtd in Fellman and Fellman 49-50) 
Other physicians likened the public’s interest to “bacteriomania” (qtd in Warner and 
Tighe 234). In popular circles, the reception of germ theory was almost akin to a religious 
conversion, as Nancy Tomes has examined in her work on “The Gospel of Germs.” The 
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germ theory offered the public a promise--not only for a better understanding of disease 
transmission and prevention, but also for more effective treatments. As an outside force 
causing disease, germs could be fought.  
The scientists promoting germ theory were responsible for causing this immense 
interest in the public as they wrote of their findings to both professional and lay discourse 
communities. They communicated their theories in understandable ways and even invited 
the public to be participants in this new science. Tomes points out, “In a Glasgow address 
reprinted in Popular Science Monthly, [Joseph] Tyndall urged his audience to ‘observe 
how these discoveries tally with the common practices of life’ and offered examples from 
his own household, such as his housekeeper’s use of brief applications of heat to keep 
pheasants and milk ‘sweet’” (Gospel 40). He also “asked listeners to think about the 
molds that grew on wet boots or a piece of fruit left exposed to the air” (40). 
Consequently, as several scholars have noted, the public accepted the germ theory of 
disease even before more proof was offered, and they accepted it before many in the 
scientific and medical communities did.  
A rhetorical perspective goes even further in showing that the moment and the 
audience for these discoveries impacted the reception of germ theory. Carolyn Miller has 
noted the importance of the concept of “kairos” to scientific discourse. “Kairos,” a term 
that connotes a specific situation and exigence, shows us that rhetors’ success depends in 
part upon making the right speech to the right audience at the right time. To audiences 
used to hearing the causes of disease as only physiological or hereditary, the germ theory 
offered a new explanation; more importantly, this explanation served to show that 
diseases could be prevented. Thus, the specific moment of the late nineteenth century, a 
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time of increase in the prevalence of venereal diseases, produced an exigence that 
allowed popular audiences to be more receptive to the new science of bacteriology. The 
popular reception of “germ theory” can also be attributed to the public’s growing interest 
in medicine. In traveling from the laboratory to the domestic space, the discourse on 
“germs” promoted a shift in rhetorical situation. Instead of dealing with the questions of 
the laboratory, where finding the bacteria associated with specific diseases was 
paramount, the situation outside the laboratory dealt with destroying the conditions that 
allowed germs to fester.  
The metaphors used to describe germs and disease also contributed to the popular 
understanding of germ theory and its use in social reforms. As Laura Otis (1999) and 
Tomes have noted, germs were often portrayed as “invaders” that people had to guard 
their bodies against: “William Marp told his audience that germs ‘hunt in packs,’ and 
another physician referred to them as ‘atmospheric vultures.’ Microbes were often 
described in martial terms as attacking, invading, and conquering their human hosts” 
(Tomes, Gospel 43). There were also less harsh metaphors, such as likening germs to 
seeds, insects, or worms (42). These metaphors used to describe the invisible “attackers” 
spurred a new rhetoric of responsibility. Tomes observes, “Hygienic infractions once 
regarded as merely disgusting or ill-bred, such as indiscriminate spitting or coughing, 
now became defined as serious threats to public health” (Tomes, “Germ Theory” 257). 
The public now had a new scapegoat for disease, one that emphasized the cleanliness of 
the person and the home.  
Reforms with a basis in germ theory unfolded in the late nineteenth century. 
Hospitals began to change their methods of disinfecting. Plumbing and sewage treatment 
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were upgraded. Household products, such as cleansers and disinfectants, were marketed 
as essential to ridding the home of unwanted invaders. The home became the setting for 
work in applied science, as Tomes has shown, with magazines advising “scientific 
shopping” as well as new appliances to be used in the fight against germs (Gospel 166). 
The home was viewed as a place needing protection from outside attackers--germs. Thus 
the women dominating these domestic spaces became soldiers in the fight against 
disease, and as Tomes argues, they applied science in the home in significant ways. In 
addition, feminist reforms, such as dress reforms, took on more urgency, as reformers 
argued for shorter skirts because of the risk of trailing longer skirts in dirty water or dust 
(Tomes, Gospel 157). Thus, changes in dress could help ward off attacks by germs, and 
women’s magazines in the 1890s urged “hygienic dress reform” (157). Altogether, germ 
theory provided the promise that sickness could be prevented through improved personal 
hygiene. 
This emphasis on responsibility also occurs in the rhetoric of venereal disease. 
With venereal disease, it was the cleanliness of the person that was emphasized: the 
metaphorical “unclean” body became the literalized “unclean body.” Physicians urged 
the public to think about their choices and promoted an agenda of sex education as well 
as legal reforms in the marriage laws that led to more liberal divorce laws and a higher 
age of consent. These changes came about as a result of alliances between physicians and 
social reformers. Thus, physicians and reformers worked together to apply scientific 
knowledge to social issues, to initiate programs to sex education in schools, and to create 
societies, such the ones formed by Morrow, which included physicians, academics, and 
hygiene reformers (Engs 145-146). Reformers then had a rich body of knowledge as well 
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as alliances to support in their reform discourses. Their rhetoric of reform relies on the 
arguments and new knowledge created in the medical discourses on bacteriology and 
venereal disease.  
For example, once the long term effects of venereal disease, especially sterility, 
were understood, reformers had a new line of argument: protect women from venereal 
disease in order to protect future generations. This line of argument was based not only 
on the findings Morrow related, but also on the increasing medical and popular interest in 
eugenics. Many other physicians emphasized the dangers of venereal diseases to future 
children, using a more eugenic line of argument. For example, Morrow named venereal 
disease as “an actual cause of the degeneration of the race” (qtd in Brandt 14). In a 1906 
symposium on the “Duty of the Profession of Womanhood” of the American Medical 
Association, several physicians weighed in on the issue (Brandt 15). Dr. Abraham 
Wolbarst referred to women as, “‘[t]he flower of our land, our young women, the 
mothers of our future citizenship’” (qtd in Brandt 15). Such arguments, which 
emphasized potential harm to motherhood, prompted reform in divorce laws, allowing 
divorce when venereal disease had been transmitted. Several states also enacted laws in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s requiring men to get tested and present certification of 
health before being granted a marriage license (Brandt 19-20).63 Other reforms included 
more liberal divorce laws and higher age of consent laws as a result of the perceived 
threat “to the race” from venereal disease. Venereal disease even began to be considered 
in more conservative marriage manuals, such as conservative physician Emma Drake’s 
What a Young Wife Ought to Know (1901). Drake emphasizes how syphilis can harm the 
 
63 These laws did not require women to get tested for venereal disease. Thus, the shift from viewing women 
as inherently diseased and the sole carriers responsible for disease transmission to blaming men had 
occurred. 
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children of a union, and urges young women and their parents to use their family 
physician as an ally in choosing their mate (62). She also applauds the law in Ohio that 
required testing for venereal disease (62-63).  However, as Morrow notes in his text, 
changes in divorce laws would not solve the problem. It would be feminist reformers who 
would emphasize the inequality inherent in the marriage system as fostering the spread of 
disease. 
The Situation Exploited and the Warrant in Use: The Rhetoric of Sexuality in 
Feminist Reform Discourses 
Much of the analysis of discourses on women and venereal disease during the 
nineteenth century has focused either on how women were blamed for the spread of 
venereal disease and further marginalized or on how the new rhetorics surrounding 
venereal disease portrayed women as “innocent, weak, and helpless” (Brandt 16), victims 
of men spreading venereal disease. For example, Mary Spongberg’s (1997) study reviews 
how physicians increasingly portrayed prostitutes “not merely as agents of transmission, 
but as inherently diseased, if not the disease itself” (6), and Allan Brandt’s history of 
venereal disease argues that the new knowledge gained in the nineteenth century only 
furthered the victim status of women. However, in looking at the discourses of the social 
purity, free love, and the later birth control movements, we see women themselves 
incorporating the new scientific knowledge about bacterial infections and venereal 
disease in order to argue for reform.  
The new knowledge of germ theory and venereal disease transmission provided 
an exigence for discussing sexual practices and revived the debate on the inequalities in 
the marriage system that social purity and free love reformers had waged throughout the 
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century. Arguments like Morrow’s gave credence to the kind of feminist reforms 
advocated by social purists and free lovers. If women were being infected by their 
husbands, this transmission not only affected their own health, but also their ability to 
bear healthy children, a key argument from expediency, to use Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s 
term, found in many feminist texts. Morrow’s argument also indicated that the institution 
of marriage did not offer much support for women who could unknowingly catch 
venereal diseases from their husbands. The physicians’ emphasis on prevention was 
particularly suited to these reformers.  
In some of these reform discourses, the connection to germ theory is merely 
suggested. Other sex reformers explicitly take advantage of the warrants provided by 
bacteriology in discussing women’s sexuality. And some capitalize on the new metaphors 
created by germ theory to argue for even more radical reforms, such as Angela 
Heywood’s argument for abortion. Thus, in order to urge changes in the marriage laws or 
changes in how women’s sexuality was conceived, the social purity and free love 
reformers drew on the exigence and warrants of the arguments established in the 
professional sphere. The reform discourses surrounding venereal disease were also 
employed in the early twentieth century birth control movement, which is an area that 
illustrates the results of the alliance between science, medicine, and feminism.  
Social Purity
The social purity movement’s aim to eliminate the double standard between men 
and women was strengthened by physicians’ discussions of prostitution64 and the 
increasing blame leveled at men as carriers of germs infecting their wives. That venereal 
 
64 Many social purists became involved in campaigns to “save” prostitutes. 
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diseases could be latent produced even more urgency. Social purists also argued that the 
conditions of inequality between men and women needed to change in order to eliminate 
the conditions that were breeding venereal disease. Frances Willard, the best-known 
social purist and a prolific rhetor, shows how this discourse relied on knowledge and 
warrants circulating in the medical community, as well as the increased emphasis on 
protecting and cleansing the home and the body in popular discourse. Willard’s rhetoric 
does not explicitly treat germ theory and its connection with disease, but her arguments 
are made more timely since the discourses of bacteriology were then widely known to the 
public. Bacteriology had revealed the dangers to women caused by the double standard 
and by men who led “impure” lives. The new scientific knowledge created new 
exigencies for women’s rights in the home and accentuated the role of preventative 
measures in fighting disease and ensuring women’s rights. 
Willard’s “A White Life for Two,” written in 1890 and presented as both a speech 
and a pamphlet, argues for various reforms under the mantle of “home protection.”  Both 
the ballot and temperance fall under this mantra, as well as reforms concerning women’s 
sexuality. Willard discusses both marital rape and age of consent laws, revealing the 
problems in the current institution of marriage. Unlike free love reformers, though, 
Willard seeks to reform the marriage system rather than to abolish it, thus making 
marriage more conducive to “home protection” and “social purity.” The “home 
protection” motto also implies a connection to the kind of rhetoric that Tomes identifies. 
The “Gospel of Germs,” previously discussed in this chapter, created a new discourse of 
the home as well, promoting changes in its management, as well as in plumbing, storing 
food, and cooking--all in the name of protecting the home from the invisible invaders. 
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Therefore, Willard’s rhetoric could evoke some of this discourse. Willard, however, 
shows that the home is under attack from within, as well: the sexual practices of men and 
women are also included under the heading of “home protection,” and men become the 
invaders capable of spreading disease in this discourse. 
In discussing the double standard, Willard urges, “The personal habits of men and 
women must reach the same high level. On a low plane and for selfish ends…man 
wrought out, with fiercest cruelty, virtue as the only tolerated estate of one-half the 
human race” (326-27). The “personal habits” she refers to and the emphasis on “virtue” 
here suggest a discussion of sexuality that asks that men and women be held to the same 
standard, rather than forcing virtue onto women only.  
When Willard enumerates the “awful deeds done by white men” (329), her 
rhetoric aligns her with the kind of arguments made by Elizabeth Blackwell. Like 
Blackwell, she brings up the behavior of soldiers towards women as proof that men need 
to be taught purity. She also condemns the Contagious Disease Acts, since they only 
punished women (330). She emphasizes the need for men to lead “pure” lives to become 
better husbands. She notes that men are not held to the same standards as women: “For it 
is an immense temptation to the ‘sowing of wild oats,’ when the average youth knows 
that the smiles he covets most will be his all the same, no matter whether he smokes, 
swears, drinks beer and leads an impure life, or not” (331). The references to the “sowing 
of wild oats” and “impure life” imply a connection with prostitution and are also 
informed by the push to debunk the myths of the male need to “sow wild oats” by 
physicians like Elizabeth Blackwell and Winfield Scott after germ theory. Thus, the 
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discourse of venereal disease created an emphasis on the behavior of such men, an 
emphasis that Willard’s 1890 text clearly exploits. 
Reading Willard’s rhetorical strategies in the context of the new science of the 
time, we see that reforms she had been advocating since 1874 took on a new urgency as a 
result of the 1880s and 1890s findings of just how much “intemperate lives” had affected 
marriages. When Willard highlights the role of prevention in the reform goals of the 
social purity movement, she also evokes connections with the rhetoric of venereal disease 
created in the medical community: 
An organized and systematic work for the promotion of Social Purity was 
undertaken in 1885 by the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union. Under 
the three subdivisions of Preventative, Reformatory and Legal Work, this 
society has gone steadily forward until the White Cross Pledge, appealing 
to the chivalry of men, has grown familiar in thousands of homes, and the 
White Shield Pledge, appealing to the chivalry of women, is following fast 
after the first. (326) 
The three subdivisions Willard establishes are similar to those the medical community 
advocated, such as the categories of reform that Morrow elaborates in his later text. The 
references to “chivalry” here imply a connection with standards of sexuality. 
Furthermore, the goal of prevention mentioned shows that the medical reformers 
provided the exigence for more work in educating the public on temperate lifestyles that 
Willard’s discourse enters. Thus, science provided new exigencies and new warrants to 
support the long standing goals of social purity.  
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Free Love
The free love critiques of marriage became more popular in the late-nineteenth 
century, at the same time that physicians were discovering the true causes of venereal 
disease and how it was transmitted. Thus, in the public eye, these radical claims had some 
backing from recent scientific discoveries. The exigence of the new sciences and the 
discussion of sexual diseases created a public consciousness concerned with sexual 
practices that the free love reformers could take advantage of. Earlier free love advocates’ 
texts, such as Mary Gove Nichols’s Marriage (1854) and Victoria Woodhull’s The Elixir 
of Life (1873), which claimed that marriage was a “diseased” institution that did women 
more harm than good, were bolstered by new findings that turned their imagery into fact. 
However, free love discourse did not position women as the victims of men who spread 
venereal disease, but instead condemned the societal and institutional structures, such as 
the marriage system, that fostered the conditions under which women caught venereal 
diseases. Within their critiques and calls to abolish marriage, the free love radicals 
employed the rhetoric of disease for different ends.  
Hulda Potter-Loomis’s 1890s treatise on social freedom, for example, exposes the 
institution of marriage as a sham that impedes progress and allows men “ownership” of 
the “wife’s sexual organs” (17 and 18). This rhetoric, emphasizing that husbands can 
control their wives’ bodies and distancing women from the sexual organs that men 
control, was given new urgency by the discourse of disease: husbands who control their 
wives’ sexual organs can infect them. Potter-Loomis does not explicitly engage the 
discourse of disease, but several of her arguments and statements evoke this discourse, 
such as when she refers to the “evils which have grown out of restrictions” (7), a phrasing 
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that suggests disease as the “social evil” being spread by the restrictions inherent in the 
marriage system. Immediately after calling to mind such evils, Potter-Loomis references 
new divorce laws, and says that these laws will not cause significant change. The 
reference to such laws immediately after the reference to “evils” in the marriage system 
implies a criticism of the newer divorce laws put in place in order to protect women from 
husbands infected with venereal disease in the 1880s. Like other free lovers, though, 
Potter-Loomis urges a deeper look into the ways that customs and institutions cause such 
evils. She also criticizes those who champion abstinence as protection, since “Human 
desire is the true spur to human progress, and we mark our progress by the fulfillment of 
our desires” (14). Free love advocates like Potter-Loomis, Victoria Woodhull, Dora 
Foster, and Juliet Severance attempted to reframe sexual discourses by showing that it 
was not sex itself that was “impure,” but the way some people practiced it. Thus, the 
arguments for abstinence and continence that social purity reformers advocated were 
condemned by the free lovers because of their position on the importance of sex to the 
individual. Instead, they wanted to look more deeply into the institutions that sheltered 
men’s actions and left women vulnerable. Since they were doing so after the advent of 
germ theory, their calls for reform became more relevant. 
Potter-Loomis refers to marriage as a “whited sepulcher” sheltering damaging 
behaviors: “What a ‘whited sepulcher’ our temple of virtue and morality is and what 
hypocrites we are who bow before its altar” (21). This New Testament image of the 
“whited sepulcher” was also used to describe the homes that allowed germs to fester. In 
an 1883 article in The North American Review, Charles Wingate exposed “The 
Unsanitary Homes of the Rich,” showing that germs could attack the homes of the poor 
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and the rich, with inadequate plumbing as a chief cause. After describing houses “of 
imposing dimensions, palatial in their adornments, and seeming to lack nothing to 
promote comfort, enjoyment, and health,” he goes on to proclaim, “A larger number of 
these houses are mere whited sepulchers, and their luxurious inmates are exposed to 
constant risk of disease and death” (qtd in Tomes, Gospel 48). The use of this same 
image reveals that both the home and the institution of marriage sheltered germs of 
disease, whether it was an actual germ, as in Wingate’s discourse, or a metaphorical 
germ, as in Potter-Loomis’s 1890s treatise. As Juliet Severance asserts in Marriage 
(1901), institutional marriage had not succeeded as “the safeguard of virtue” (4-5). 
The most prolific and visible free love advocate, the infamous Victoria Woodhull, 
not only had a new exigence for her critique of marriage, but also a new warrant for her 
eugenic ideals. In her pamphlet on Stirpiculture; or, The Scientific Propagation of the 
Human Race (1888),65 Woodhull’s line of argument is similar to those behind the 
marriage laws in several states that prevented men inflicted with venereal disease from 
getting married. She sets up a series of propositions, one of which is “Thou shalt not 
marry when malformed or diseased” (9). We see here the beginnings of the eugenic 
rhetoric of the early twentieth century that attempted to prevent the “unfit” from 
procreating. Such discourse has its root in the efforts to prevent the spread of venereal 
disease, but it was shaped for quite different and more sinister ends at the turn of the 
century. For Woodhull, a women’s rights agenda that affirmed female sexuality was 
connected to women’s role as “mothers of the race”; therefore, Woodhull’s rhetoric 
 
65 The term “stirpiculture,” an early form of eugenics practiced by free love advocate John Humphrey 
Noyes, is an especially significant choice of term because of the root “stirps,” which can be used to 
describe the branch of a family and is also used in zoology as a term of classification (Oxford English 
Dictionary). 
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previews the kind that doctors produced in response to Morrow’s later conclusions about 
venereal disease as a threat to the family unit and to future generations. Woodhull saw 
her arguments as applying “scientific knowledge for the benefit of humanity” 
(Humanitarian Government 3), but she was really applying the arguments that physicians 
had constructed based on their interpretations of scientific knowledge. 
Free love advocates often condemned society’s efforts to reform the harms done 
in the marriage system: “The laws of the United States are constructed to deal with 
effects only, and do not take into consideration the causes” (Woodhull Martin, 
Stirpiculture 26-27). This sentiment was shared by many in the movement, including 
Severance and Waisbrooker. These reformers believed that only a system where women 
could choose their husbands freely, not under economic duress, and where their actions 
and sexual practices would not be dictated by law, would cure society of its ills, and in 
this new context, would cure society of literal diseases. The discourses coming out of the 
discipline of bacteriology strengthened their claim that the institution of marriage 
produced the conditions for disease, and also gave them a new argument to apply to their 
goals. 
 Even more radical sex reformers took advantage of the new metaphors created by 
the discourse of bacteriology and venereal disease for much different ends. Angela 
Heywood seems to be the most radical free love advocate in the movement, since she was 
one of the few who advocated abortion and also attempted to revolutionize how sex was 
discussed, preferring the more “vulgar,” common language to the terms employed by 
“polite society.”66 Thus, Heywood’s rhetoric is more confrontational than other 
 
66 See Chapter 1 and Battan (1993), “’The Word Made Flesh’: Language, Authority, and Sexual Desire in 
Late Nineteenth-Century America.” 
157
reformers’. Her piece on “body housekeeping,” published in 1893 in the last issue of The 
Word, the radical periodical she edited with her anarchist husband, takes her signature 
confrontational rhetoric and applies it to the right of women to have abortions. In this 
work, her reconfiguring of abortion not only relies on legal rhetoric, but also on the new 
metaphors created by the popularized germ theory of disease. 
Heywood presents abortion as a form of “washing” when she says, “Is it ‘proper,’ 
‘polite,’ for men, real he men, to go to Washington to say, by penal law, fines, and 
imprisonment, whether woman may continue her natural right to wash, rinse or wipe out 
her own vaginal body opening,--as well as legislate when she may blow her nose, dray 
[sic] her eyes, or nurse her babe” (131; emphasis in original). In this rhetoric, unwanted 
pregnancy is likened to a germ in the body that must be washed out. The metaphors that 
Tomes and JoAnn Brown (1997) identify correlate with this rhetoric. Both scholars find 
that in popular thinking, germs were the invaders that needed to be cleansed with proper 
hygiene. In Heywood’s argument, the body is infected by a germ, or stranger, a 
connection perhaps made possible by August Weisman’s use of the word “germ” in the 
“germ plasm theory of heredity” he asserted in 1883 (See Chapter 5). In Heywood’s 
argument, the process of abortion is a means of hygiene; it is compared with the benign 
act of washing the body. She likens the act of “washing” out the vagina to the common 
practice of blowing one’s nose--both acts done in response when one has been invaded by 
“germs.”  
 Heywood concludes her argument with another reference to abortion as “body 
housekeeping”: “Sex is not an unheard of or an unfelt fact in any one, and the sooner 
body housekeeping has rational mention the better. Intelligent acquaintance with, and 
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clear knowledge of ourselves will replace the song of disease with the song of Health, 
and make home-thrift the rule, instead of the exception” (133). Her emphasis on the home 
and her metaphor of the body as something that needs cleaning and housekeeping 
connect with the language used in those campaigns. Thus, in Heywood’s portrayal, 
abortion is likened to the kind of “home protection” rhetoric employed by those applying 
science to everyday practices.  
 Both social purity and free love reformers were able to use the new discourses of 
disease to argue for women’s rights. Both sets of reformers were also able to reaffirm 
women’s sexuality through this discourse. Women were portrayed as potential victims of 
disease, but not as passive, asexual victims. Instead, these reformers revealed social 
codes, legal codes, and the marriage system as the culprits for breeding the conditions for 
disease. While sex was the means of transferring the “germ,” it was the inequality 
inherent in the sexual relations between men and women that these reformers blamed for 
the spread of such diseases. Their conclusions matched those of Scudder, Blackwell, and 
Morrow. In accessing medical reform literature, they were able to use the new rhetorics 
of bacteriology for feminist reform ends. Later discourses illustrate how these arguments 
from expediency led to material feminist reforms, such as birth control.  
Birth Control: Sanger
Birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger (1879-1966) comes in at the end of this era 
in the history of sexuality, and through her work we can see how the discourse of disease 
as related to the rights of women evolved. Born Margaret Higgins in 1879 in Corning, 
New York, she lost her mother Anne Purcell to the strains of childbearing; her mother 
had born eleven children (Garraty and Carnes 19.264). Trained as a nurse, Sanger worked 
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with poor populations and was appalled by the rates of pregnancies and diseases in these 
populations, which led to her later advocacy of birth control. Working in New York City 
in 1911, she also became involved with radical socialists (19.264). Sanger was asked to 
write a column for the New York Call in 1913; entitled, “What Every Girl Should 
Know,” this column frankly discussed venereal disease, leading to its banning under the 
Comstock law. Sanger jumped bail and fled persecution for obscenity in 1914, settling in 
England for a year. Her husband, William Sanger, was then targeted and he went to jail in 
1914 for sending out one of his estranged wife’s pamphlets. Margaret Sanger returned to 
face prosecution in 1915, but the government dropped its charges against her as a result 
of the death of her five year old daughter (19.265). She continued to advocate birth 
control, which was made easier after the Comstock laws were eliminated in 1936.  
In her 1920 book, What Every Girl Should Know, a collection of essays from her 
column, including the one that provoked her arrest, Sanger argues that science has 
dispelled popular myths about women, men, and venereal disease. Her rhetoric aligns her 
more with social purity advocates than free lovers, since she urges “continency until 
marriage and then monogamy” as the best protection against venereal disease (72), and 
she blames the spread of venereal disease on a double standard of sexual morality. Her 
discourse presents the most salient use of science and illustrates how science was able to 
eliminate older myths that positioned women as “unclean” and as breeders of disease. 
 Like Blackwell, Sanger blames social ideologies, such as the belief that young 
men need sex as soon as they reach maturity, for the conditions that spread disease. She 
blames parents who believe that the sexual organs of young men will be harmed if not 
used at the age of maturity for perpetuating unhealthy sexual practices (63-64). She then 
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proclaims, “It is now a recognized fact that it is no more necessary for a boy to ‘sow wild 
oats’ that it is for a girl, and women are today demanding of men the same cleanliness of 
body and mind which men have heretofore considered necessary only in women” (65). 
This statement shows that the efforts of physicians in the late nineteenth century to 
discourage male promiscuity continued, and that “proofs” like Morrow’s, who used men 
who left the priesthood as evidence, strengthened the claim that young men did not need 
“to sow wild oats.” Like Woodhull in her 1874 Tried as by Fire speech, Sanger places the 
blame for ignorance on both the medical establishment and parents who do not educate 
their boys and girls on sexuality, and Sanger even urges that girls should become familiar 
with male anatomy (67).  
Sanger also illustrates how science dissolved old myths about women and 
venereal disease with her explanation of how gonorrhea is caused by bacteria: 
In former days gonorrhea was considered an ordinary cattarhal 
inflammation, “no worse than a bad cold,” the old saying went. It was 
thought to originate in women with the discharge at the end of the 
menstrual cycle…in fact any secretions from the uterus, of an irritating 
character, were thought to be sources of gonorrhea. However, with the 
discovery of the microbe “gonococcus,” in 1879, by Dr. Albert Neisser, it 
is now an established fact that the disease comes from a source where 
there is either latent or chronic gonorrhea, which, of course, means that the 
gonococcus is present. It is considered a conservative estimate that at least 
50 per cent. of the adult population in this country have suffered from 
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gonococca infection. More men than women have been and are infected. 
(69-70) 
Sanger here shows how bacteriology refuted the kind of ideologies of women’s role in 
disease that Spongberg studies.67 Older myths about women being inherently diseased or 
their discharge being “unclean,” and even a belief that one could tell if a woman had 
syphilis by the structure of her body, were eliminated by Neisser’s discovery.  
Sanger also calls upon previous scientific and medical studies, such as Morrow’s 
study of the number of people infected with venereal disease in New York, as well as 
more recent statistics on the frequency of infection. She uses Morrow to create more 
urgency to talk about the topic: “When a few years ago Dr. Morrow stated that there is 
more venereal disease among innocent, virtuous wives, than among prostitutes, this 
statement should have resounded throughout the walls of every home in the land, instead 
of which it is kept intact within the covers of large volumes, where only those wearing 
cap and gown have access to it” (67). Sanger here illustrates how medical practitioners 
still used the danger posed to “innocent, virtuous wives” as an exigence for greater efforts 
at sex education. She also emphasizes the importance of communicating information to 
the public, rather than keeping it within the medical community. Finally, Sanger draws on 
the eugenic implications of the discourse of disease, calling both gonorrhea and syphilis 
“social dangers” because of their effects on offspring (80). Her rhetoric demonstrates 
how the key features of the discourse of disease in the late nineteenth century survived in 
new reform discourse of the twentieth century. 





Throughout the nineteenth century, free love advocates had critiqued the marriage 
system, invoking the metaphor of disease. It is no surprise, though, that free love rhetoric 
had its heyday starting in the 1870s, the same time that the scientific community was 
finding out how deeply actual disease had infiltrated the marriage system. The arguments 
of social purity and free love reformers were therefore refreshed by the new discourses 
coming out of the findings of bacteriology. In these reform discourses, human agency 
increased. The war against germs waged in medical and popular communities 
emphasized human agency in promoting cleanliness. In order to have an impact on the 
rhetoric of sexuality though, venereal diseases needed to be equated with other diseases 
caused by germs. Once Neisser discovered the germ agent in gonorrhea, such a shift 
occurred. As Morrow shows, the war against venereal diseases needed to be waged in the 
same way as the war against diseases such as tuberculosis (xxi and 385-387). The new 
disease agent provided a general reform warrant, which could then be applied in 
numerous ways. Scientific and medical findings then led to material social reforms and 
alliances between scientists, physicians, sanitarians, and reformers.   
The findings in bacteriology helped reformers to call into question long-held 
assumptions. As this chapter demonstrates, social ideologies were often blamed as causes 
of the spread of venereal disease. Findings in bacteriology had promoted hygienic 
changes in sewage treatment and housekeeping to ward off infectious diseases. Sexual 
reformers wanted the logic behind such reforms (logic that showed how germs spread) to 
extend to the checks against venereal disease. Woodhull (1888) illustrates the 
comparisons they made:  
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If there be a cesspool in a street, the neighbours do not hastily cover it up 
so that it may be hidden from the public view. No; they have the very 
bottom dredged that their loved ones may not sicken and die from the 
malaria. But the social and political cesspools may go on gathering in the 
germs of deadly miasma, while each human soul vies with the other to 
ignore the fatal effects. (Stirpiculture 24) 
Medical and social reformers attacked these social and political “cesspools,” hoping to 
check their spread of venereal disease. 
While the discourses concerning bacteriology and venereal disease are clearly 
gendered, they still could be used for feminist reform purposes. Social purity, free love, 
and birth control advocates capitalized on scientific findings to renew the exigence for 
the sex education such reformers had been advocating since the mid-nineteenth century. 
They also had a new warrant for their argument that marriage was a diseased institution. 
The applications of germ theory in the home then provided a new way of talking about 
the home as needing protection, whether it was from outside or inside forces. Most of 
these reformers made such arguments without negating women’s sexuality itself. Science 
defeated many of the old myths about the nature of such diseases and refuted the notion 
that they were a punishment for immorality. The implementation of sex education that 
came out of these discourses is also an important marker in the history of the rhetoric of 
sexuality. What bacteriology did most, though, was create a greater sense of urgency, 
making sex a vital topic in popular discourses.  
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Chapter 4: Embryology
The first thing to be done is to get rid of the idea that sex in its parts and 
manifestations is something to be ashamed of. Another has well said: ‘No 
one idea has ever fettered the progress of the race and retarded its 
development to such an extent as the silly superstition that there is 
something repulsive in the origin of life, something obscene in the process 
of human reproduction.’  (Waisbrooker, Fountain of Life 24)
Lois Waisbrooker’s 1893 statement demonstrates one of the roles science would 
fill in free love arguments: To make sex less “obscene” and “repulsive,” free love 
advocates had to position the sexual act in a scientific perspective as a step in the process 
of reproduction and a step in the process of evolution. Embryology, a science concerned 
with these processes, thus provided still more scientific warrants for free love arguments. 
Arguments in the reform sphere stressing the importance of the mother to prenatal 
development and the need for her protection were given an important exigence through 
new discoveries in embryology. In this new perspective, women’s rights and free love 
thus became a matter of evolution. 
 The science of embryology used the past to explain the future in its study of the 
development of the embryo and the progression of the species in evolution. Free love 
rhetors seized on this emphasis by positing free love as the means to a final stage on the 
evolutionary chain. The link between the discourses of science and free love feminism 
thus becomes more explicit when one looks at the sciences dealing with questions of 
human development and reproduction. While knowledge of physiology provided the 
warrants for arguments asserting women’s status as sexual beings and bacteriology 
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provided warrants for arguments confirming marriage as a “diseased” institution, the 
discipline of embryology and theories of heredity gave free love rhetoric its more 
compelling arguments that free love could have beneficial results. Free love feminists 
theorized that only when men and women united in love, without constraints, and forsook 
the inequalities embedded in the marriage system, would true progress in human 
evolution occur. To argue this line of thought, however, they relied on the warrants 
established by the scientific community concerning how fetal development occurred and 
how embryos diversified from the moment of conception until birth.  
 The science of embryology also provided warrants for arguments that highlighted 
women’s special role in fostering human evolution and development. The developments 
in embryology could have been read as helping to confirm women’s status as 
childbearers and to restrict their activities from the public sphere since these 
developments emphasized the need to protect women during the sensitive times of 
conception and gestation. But actually, reformers concerned with sexuality used the new 
knowledge about embryological development to further their specific women’s rights 
agendas. They found in embryology further exigence for why women should have 
freedom to choose sexual partners and to demand changes in the sexual conditions of the 
household. Under their arguments, women should be given more rights rather than 
restrictions because of the mother’s special relation to the developing embryo. In 
addition, the knowledge that both men and women equally contributed the material to 
form the new embryo added weight to these reformers’ claims for the importance of 
women in human evolution.  
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The three main questions addressed by nineteenth-century embryology concerned 
whether the adult organism was preformed or went through a specific process of 
development--the preformation versus epigenesis debate; whether or not the development 
of the embryo reflected the stages of development of a species--known as recapitulation 
theory; and whether males or females were primarily responsible for the characteristics of 
the growing organism. Findings in embryology then translated into a popularized 
discourse in the medical field, where physicians stressed women’s role in the 
development of a new life. Finally, racial uplift and free love speakers parlayed these 
discourses into a rhetoric of reform. Eventually, embryology would also contribute to the 
means by which reformers could understand birth control.  
This chapter analyzes how developments in embryology, a science concerned 
with such diverse matters as how cells divide and how ova are shaped, could nevertheless 
provide warrants for women’s rights in free love discourse and also in racial uplift 
arguments. This chapter first reviews the findings in embryology, the most important of 
which, to free love reformers, was the fall of preformation theory, since it seemed to 
provide the possibility for influence on the embryo. This chapter also reviews how the 
scientific discourse of embryology made special use of visuals to convey the stages of 
development, leading to a dissociation of the human female from the processes occurring 
inside her. It would be up to reformers to re-embody the woman and to argue for her 
status as an agent of evolution. Finally, this chapter shows how the findings in 
embryology often revitalized older beliefs about the influence pregnant women had on 
the embryo/fetus.  
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The Part as the Whole Warrant: Embryology in the Nineteenth Century 
 While embryology, or the study of the development of organisms, existed before 
the nineteenth century, it was in the nineteenth century that it emerged as a premier 
discipline, due to the work of the preeminent embryologist Carl Ernst von Baer and to 
advances in cell theory. Before the nineteenth century, embryology was mired in debates 
over preformation versus epigenesis, as well as in inaccurate conceptions of embryo 
formation. Nineteenth-century thinkers would resolve these debates through observations 
of eggs and cell division. This section will review the varied theories of embryology: the 
preformation and epigenesis debates; the use of embryology in evolutionary theories of 
Darwin and the recapitulation theories of Haeckel; and the findings in cell theory that 
allowed embryologists to locate fertilization and confirm the contributions to the embryo 
from the male and the female. 
Older Views in Embryology
In 1651, William Harvey made the famous statement that “All that is alive comes 
from the egg” (qtd in Pinto-Correina 2). A new focus on the egg would resonate in later 
centuries, though older ideas still persisted. For example, Nicolas Venette’s influential 
investigation into sexual relations in his 1686 sex manual Tableau de L’amour Conjugal 
ignored the debates between ovists and spermists--that is, the debates over whether the 
egg or the sperm largely created the new being--in favor of the classical views of 
Hippocrates, which theorized that both male and female produced “seed” through 
ejaculation, leading to the persistence of the idea that female orgasm was required for 
conception, and that these seeds combined to form the offspring (Porter and Hall 75-76). 
Venette’s text also located conception in the fallopian tubes, rather than the more popular 
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view that conception occurred in the uterus, and he endorsed the belief that conception in 
the right tube would produce male offspring and in the left tube would produce female 
offspring (Porter and Hall 78). The highly circulated sex manual Aristotle’s Master-piece 
(1684) noted the debate over whether the fetus is nourished through the umbilical cord or 
the mouth, but endorsed the view that it was nourished through the mouth (Porter and 
Hall 45). Most of the debates in embryology prior to the nineteenth century then centered 
around the question of whether the male or the female contributed most to generation. 
Another debate in embryology concerned preformation and epigenesis. In the 
seventeenth century, adherents of preformation theory posited that all living organisms 
were preformed and that there was a primordial organism in which the forms of all 
succeeding generations were encased. The logic behind preformationism was that nothing 
could come from nothing (Pinto Correia xv). Preformationists were not logically wrong; 
they understood that spontaneous generation could not exist. However, while their 
general warrant would be accepted, their specific claim would be rejected by nineteenth-
century embryologists. 
Preformation also led to debates over the centrality of the egg or the sperm in the 
development of the embryo, which split into two camps: the ovists who believed that the 
preformed new being was stored in the egg, and the spermists who believed that the 
preformed new being was located in the sperm (Pinto Correia xvi). The debate over 
whose influence determined embryonic development vacillated between the male and the 
female, depending on social ideologies. In classical times, some viewed the influence of 
the mother as stronger because of the sharing of the blood and blood vessels (Needham 
216). Other theories concerned the semen giving “form” to the embryo with the female 
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providing the “shaping” (Needham 40). Clearly, whether the influence of the male or the 
female was emphasized often depended upon gender ideologies (Needham 45). These 
earlier ideas relied on an understanding of the body as a complex machine, but once 
bodies were broken down into cells, a new ideology of generation could be created. 
Nineteenth-Century Developments in Embryology
During the nineteenth century, embryology emerged as a formalized scientific 
discipline, capitalizing on technological advances in the microscope as well as on 
theoretical advances in cell theory and evolution. Embryology achieved status as the 
study of development, contributing to knowledge of sexuality and reproduction. Its 
questions were considered the source of knowledge for how we got here and where we 
are going as a species. As Carl Ernst von Baer stated in 1828, “The history of 
development is the true source of light for the investigation of organized bodies” (qtd in 
Coleman 36). Similarly, Ernst Haeckel found the study of embryology integral to 
understanding the present and the future: “Development is now the magic word by means 
of which we shall solve the riddles by which we are surrounded” (qtd in Oppenheimer 
272). Though optimistic and idealistic in their interpretations of the role of embryology, 
their focus yielded practical applications. Embryology opened the door towards using the 
part to explain the whole--by unlocking the mystery of the embryo, scientists would 
reveal the mysteries of human descent and human bodies, and open a door that reformers 
glided through in their attempts to reconfigure women’s roles in evolutionary ascent.  
The centuries-long debate between preformationists and epigenesists came to an 
end in the mid-nineteenth century, though holdovers to preformation still existed. In 
contrast to preformation theory, the theory of epigenesis, a belief that the egg was an 
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unformed entity, illuminated the stages of development. Epigenesists viewed 
development as a process and each stage in organic development saw the fertilized egg 
assume increasingly complex structures, with each stage as the basis of the next stage in 
the process (Coleman 35-36). Scientists who examined the development of different 
animals found proof of epigenesis, observing these stages, and support for preformation 
began to wane (Coleman 43). Epigenesis thus provided a new warrant--that embryonic 
development went in distinct stages, each dependent on the previous stage.  
Carl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), a preeminent embryologist, contributed to the 
defeat of preformation theory in his study of the mammalian egg in 1828, which showed 
how organisms develop through a process of differentiation (Bowler and Morus 170-
171). Von Baer, who had also led expeditions through Arctic Russia and the Caspian Sea 
in the 1830s (Porter and Ogilvie 111), studied medicine but found himself drawn more to 
scientific research in embryology and zoology than to medical practice. He performed his 
influential work while holding positions as professor of anatomy and zoology in Vienna, 
Wurtzburg, and Konigsburg (Williams, Biographical Dictionary 26). His investigation 
into the layers of embryos began after his colleague Ignaz Dollinger, Professor of 
Anatomy, suggested he study chick embryos. However, this work, which included 
looking at the blastodermic membrane removed from the yolk, proved expensive, 
because it required a large number of eggs and someone to oversee the incubator (Porter 
and Ogilvie 111-112). Von Baer instead chose to develop the work of his friend Christian 
Pander who had been investigating the layers of the vertebrate embryo, in 1817 
concluding that there are three layers. Von Baer then theorized that these “germ layers” 
were central to the development of the embryo (112). He later showed how these distinct 
171
membranes developed into the body’s separate systems and tissues, such as the nervous 
system (112). 
Von Baer also turned his attention to finding the mammalian ovum. While Harvey 
had previously sought the mammalian egg in the uterus of a deer, von Baer sought the 
egg in the ovary of a dog—and found it. He then was able to state with authority that 
“every animal that springs from the coition of male and female is developed from an 
ovum, and none from a simple formative liquid” (qtd in Porter and Ogilvie 112). This 
finding refuted older views that the embryo formed from “seed” ejaculated from both the 
male and the female (Porter and Hall 76).  
Von Baer also drove the last nail into the coffin of preformation theory with his 
work on germ layers. His theory that each layer produces specific organs and tissues of 
an organism helped to show that the embryo went through specific stages of life in its 
development. He also refuted the belief that all vertebrate embryos have the same 
development pattern and argued instead that they were merely similar in early stages. He 
left labels off embryos from different species to show how they were all similar in early 
stages of development, leading him to conclude that “all arise from the same fundamental 
form” (Von Baer qtd in Porter and Ogilvie 112). He published his studies of the 
mammalian egg in his 1827 work On the Origin of the Mammalian and Human Ovum,
which along with his later work, The Developmental History of Animals (1828-1837), 
proved influential to scientists studying embryology and evolution. 
Meanwhile, several important developments in knowledge of cells added to an 
understanding of the process of fertilization and development of embryos. In 1843, 
embryologists with improved microscopes viewed the sperm interacting with the egg, 
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which showed how fertilization occurred, though the significance of this finding was not 
realized for several years. In 1855, German embryologist Robert Remak proposed his 
theory on how new cells formed from division of old cells, a refutation of spontaneous 
generation theory. Remak (1815-1865) had a relatively unremarkable academic career 
until 1836, when he obtained his first compound microscope (Williams, Biographical 
Dictionary 411-412). In 1851, he showed that two of the layers von Baer had proposed 
were actually one layer. He then turned to the study of cell proliferation in 1852, leading 
to his important discovery on the division of cells. While Remak and other scientists were 
concerned with the generation of current life forms, others made past stages life their 
chief concern. 
Darwin’s work on evolutionary theory helped to reconfigure the study of 
embryology in his arguments on common descent using embryology as evidence (Mayr, 
Growth of Biological Thought 469-476). Indebted to the work of von Baer and Johann 
Meckel, Darwin posited that the stages of development revealed in embryology 
demonstrate the progression of species from lower to higher organisms. Darwin found 
support for the progression to higher stages through embryonic development, though he 
clarifies, “The embryo in the course of development generally rises in organisation: I use 
this expression, though I am aware that it is hardly possible to define clearly what is 
meant by the organisation being higher or lower. But no one probably will dispute that 
the butterfly is higher than the caterpillar” (Origin 356). As with epigenesis and 
recapitulation, Darwin saw the products of evolution in an ascending series.  
But Darwin’s most important contribution, in terms of reform, was his question of 
how changes and variation occurred. His theory of “descent with modification” placed 
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the occurrence of variations within the embryo, but he was careful to note, “The question 
is not, at what period of life any variation has been caused, but at what period it is fully 
displayed” (358). Darwin left the question of agency open, which provided a gap to enter 
for reformers. His speculation on how variation occurs is of particular significance for 
later reform rhetoric: 
The cause [of variation between parents and offspring] may have acted, 
and I believe generally has acted, even before the embryo is formed; and 
the variation may be due to the male and female sexual elements having 
been affected by the conditions to which either parent, or their ancestors, 
have been exposed. Nevertheless an effect thus caused at a very early 
period, even before the formation of the embryo, may appear late in life; 
as when a hereditary disease, which appears in old age alone, has been 
communicated to the offspring from the reproductive element of one 
parent. (Origin 358)
Darwin’s theory that the “sexual elements” could be affected, sometimes to the detriment 
of later offspring, became a central point in reformers’ arguments. This theory gave 
credence to a view of heredity affected by outside influences. The lack of precise agency 
in his theory was also a critical point since reformers were then left to nominate agents 
that served their argument. 
 Another influential philosophy in the study of embryology was recapitulation 
theory, which theorized that each organism would go through an evolutionary series in its 
development, from lower to higher forms (Russett 50). The organism would, that is, 
recapitulate its ancestry in its development. Proponents of recapitulation theory, such as 
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Johann Friedrich Meckel and Ernst Haeckel, believed that they could look to the whole 
history of the animal phyla to explain the individual organism’s development. Meckel 
said in 1821, “The development of the individual organism obeys the same laws as the 
development of the whole animal series; that is to say, the higher animal, in its gradual 
evolution, essentially passes through the permanent organic stages which lie below it” 
(qtd in Coleman 50).  
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), like von Baer, studied medicine but found himself 
uninterested in medical practice (Williams, Biographical Dictionary 219). He instead 
became a professor of zoology, and was also responsible for coining the term “ecology” 
(Porter and Ogilvie 442-443). After meeting Darwin in 1866, Haeckel became one of his 
most enthusiastic proponents.  He found support in evolutionary theory for his intense 
interest in recapitulation theory. Drawing on the finding that gill pouches existed in both 
bird and mammal embryos that were not present in the adults of these species (Porter and 
Ogilvie 442-443), Haeckel revived recapitulation theory, and theorized that “ontogeny 
(the development of the individual organism) recapitulates phylogeny (the evolutionary 
history of the species)” (Bowler and Morus 170). A gifted artist, he also produced 
depictions of species descent to support recapitulation theory. 
The theory of recapitulation was thus based on a structure that placed humans at 
the top of an evolutionary hierarchy, and that viewed humanity as the intended goal of 
evolution (Bowler and Morus 153). It also offered a key component to reformist 
arguments: the notion of “the part as the whole,” emphasized by Haeckel. Proponents of 
recapitulation theory saw the embryo as the model for evolution, with the embryo 
literally going through the process of evolution in its development (Bowler and Morus 
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151-153). While recapitulation had its adherents and detractors, historian of science Ernst 
Mayr (1982) points out that the theory, while based on misinterpretation of the laws of 
parallelism (Growth of Biological Thought 471), was responsible for increased interest in 
embryology and important findings in the field (474). Use of the embryo as a model for 
evolution in recapitulation theory eventually supplied a line of argument for reformers: 
the embryo residing within the woman made her an agent of evolution, and she was 
literally the setting where evolution would take place. 
 However, it was cell theory that exerted the most influence over the study of 
embryology, especially concerning the question of whose material, the male’s or the 
female’s, contributes most to the formation and characteristics of their offspring. Cell 
theory allowed scientists to understand the creation of new life as a division of cells and 
also pointed the way towards understanding how the egg and sperm contributed to the 
new cell (Bowler and Morus 165). Remak had already shown that new cells were formed 
by the division of old cells, which paved the way for examining what was occurring in 
the process of fertilization. Fertilization itself would be illuminated by two different 
scientists working independently of one another, but coming to the same conclusions.  
 In the 1870s, Oscar Hertwig (1849-1922) and Herman Fol (1845-1892) both 
examined the joining of the sperm and the egg and the initial presence of two nuclei, thus 
showing how the fertilized ovum formed out of material not from one, but from both 
parents. Hertwig, a zoologist and professor of anatomy, cytology, and embryology, took a 
trip to the Mediterranean that led him to study the sea urchin, whose large eggs made cell 
division easy to study (Gillispie 6.338). He saw that only one spermatozoa was needed to 
fertilize the egg and that two nuclei existed after fertilization, one from the egg and one 
176
from the sperm. Fol, a biologist studying mollusks, came to the same conclusions, which 
he published in papers in 1877 and 1879. These men’s important discoveries in cell 
theory thus provided strong evidence for the claim that both parents supplied the material 
for the embryo.  
Cell theory, then, pointed the way towards understanding the contributions of 
both parents, lessening gender biases and forming the basis of later breakthroughs in 
heredity, such as August Weismann’s work on germ plasm (see Chapter 5). Weismann’s 
work would not have been possible without knowledge of how the egg is fertilized and 
how both parents contribute material to the embryo (Bowler and Morus 171). The focus 
on the cell served to further break down the process of reproduction--it could be 
understood not only at the level of physical interaction of bodies, but also at the levels of 
the cells that compose this material. Thus as Waisbrooker, whose quotation opens this 
chapter, would claim, what could be obscene about a process that produces cell fusion 
and division? 
The elite but widespread science of embryology dealt with various issues that 
would find their way into the public consciousness and validate the popular interest in 
examining sexuality: the theory of epigenesis, or how each embryo develops in a series of 
interdependent stages; the theory of evolution, which explained variation and species 
development; and recapitulation theory, which focused on the part, the embryo, as the 
whole of the evolutionary history of the species. Cell theory also became integral to the 
discourse of embryology, because it explained the division of old cells to form new cells 
and helped to illuminate the process of fertilization. Just as important as what these 
theories said, however, was how these theories were conveyed. 
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Warrant-Establishing and the Discourse of Embryology
Embryology occupies a central role in the history of how scientists put their 
findings into discourse since it emphasized the importance of visual and even three-
dimensional representations in communicating discoveries of processes invisible to the 
naked eye. Theories in the field, ranging from epigenesis to recapitulation theory, would 
not have reached such a vast audience and achieved such influence if scientists like von 
Baer, Wilhelm His, and Haeckel were not able to use different visual methods for 
communicating their findings. Their use of visuals also resulted in new audiences for 
scientific discourses. Nick Hopwood’s studies of the history of the science of embryology 
(1999, 2005, 2006) have demonstrated the importance of visual representations to this 
science. From von Baer’s demonstrations and illustrations of the layers of the embryo in 
the 1820s, to Wilhelm His’s three-dimensional models of embryos in the 1860s, to 
Haeckel’s drawings of vertebrate embryos to compare development and prove 
evolutionary theory in the 1860s and 1870s, scientists not only provided more concrete 
evidence for their own discourse communities, but their representations also opened up 
their discourses to new audiences who found these visualizations compelling. Visually 
representing models of embryos allowed scientists to both convey and organize their 
findings as well as to depict the series and stages of development (Hopwood, “Pictures” 
265).  
 For example, scientific arguments for development and evolution often employed 
images of ladders and branching trees to visualize the multi-layered process of 
development. Species ascent was then given more presence through these visuals. 
Reform arguments also picked up on these metaphors of ladders and trees. Critic Nick 
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Hopwood (2005) has even noted that visuals became the preferred method for 
demonstrating the process of development because they often provided stronger evidence 
than textual descriptions (Hopwood, “Visual Standards”). His’s three-dimensional model 
revealed the depth of the layers in embryos. Developments in the microscope showed 
how there could be analysis of material at the level of cells, which scientists could then 
represent visually. Visual models of embryos also enabled scientists to convey the 
workings of the process of development down to the level of cells, which is a prominent 
feature in medical popularizations of this branch of science as well. Haeckel’s visual 
representations are perhaps the most controversial: he used images to show the 
comparative development of different species of embryos to support theories of evolution 
and recapitulation, but many of his images were later contested and Haeckel was accused 
of fabrication to support evolution (Hopwood, “Pictures of Evolution”). However, his 
work contributed to the growing trend of using visuals to convey the findings of 
embryology. These visuals aided in the development of warrants because the stages of 
development could be illustrated for the audience. 
Finally, the scientists’ use of the embryo as the model for how evolution occurred 
in natural selection and recapitulation theories demonstrates the rhetorical strategy of 
dissociating the part from the whole, yet representing that part as the whole. In the human 
female, the embryo is part of the whole body, yet it represents the process of evolution, or 
the whole run of phylogeny, within her body. Representing the embryo as the model for 
evolution made the evolutionary process tangible, though embryos were often depicted as 
isolated from the female body. This dissociation of the embryo from the body takes the 
woman’s body out of the process, yet the key is that the part was meant to represent the 
179
whole in both contexts--that of evolution and that of growth within the body. Depictions 
of the embryo as the model for evolution and the discovery that the embryo grew within 
the female body eventually provided warrants for reformist arguments on the status of 
women. But reformists first needed to re-embody the embryo to highlight the warrant for 
their arguments stressing women’s need for protection and status.  
While critic Nick Hopwood (2006) points out that many of the embryologists’ 
procedures and methods of visualization took the embryo out of its context in the female 
body, and therefore disconnected the embryo from the pregnant woman (“Pictures” 265), 
he barely skims the surface of the implications of this assertion. Through their rhetoric, 
both textual and visual, embryologists create a disembodied sense of the embryo, one that 
separated women from the process of development. Scientific disciplines often create 
images isolated from context to delve deeper into the essence of the figure they are 
representing. The embryo was isolated in visuals detached from its context in the 
pregnant female. This detachment allowed scientists to diagram the different parts of the 
embryo. Gradually, embryological discourse changed, starting with its popularizations by 
physicians, who connected the development of embryos to the site of women’s bodies. 
This connection highlighted women’s health as central to the proper development of the 
embryo. Reformers would take this connection even further, accentuating women’s role 
and embodying the disembodied host (the woman) for the embryo. The scientists’ 
isolation of the embryo occurred at the level of warrant-establishing, but once 
embryology became a warrant in reformers’ claims, the embryo was contextualized 
within the female body. Kenneth Burke’s pentad is useful to analyze these changes:  for 
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the scientists, the scene for the embryo was the laboratory, but for reformers, the scene 
became the woman’s body, making her the agent of evolution. 
From the Science to the Mainstream: Medical Practitioners and the Popularization 
of Embryology 
 How the findings in embryology would be used in the reform movements was 
determined by their popularization by medical practitioners and physicians in medical 
advice books. These popularizations often took the argument further than the fact and 
definition stases of the scientists, who explained the findings in embryology; popularizers 
applied the new information to value and action arguments to accentuate the importance 
of the woman’s health in development. Physicians both explained the generation and 
development of embryos and made arguments for why women should have rights. The 
texts examined in this section by physicians Russell Trall, John Cowan, and Emma Drake 
are chosen because of their links to reform discourses. These texts popularized the 
science of embryology in medical advice manuals aimed at female audiences. These 
types of manuals, and in Trall and Cowan’s case, the books themselves, were cited by 
women in Dr. Clelia Mosher’s study of the sexual knowledge and behavior of late 
nineteenth-century women as influential to their understanding of sexual physiology and 
sexual practices. Trall’s book was also advertised in Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly,68 
and Cowan’s received the endorsement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Drake, a physician 
whose advice on sex aligns her with both the social purity and eugenics movements, was 
 
68 I found several advertisements for Trall’s book when browsing the archives of Woodhull and Claflin’s 
Weekly at the Library of Congress. 
181
also an authority for the reformers.69 Thus, these intermediary medical texts represent the 
kind of texts from which reformers derived their knowledge of the elite science of 
embryology. This section will analyze how embryology was conveyed in medical texts in 
order to look at the influence of this discourse on reformers in the subsequent section. It 
shows how the findings in embryology often “refreshed” older ideas and helped to focus 
the discourse of the body on reform. 
Russell Trall
Russell Trall’s 1866 Sexual Physiology: A Scientific and Popular Exposition of 
the Fundamental Problems in Sociology was not only a popular source of information on 
physiology, but an example of a text that that relied on visuals to convey the stages of 
development within the human female. Trall’s philosophies on women’s rights clearly 
influenced his discussions of physiology (see Chapter 2), as he attempted to dismantle 
ideologies of women’s bodies as constricting and to naturalize their bodies and functions. 
Similarly, women’s rights ideologies find their way into his discussion of embryology. 
 Trall’s chapter on embryology falls in the middle of his book, between his 
explanations of physiology and his application of physiologic knowledge to providing 
advice on sexual practices. Much of his chapter on embryology consists of diagrams and 
their explanations, as well as quotations from embryologists explaining the process of 
fetal development. In fact, much of the chapter is composed of others’ words, with 
abundant quotations, sometimes lasting for several pages. This practice of quoting at 
length was common to several popular medical texts I examined that incorporate 
 
69 Drake’s published marital advice books throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often 
espouse social purity and eugenic ideals, and some of her writings are included in compilations of these 
movements. 
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explanations of embryology. In contrast to his explanations of anatomy and physiology, 
where he often explains and interprets the anatomy of the body in his own words, Trall 
seems to be more a conduit for science in this section. The new science of embryology 
during this time period, then, is one that was new to physicians who did not feel they had 
the ethos to explain it themselves. They instead relied on more authoritative sources. 
There is much that Trall admits to ignorance of, including where fertilization occurs 
(114). The influence of scientific discourse, however, is evident in Trall’s choice to 
visually convey most explanations of human development in the embryo.  
 Using the bird egg for comparison, Trall’s chapter on embryology explains the 
shape and composition of the egg. He first labels each part of the egg, and then elaborates 
on the purpose of these parts. Describing the composition of cells in the egg and 
membrane to set up his explanation of fertilization, his explanation breaks down the parts 
of the fertilized cell and describes how the different parts of the cell become the embryo: 
“The blastodermic membrane, though consisting only of cells nearly uniform in size and 
shape, is nevertheless a truly organized membrane, made up of fully-formed anatomical 
elements. It is, moreover, the first sign of distinct organization which made its appearance 
in the egg; and as soon as it is completed, the body of the new foetus is formed. The 
blastodermic membrane is, in fact the body of the foetus” (106). He also specifies how 
the cell “converts into an organized structure” (105). He thus combines two important 
findings in embryology in this first section: epigenesis, or how the embryo develops in 
stages, and the germ-layer theory that explains how these membranes grow into specific 
organ systems of the body. The influence of von Baer’s work is clear, as well as the 
current scientific focus on the cell.  
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The sequence of the diagrams in the chapter also draws on the scientific 
explanations of embryology, showing how development occurs from the cell to the fetus. 
The visuals help to break down this growth through the use of color and shading to show 
depth. The chapter begins with a diagram of a section of a bird’s egg, filled in with gray 
lines to convey the richer elements unexplained in this diagram. This particular diagram 
breaks down the parts of the egg, representing the yolk, shell, membrane, and albumen. 
The second page looks deeper at one element of the first diagram, representing the 
“cleaving of the yelk” showing the division of cells, explaining: “first into two, then into 
four, then into eight, and so on, and by the metamorphosis which its progeny undergo, 
that the whole embryonic fabric is gradually evolved” (Carpenter qtd in Trall 102). The 
diagram represents this division by showing in five stages how the cells divide into two 
then divide even further. The next page represents the “progressive multiplication of 
cells”: it starts with four pictures depicting the cell going from one to four cells; labeled 
A through H; these four diagrams elaborate this process further, showing the later stages, 
until H in the sequence is a picture of an oval enclosing multiple small circles, 
representing cells. The diagrams in this chapter go even further in analyzing the parts of 
those cells. Later figures diagram the “germinal membrane” and “embryonic rudiments” 
of the individual cell (106-107). Thus, the figure is repeatedly broken down by these 
diagrams until the figures reach the stages of incubation; these figures then enable the 
reader to understand the egg and the embryo at the most basic level of cells.  
 Later pictures also explain the process in the human ovum: these contain more 
white space than shaded areas, breaking down the shape of different parts rather than 
demonstrating the depth of the materials within. Figures 66 and 67 contain the fetus at 
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forty-five days and at two months: in both representations, the fetus contains a cord 
leading off to nowhere: there is no woman in the picture. Figure 68 depicts the “foetus at 
three months in its membrane,” which appears to be smiling and waving, a further 
method to make the processes come alive for the reader. Finally, Figure 69 depicts the 
fetus at the “full period of utero-gestation” (119). In this picture, shaped like a square, the 
fetus is shown beneath layers of protection, but the full body is left unrepresented. 
However, there does appear to be a small representation of the vagina beneath the fetus, 
showing hair, but not much else. The subsequent diagrams in the chapter depict the 
placenta and the cord attached to the fetus. 
 Trall’s visual diagrams accompany many of his explanations and they become the 
primary means to describe embryological development. However, these diagrams do not 
give the reader a sense of the dimensions of the embryo, unlike His’s demonstrations 
(Hopwood, “Giving Body”). Therefore, much of Trall’s explanation includes making that 
diagram come to life for the reader, explaining the weight and dimensions of the embryo. 
He employs analogy to flesh out his explanation: “The head is very large in proportion to 
the body; the trunk is elongated and pointed; the limbs resemble the shoots of vegetables; 
dark points or lines indicate the existence of the eyes, mouth, and nose, and parallel 
points indicate the situation of the vertebra. The length is nearly one inch or about ten 
lines” (115). The shortcomings of a diagram to convey size necessitates such 
comparisons. Readers would be more able to visualize the dimensions of the fetus and 
how they alter and align.  
Trall’s sequence of diagrams represents the trend in the use of visual diagrams to 
understand embryology: in order to convey the processes occurring at the level of cell 
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division, the processes are removed from the female body. But the body gradually returns 
as the process goes further: first showing how the umbilical cord is attached to the fetus, 
then showing the fetus within the uterus, until it is finally represented in the uterus within 
the reproductive system. The representations that gradually reveal the parts of the 
woman’s body then make it possible to situate these processes within the woman. 
Because the female’s body is the site of this complex development, it becomes possible 
to argue that she should receive special rights because of her role. 
 The findings in embryology enabled Trall to discuss women’s rights in refuting 
misperceptions about the mother’s influence on the embryo. He ends the embryology 
chapter by refuting the notion: “That ‘the mother throws off her disease on the child,’ ...a 
common mode of expressing this prevailing fallacy. It ought to be known that although 
the child may, while in the womb and also while at the breast, be injuriously affected by 
all the morbid conditions of the mother, its sickness or death does not in any case ‘carry 
off’ disease or morbid matter from the mother” (132). Trall seems to be correcting an 
idea that females get rid of a disease by giving it to their unborn child. He clarifies that 
the mother can give a disease to a child, but she will still have it. Like his explanations of 
physiology, Trall uses embryology to dispel popular myths about the female body and its 
processes. 
 Later chapters in Sexual Physiology elaborate a more feminist interpretation of a 
woman’s influence on the embryo and fetus. Like many free love reformers, Trall 
stresses the importance of the health of women to bearing healthy children. He argues 
that women should be subject to conditions that enable them to maintain a healthy 
lifestyle. Attributing the high numbers of abortions to the fact that women have few 
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rights, he asserts, “Restore woman to health, and give her what God has ordained as her 
birthright--the control of her own person--and the trade of the abortionist will soon cease” 
(204). He does not condemn women for seeking abortions, but rather the unequal 
conditions that lead to the need for abortions. His later discussions of hereditary 
transmission go further in espousing rights for women since women are the primary 
influence of the embryo. 
Using the knowledge of embryology, Trall establishes that both parents contribute 
to the new life. However, he stresses the mother’s influence once the egg has been 
fertilized and shows why she should then have rights: 
At the moment of impregnation both parties must, to some extent, transmit 
the lesser or the greater degree of their constitutional peculiarities, thus 
occasioning the greater or less resemblance to one or the other parent. But, 
from the moment of conception until birth, the influences of the mother 
are constant. During this period nothing can affect her injuriously that 
does not, to some extent, damage her child. (257) 
Trall’s use of older beliefs here shows how nineteenth-century findings in embryology 
often revitalized these beliefs. After elaborating physical conditions that would harm the 
child, Trall also details how conditions that force the mother into unpleasant mental 
conditions can harm the growing fetus: “…a terrible sight, a grievous misfortune, an 
unhappy home, an unkind husband, a suffering child to care for, etc. etc., are each and all 
causes of abnormal conditions on the part of the mother, and consequent deterioration on 
the part of the child” (258). Thus, an unpleasant husband is something a woman should 
be protected from with specific rights. He establishes, “The rule, then, for the production 
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of good children is exceedingly simple. Keep the mother happy and comfortable” (258; 
emphasis in original). Under his logic, since a woman can impress feelings and even 
thoughts on the embryo, she should not be made to have negative feelings and thoughts. 
She will only transmit the best qualities if given rights and protection from negativity. 
Trall does not, however, advocate a sedentary or protective lifestyle for the protected 
mother: she will still need exercise and mental stimulation. Instead, she should have the 
conditions given to a person with full rights and full “control of her own person.”  
John Cowan
Physician John Cowan goes further in elaborating the importance of rights for the 
mother in his theories of heredity and pre-natal influences based on embryology. His The 
Science of a New Life (1889) advises potential parents on how to bear healthy and 
intelligent children using ideas derived from physiology, embryology, and hereditarian 
science. A medical reformer who advocated continence, Cowan’s ideas of sexuality align 
him with social purity goals. The Science of a New Life focuses on heredity and prenatal 
influences, topics central to reformers like Frances Willard. Like Trall, Cowan’s text 
conveys information through visual diagrams and lengthy quotations from other 
authorities to explain embryology. His chapter on intra-uterine growth uses the findings 
of embryology to elaborate the period of “gestative influence.” Thus, information on 
embryology is used to support a larger argument in the text about heredity. 
 Like Trall, Cowan quotes at length from other authorities, most notably a 
“Professor Dalton,” to explain the development of the embryo. Writing in 1889, the 
science of embryology would be less new to him than to Trall, but Cowan’s explanations 
of the science still rely heavily on other sources. The arguments for reform that come out 
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of these explanations, however, are given Cowan’s own voice. In addition, his 
explanations of embryology also combine older ideas with the new science to argue how 
the parents can influence the growing life in the embryo. 
 Cowan also shares a commonality with Trall in his visual depictions of the 
growing embryo from the level of cells to the fetus in-utero. While he, too, removes the 
process from the woman’s body in visualizing the microscopic aspects of development, 
he also depicts the embryo within the uterus, situating it in a context, though the rest of 
the body is still unrepresented. Thus, the depictions of the embryo signify stages of 
development: on the cell level, the pictures are isolated from the body or the context. At 
the level of the development of the fetus, however, the representation does include the 
uterus as its home. It is at the reform stage that these representations become more fully 
re-embodied since reformers emphasize the importance of the mother and her body on 
fetal development. 
 Cowan also accompanies his diagrams with explanations of the weight and 
dimensions of the embryo. He quotes from Professor Dalton who breaks down the 
process into days, using analogy to more fully represent the changes in size:  
On the tenth day it has the appearance of a semi-transparent grayish flake. 
On the twentieth day it is nearly the size of a pea, filled with fluid, in the 
middle of which is an opaque spot, presenting the first appearance of an 
embryo, which may be clearly seen as an oblong or curved body, 
according as it is viewed, and plainly visible to the naked eye on the 
fourteenth day. Its weight, at this time, is about one grain….On the twenty-
first day the embryo resembles an ant or a lettuce-seed….On the thirtieth 
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day the embryo is as large as a horse-fly, and resembles a worm bent 
together… (182) 
These descriptive analogies make the embryo more real to the popular audience. The 
choice of analogies to a pea, an ant, a lettuce-seed, a horse-fly, and a worm also represent 
objects the audience would be familiar with, particularly in the domestic sphere. The 
analogies to lower life forms also help the reader to follow the course of evolution.  
Cowan also emphasizes how the embryo represents a growing life, a life that can 
be determined while in-utero. Immediately following the chapter on development, Cowan 
stresses the agency of the parents in influencing this growing being: “This minute speck 
represents an individual who eventually will be temperate, or else a drunkard or glutton; 
who will be chaste or licentious; whose life will be a success or a failure, depending 
alone or altogether on what the parents choose to make it” (188). Picking up older ideas 
on pre-natal influence, he particularly emphasizes the role of the mother: “…it is through 
the blood of the mother only that the body of the child is nourished, its character 
influenced, and its habits of life formed” (189). Since her blood is nourishing the fetus, it 
is her blood that will influence its characteristics. The reformers’ ideas on pre-natal 
influence are clearly derived from this line of thinking. Cowan summarizes, “A man or 
woman’s daily thoughts and actions affect and impress the secretions of the nutritive 
system, and through this the blood; and in this way, through its reaction on the nervous 
system, the character of the man increases for better or worse, as may be. It might with 
truth be said, that a drop of blood represents in its elements the character of the individual 
who manufactured it” (189). The emphasis on the thoughts of the mother, older advice 
that is retold in a scientific register, was exploited by reformer Adella Hunt Logan, 
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discussed below, as well as free love reformers who argued that women should have 
rights to prevent negative thoughts from influencing the fetus. 
Cowan, aligned with social purity ideals, also emphasizes the importance of 
giving rights to the mother in order to secure the growth of a healthy and happy child. His 
emphasis on the blood shared between mother and child relates to larger cultural ideas 
about how “blood tells,” but also alludes to some of the ideas that Needham documents in 
his history of embryology on the influence of the mother because of blood and blood 
vessels (Needham 216). While drawing on such developments as the growth and stages 
of the embryo given by epigenesists, the evolutionary hierarchy given by Darwin and 
Haeckel, and the knowledge of both parents contributing characteristics to the new life, 
Cowan also relies on older ideas in his explanations of how parents can actively influence 
the type of child they conceive and then foster in fertilization and incubation. His ideas, 
while compatible with older superstitions, are nevertheless given new “life” by the new 
scientific developments of the time. For Cowan, a temperate life and temperate attitude 
before conception and during incubation will create a temperate child, an idea which 
makes his approach particularly attractive to reformers. 
Emma Drake
A conservative physician whose ideas also align her with social purity ideals, 
Emma Drake’s What a Young Wife Ought to Know (1901) provides her audience of 
young women with advice on maintaining health, choosing a husband, and caring for a 
child. Drake published throughout the late nineteenth century, often espousing social 
purity and eugenic goals. In her 1901 text, she uses the scientific developments of the 
past century to advise young women to pursue a temperate life. Nestled between chapters 
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on the “Ailments of Pregnancy” and “Baby’s Wardrobe,” Drake’s chapter on 
“Development of the Foetus” uses embryology to impress upon women the importance of 
their role in sustaining new life. 
 Drake begins this chapter on development with, 
How does the tiny speck, so tiny that it cannot be seen with the naked eye, 
only one hundred and twentieth of an inch in diameter, how does this tiny 
atom of matter, begin in its growth, continue and develop into the full 
grown child? This little germ or ovum, the part furnished by the mother, in 
the creation of a human being, contains the germinal vesicle, or embryo 
cell, and the stored up food for the early days of life after conception takes 
place. After the ovum leaves the ovary, somewhere in its journey to the 
uterus or womb, it is met by the spermatozoon, or male element of 
conception, and by their mysterious union the new life begins. (155-156) 
This emphasis on the sperm meeting the egg and on the minuteness of the process and 
growing embryo is made possible by scientific sources. Drake’s introduction to the 
chapter emphasizes the question of development: how can something we cannot even see 
be influenced? Her narrative underscores the mystery in these processes, which 
embryology had illuminated. This emphasis also leads into her anti-abortion argument in 
stressing that this “minute speck” is in fact a growing life. Her explanations of the stages 
of development further her anti-abortion goals. 
 Like her fellow physicians Cowan and Trall, Drake details the stages of 
development. However, she also details the alteration of the woman’s body during 
pregnancy, noting the changes that occur in the uterus once fertilization has taken place. 
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While she does not use visual depictions to embody these stages, the body of the woman 
is brought back into this discourse since she highlights the changes occurring in the body 
and situates the process of development within the body to further her argument against 
abortion. Also like Trall and Cowan, Drake quotes extensively from other authorities to 
explain the progressive development of the embryo. She quotes full pages breaking down 
the development of the embryo and fetus by month, attributing these quotations to a 
textbook by Leavitt called The Science and Art of Obstetrics (158). Finally, she also 
breaks down the process of development to the level of cells (157).  
 Where Drake differs from the other physicians is in her more explicit reform 
agenda within the chapter on embryology. While Cowan and Trall promote reform 
agendas at the end of their embryology chapters, and then use that knowledge for reform 
arguments placed later in their texts, Drake intersperses her explanations of development 
with an anti-abortion argument. At several stages within the chapter, she stresses that she 
is conveying this information in order to combat the temptation for a woman “to rid 
herself of the product of conception” (157). She begins the chapter with a testament to the 
extraordinary process that occurs, brings up the anti-abortion argument throughout the 
explanations of development, and finally ends with a celebration of the product of this 
development. She writes, 
So the baby grows until it reaches intrauterine maturity, and comes into 
our arms for cherishing. Pity, pity the little one that comes with no love to 
receive it, and pity more the mother of such a child. No woman has a right 
to marry, unless she desires offspring and is willing to fit herself for 
maternity. No man has a right to take upon himself the sacred vows that 
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make him husband, unless he comprehends all that it means, and is 
measurably ready to meet its duties and responsibilities. With such 
preparation, and such understanding upon entering matrimony, we should 
see a nobler, stronger race of men and women in the coming generations. 
(162) 
Thus, in Drake’s text, embryology is used to create a rhetoric of responsibility. Unlike 
Trall and Cowan, she stresses the rights of the child over the right of the parents. In social 
purity and free love discourse, however, this responsibility is twofold: the woman should 
have rights so that she can bear a healthy and happy child and the child has the right to 
have two parents committed to creating a healthy and happy child. Social reformers often 
gave presence to the rights of the child in order to argue for the rights of the mother, as 
illustrated by Drake’s advice. Drake also highlights the overall goal of “a stronger race,” 
positing that this goal will ultimately derive from an understanding of embryology and 
the woman’s role in development.  
The Discourse of Popularization and Implications for Reformers
The popularization of embryology, as represented by Trall, Cowan, and Drake, 
relies on several key theories of the scientific community. In describing the stages of 
development, they base their knowledge of epigenesis on demonstrations like von Baer’s, 
such as Trall’s references to the germ layers. The division of cells is also a prominent 
feature of each text: readers of their texts would be interested in how these processes 
begin at the microscopic level, and the use of cell theory forms the basis for later 
arguments about women and men’s contribution to the new organism. Furthermore, the 
ideas of evolutionary theory and recapitulation, which both rely on a sense of hierarchy, 
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are then given presence in the discourses positing the agency of women to influence the 
growing life. Linking these ideas together, the physicians popularized the theories of 
embryology into a rhetoric of responsibility and agency. 
 The popularizations of embryology also share several rhetorical features. All three 
of the popularizations surveyed here rely on the words of others to explain embryological 
development, whereas other areas of their books do not use quotations as extensively. 
Thus, these works seem to be popularizations of popularizations. Notable is the idea that 
they could not sum up or change the words of the original source, but can only quote for 
pages at a time. As a science gaining more of an “elite” status in contrast to the more 
popular science of physiology, practicing physicians may have felt removed from the 
different methodologies of the new science of embryology, such as the use of more 
advanced microscopes. Physicians would have the ethos to explain how the different 
parts of the body work and how to prevent and cure disease; the science of embryology, 
however, breaking down processes to the level of cells, seemed more removed from the 
actual practice of medicine, thus necessitating use of more prominent authorities on the 
topic in these popular medical texts. 
 The use of analogies and emphasis on the dimensions of the embryo are also 
common to these three texts. Each physician either creates or relies on the analogy of a 
quoted authority to give presence to the growing embryo. Providing the dimensions of the 
egg and then the embryo and the fetus would enable a stronger sense of just what was 
occurring in the body, and, in Drake’s case, give presence to the idea of a growing human 
life. Analogies of size as resembling a pea or an insect seem less idealized, but would 
create a stronger sense of the dimensions since the diagrams would not impress these 
195
dimensions on the reader. These analogies bring together the textual and the visual 
rhetoric to promote understanding of these removed and embedded processes. 
 Finally, in their use of diagrams, physicians reinforced the importance of visual 
rhetoric to this science. The diagrams would sequentially illuminate the process of 
development, popularizing the theory of epigenesis. To do so, however, the embryo 
became disembodied--a necessary preliminary to observing the processes of the embryo 
at the level of cells. The use of shading and white space in their pictures also served to 
convey an argument about embryology: they shaded when they wanted to emphasize the 
depth of the processes occurring, and the un-shaded white space when they wanted to 
display connections between different parts. Gradually, as the embryo develops, the 
growing life is situated within the body of the woman. In order to make further arguments 
about the woman’s important role in the process of development, the embryo had to 
become rhetorically re-embodied. The situation of the growing life within the woman 
also serves to take a step back from the process and observe it not at the level of cells, but 
at the level of the processes occurring in the body. Reformers could then stress the 
importance of the mother in impressing characteristics upon the growing life, and argue 
for her rights on the basis of the importance of the mother’s health. 
Birth control
The developments in embryology have one further integral application: the 
increased knowledge of how and where fertilization occurs increased knowledge of how 
to prevent conception. For the natural remedies often proposed by reformist physicians, 
especially water cure physicians, understanding the cycle and movement of the egg then 
reinforces natural birth control methods, such as the rhythm method advocated by many 
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physicians. The task of making these methods more efficient would fall to later birth 
control pioneers, such as Margaret Sanger, but the greater knowledge and practices of 
birth control would not have been possible were it not for the growing science of 
embryology. 
The Reformers: Embryology as Warrant 
 Once the science of embryology was popularized, it began to travel into the realm 
of reform, as demonstrated by the reformist tendencies of Trall, Cowan, and Drake. 
Social reformers arguing for women’s rights on the basis that giving rights to women 
would aid evolution rather than hinder it needed these scientific developments to support 
their arguments. The use of embryology as a warrant for women’s rights occurred in both 
racial uplift and free love rhetoric. Though women involved in racial uplift did not 
explicitly argue for sexual rights, as free love reformers did, they did use similar 
rhetorical strategies to highlight women’s special role in evolution and uplift. The overlap 
between these reform discourses illustrates how the sciences of embryology and heredity 
carried authority in the popular realm. Arguments for rights that might usually be based 
in natural rights or law became based in science and evolution. While some of the uses of 
embryology as warrant seem like leaps in logic, especially when it comes to the 
arguments based on prenatal influence, my analysis shows how the logic of these 
arguments merely extended and applied the developments in embryology and how, to 
reformers, those developments in embryology seemed like new warrants for old 
arguments. The scientific warrant positioned the mother as the site of complex 
development. Complex development requires special treatment. Therefore, reformers 
argued, mothers should be carefully treated. 
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The Woman’s Role in Racial Uplift with Embryology as Warrant
Adella Hunt Logan (1863-1915) used an argument for the special treatment of 
women in her racial uplift goals. Logan was raised in Hancock County, Georgia, part of a 
large “free family of color” (Alexander). Her parents, a white father and African 
American mother, could not marry since laws in Georgia restricted interracial marriages 
at the time. Logan, one of nine children, was well-educated and became certified as a 
teacher in Hancock County when she was only sixteen years old (Alexander 169). She 
later attended Atlanta University and taught for several years at Tuskegee. Logan 
challenged racial and gender stereotypes throughout her life, and advocated equality and 
women’s suffrage. But after suffering from depression, a result of her despondence at 
social equality, she ended her own life in 1915 (Alexander 194). Family friend W.E.B. 
DuBois remembered Logan as one of the “voices from within the veil” (194).70 
In 1897, DuBois organized the “Second Conference for the Study of Problems 
Concerning Negro City Life” in Atlanta, where Adella Hunt Logan spoke on “Prenatal 
and Hereditary Influences.” Her speech illustrates an explicit use of the findings of 
embryology, as she refers to the findings that both men and women influence the 
characteristics of the embryo. A more implicit use of the science occurs in her references 
to the impressions that can be made on the embryo, references drawing on the possibility 
of influence resulting from the rejection of preformation theory. While she uses the 
theories of heredity I will discuss in the next chapter, she also explicitly refers to some of 
the findings of embryology to support her goal of emphasizing the importance of 
women’s roles in creating the next generation to uplift the race. Logan’s speech drew on 
 
70 See Adele Logan Alexander’s Ambiguous Lives: Free Women of Color in Rural Georgia, 1789-1879 
(1991) for additional biography of Logan and her family. 
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scientific warrants, as its title indicates, to make the argument that women have a special 
role in uplifting the race through the creation of better children; therefore, they need 
rights, including protection from inequalities and negative influences. 
 Logan highlights women’s unique roles in the creation of better children, but she 
also stresses that the characteristics of the future child will be influenced by both mother 
and father: “Before the body is ready to begin life as a separate being, as a new 
personality, it is molded and cast by the combined traits of the father and the mother from 
whom this new creature must draw its individual existence. And the intellectual and 
ethical cast will follow as closely the law, ‘Like begets like,’ as will the physical” (212). 
This statement, refreshed by the findings of embryology in the late nineteenth century 
that both parents contribute material to a new life, also contains an implicit argument for 
women’s rights. If the woman influences the future life and molds it before its birth in 
physical, intellectual, and ethical characteristics, women should thus have rights that 
nurture and maintain their intellectual pursuits. 
 Logan’s speech resituates the debate on racial uplift to focus on the possibilities 
of uplift in producing the next generation. Consequently, women as bearers of these 
possibilities need rights. But in order to argue for those rights, Logan needs to refer to the 
knowledge of how men and women affect the characteristics of the next generation.  To 
do so, Logan not only must show that both parents contribute material to the forming of 
the embryo and the characteristics of the future person, but that both parents are 
responsible for prenatal influences, picking up points made in contemporary medical 
popularizations, such as Trall’s: “To no one source more than the conditions attendant 
upon pregnant women can the cause of physical or moral evil be traced. The unborn child 
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draws its physical and in large measure its intellectual and ethical make-up from its father 
and its mother. Not from the mother alone, as many suppose, but from both” (213; 
emphasis mine). Thus, Logan’s women’s rights rhetoric, while stressing the unique role 
of the woman, places responsibility on both parents. She continues, “Both parents 
contribute to the possibilities for health, good or bad, and furnish the germs for character 
creation and development just as certainly as they together originate physical life” (213). 
While these statements rely on many of the hereditarian theories discussed in the next 
chapter, embryology also helps us understand her aims. Since it is an established 
scientific fact in the nineteenth century that both parents contribute, uplift needs to occur 
in both genders. And that uplift needs to account for the prenatal influences operating on 
the mother, which the father affects since he has influence, and as the free love advocates 
would claim, physical, legal, and emotional control, over the mother. 
 Since medical popularizations stressed the importance of prenatal influence in 
molding the characteristics of the unborn, the logic becomes that what affects the mother 
affects the embryo or fetus. Logan’s use of such logic then translates into women’s rights. 
She emphasizes, “let it be distinctly understood that the development of germ life 
depends upon the original germ and equally upon the culture and treatment of that 
germ71:--in short, teach that the prenatal development of the child depends largely on 
whatever affects the mother” (214). Logan re-embodies the woman’s role in 
embryological development--the woman is the vessel holding the “germ life” that can be 
influenced for good or for bad. By situating this important development within the 
woman’s body, she can then argue for women’s rights. Under her logic, a woman should 
 
71 Her use of the term “germ” also suggests August Weismann’s theories, published in the 1870s (see 
Chapter 5). 
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not be subject to conditions that would cause her to think negative thoughts that would 
make an impression on the embryo: “Few women seem to appreciate the fact that the 
sensitive embryo receives the impression made upon the mind of the mother” (214). In 
this discourse, the husband can be the cause of those negative thoughts. Logan describes 
how the father might resent the unborn as an additional mouth to feed, which can then 
create negative thoughts in the mother that would make a negative impression on the 
embryo (213-14). Thus, both parents have a responsibility in prenatal influence. 
 To drive home her point, Logan employs an image often evoked in free love 
rhetoric: “If the pregnant woman is constantly wishing that her unborn child were dead or 
that the man who has given her this burden,--as she has learned in chagrin to regard the 
child,--were dead,; who can wonder that out of such murderous thought there should 
come in very truth a murderer!” (214). Free love advocate Mary Gove Nichols had used a 
similar line of argument almost fifty years earlier. Free love advocates often argued that 
the inequalities and conditions fostered by the marriage system created murderous 
thoughts in women, which could then be transferred to unborn children. This rather 
unusual notion is employed to then argue that women should receive equality and other 
rights that would prevent them from harboring such thoughts and resentments. 
Free love advocates took this causal argument even further, arguing that it was the 
brutality with which men treated their wives during sexual unions that would cause such 
murderous thoughts; thus, women would need partnerships based on equality and 
pleasurable sex in order to prevent such feelings. Logan employs this logic not to argue 
for sexual rights, but for the importance of women as bearers of the future generation in 
the goal of uplifting the black race. This logic was given further urgency by 
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embryological discourse since embryology highlighted the process of embryonic 
development--the reformers could then show that the development was affected by 
outside factors. The findings gave new presence to a well-known truth. Darwin’s 
arguments on embryology did not completely discount such influences. Logan’s use of 
similar logic and her application of studies in embryology demonstrate how scientific 
discourses infiltrated social movements with such diverse goals. 
The Woman’s Need for Sexual Rights with Embryology as Warrant
Physician and free love advocate Juliet Severance’s (1901) rhetoric shares 
similarities to Logan’s in her statement that, “As certainly as like begets like, as surely as 
temperament, traits of character, complexion, color of eyes and hair are imparted by 
parents to offspring, so surely is the loathing, the pollution, the hate that filled the 
mother’s mind transmitted to her child” (Marriage 29-30). Severance’s wording here 
shows how reformers employed analogy to argue that women should not be subject to 
conditions where they would have loathsome thoughts that would transfer to the 
characteristics of the embryo: if the traits of character, complexion, and color of eyes and 
hair are transmitted through both parents’ material during intercourse and form the basis 
of the embryo, why couldn’t thoughts and feelings also be transmitted? If the embryo was 
affected by physical changes and physical conditions of the mother, why couldn’t 
emotional and intellectual conditions also affect the embryo? At this point, scientists had 
determined that both parents contributed material; what was debated was what that 
material contained. Preformationists had for many centuries posited that the person was 
preformed in the embryo, but epigenesis theory clarified that development went in stages. 
If the person was not already preformed, then could each stage be affected by outside 
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influences? The arguments of the medical popularizers and reformers that such influence 
could occur then show how the popular realm can interpret and reshape scientific 
findings to suit specific purposes. 
 Victoria Woodhull’s arguments also stem from the presumption that the embryo 
could be influenced and its future characteristics shaped, and she takes this argument 
further in her more radical goals for sexual rights for women. Her 1874 speech, Tried as 
by Fire, which epitomizes her rhetorical strategies and techniques, bases many of its 
conclusions on the presumption that women, as vessels of embryos, require certain 
conditions to aid the evolution of the race. She uses this presumption to then argue for 
such goals as sex education and the right of women to pleasurable sex. If women were 
united in love with the partner of their choice, and provided with sex education, they 
would be more healthy and able to produce a better race. Thus, Woodhull uses the 
ultimate goal of superior children as her justification for free love, while also furthering 
her eugenic ideals. 
 Woodhull encapsulates her inquiry into the “two questions in this whole matter 
of reforming the world,” which are “vital and inseparable”:  “The first is, to discover and 
develop the science of proper generation, so that all the inherited tendencies may be 
good; and the second is, that the germ life, once properly begun, may not be subjected to 
any deleterious influences, either during the period of gestation or development on to 
adult age” (Tried 30). She presents her statements as self-evident when she says,  
There can be a better race only by having better children. If they are bad, 
good men and women are impossible. There can be better children only 
through better understanding by women of the processes of gestation, and 
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better methods of rearing and education. These propositions are self-
evident, and point directly to the sexual relations as the place to begin the 
work of improving the race. (29) 
 These statements have a basis in the warrants produced by the embryologists: that the 
embryo can be harmed by “deleterious influences,” (a claim that would be strong for 
temperance advocates) such as alcohol, had been established, and it is an example that 
Woodhull exploits. She extends the logic of the well-known facts of “deleterious 
influences” to cover more than just substances:  Since the mother’s consumption of 
substances can harm the embryo, can her consumption of inequality also harm the 
embryo? The health of the mother is also a key point for free love advocates, since they 
argue that the current conditions of sexual relations harm women’s health. If women are 
not healthy, then they cannot produce healthy children. Thus, a pleasurable sex life to 
maintain health, an argument backed by physiology, will produce healthy influences on 
the embryo. In addition, since the embryo is produced by sexual relations, sexual 
relations are the place to begin improvement. Woodhull presents her logic in stages, but 
these stages are reversed from arguments in scientific discourses. While scientific 
arguments start with the elements of conception and gestation and lead to the evolution of 
the race, Woodhull takes the evolution of the race for the better as a premise, which then 
requires optimal conditions for the processes of conception and gestation. 
 Similar to Cowan’s, Woodhull’s logic focuses on situating the mother as the 
primary influence during gestation. She proposes, “Nothing is more certain than that the 
mothers can make their children just what they want them to be, limited only by the 
inherited tendencies of the father” (Tried 30). Although scientists were proposing dual 
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influences on the formation of the embryo, in order to argue for women’s rights, the 
woman’s role in gestatory influence must be given presence. Woodhull achieves such 
presence by presenting her statements as self-evident and connecting the embryo growing 
within the body to the conditions of sexual relations. While men have influence, the 
woman is the vessel and thus a stronger influence during gestation. Consequently, women 
must be protected from harmful influences. They must also possess the agency to mold 
the characteristics of future people within their bodies. The pentadic ratio discussed 
earlier is evident here: It is the agency of the woman and the scene of her body that is 
given presence.  
 Woodhull’s logic also relies on an evolutionary perspective in her insistence on 
the influence of the mother in creating better children. The process of evolution becomes 
an exigence to discuss sexual relations, since it is through sex that new beings are created 
to evolve. For Woodhull, science of evolution warrants the argument that only through 
sexual freedom can true evolution occur. Her audience, familiar with Darwin, would then 
view free love as an agency for evolution. Her 1874 speech, proposing such radical ideas 
as the importance of sexual pleasure and the right of women to experience that pleasure, 
the abolition of marriage, and the goal of sex education beginning at an early age, would 
not be viewed as “obscene” sex speech, a view of sex speech both she and Waisbrooker 
attempt to refute; her speech would instead present an argument for spiritual evolution 
positing sex as not an obscene but a natural process, the means to achieving progress in 
evolution. Science, then, not only became the warrant in these arguments but the 
justification for discussing such radical reforms concerning sexuality. 
205
Lois Waisbrooker takes a different perspective on evolution in her 1879 work 
From Generation to Regeneration, or The Plain Guide to Naturalism. In this free love 
and spiritualist text, Waisbrooker argues that the ultimate goal of sex is not the 
production of better children to advance evolution, but rebirth on a spiritual plane as the 
end of evolution. To make this argument, she relies on the idea of ascent in evolution and 
on the connection between generation and “regeneration,” the term she uses to describe 
this rebirth. While Waisbrooker presents a different ultimate goal in human evolution, her 
argument is similar to Logan’s and Woodhull’s in her assumption of woman’s integral 
role in both generation and regeneration. The science of embryology refreshes the 
warrants for her arguments. 
 Waisbrooker’s logic is similar to that used by champions of evolution and 
recapitulation. She stresses understanding the “past history of our planet” to understand 
the future (Generation 3). She also explains, “this effort to renew life’s cycle is a 
prophecy--one of Nature’s hints--an index finger pointing to future possibilities” (4). In 
referencing this “cycle,” she implies the same logic as recapitulation since recapitulation 
itself implies the cycle of generation and development repeating earlier cycles. She also 
refers to an order in development and nature’s laws: “Are not Nature’s laws uniform in 
their action, only varying in modes of expression, as manifest through the different orders 
of life? If so, then the thought of any form of development, when it becomes a fixed and 
growing belief, must be to the human what the blossom is to the fruit--a pledge of its 
possibility…of its certainty, when the right conditions exist” (5). The references to the 
uniformity of nature’s laws, to variation, and to orders of life imply evolutionary 
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warrants. These warrants set the stage for her later arguments for what conditions should 
exist.  
 While Waisbrooker posits sex as the means to spiritual rebirth, or regeneration, 
she connects sex to the generative process. Her argument that the act of sex is the path to 
regeneration comes from her logical connection that since sexual relations are the path to 
generation, they must also be the path to regeneration: She proposes, “as generation is a 
tangible physical fact, why should not regeneration be also? Will nature never be able to 
gestate from matter an organized form which she can perpetuate to the same indwelling 
life, instead of through a succession of lives, bearing a like form” (Generation 6). This 
point then connects to how better sexual relations can produce better results: “Life, or the 
base upon which it rests, as we have already seen, comes from sex union, but the 
character of the life depends upon the nature or condition of the elements thus uniting” 
(10). As she establishes in The Fountain of Life, or the Threefold Power of Sex (1893), 
the view of sex as repulsive or obscene defines the conditions under which it takes place. 
Consequently, she argues, “We give it its character by the estimate we place upon it” and 
“The low idea makes the act low and the product low” (Generation 11). She also relates 
to free love arguments on the importance of the conditions under which two people 
engage in sex: the conditions must foster equality in status to produce positive results and 
end in “mutual benefit” (Woodhull, Tried as by Fire).  
 Evolution, according to Waisbrooker, has a higher goal than humanity. Like the 
scientists who positioned humanity as the culmination of evolution, Waisbrooker sees 
humanity as the top of a hierarchy, as when she says, “Every step of evolution from the 
monad to the human has been made possible through the interaction of the sex factors, 
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and through such interaction we must rise still higher, if at all” (Eugenics 60). 
Waisbrooker adds that there are further goals to reach:  
Going back to the time when organized forms first existed upon this 
planet, we find that the highest in the scale of development were crude 
compared with the lowest of to-day: not so much, perhaps, in form as in 
substance, while the distance between them and the highest now upon the 
earth is so great that we are astonished, and naturally ask for the law 
through which this advance has been made. And upon investigation we 
learn that sex lies at the base of it all--that the masculine and feminine 
forces are the factors, and sex union the steps in the spiral stairway which 
progress has continued to climb even till the present hour; and it is  hardly 
supposable that the greatest blessing which can come to the race through 
the joint action of these factors has yet been reached; and the more 
especially when we remember that in each succeeding age of the past they 
have given its better and still better results…” (Generation 6). 
Waisbrooker references how the chain of development has been explained from higher to 
lower. The “law” or agency of this advance is sex: males and females unite and form an 
embryo that develops into a person. However, Waisbrooker, like many sexual reformers 
who viewed sex as “the core of being” (Lefkowitz Horowitz, Rereading Sex 9), 72 and 
emphasized sex as a physical and spiritual union, posits a less tangible result than the 
 
72 Lefkowitz Horowitz identifies four frameworks for the discussion of sexuality during the nineteenth 
century, the fourth of which she calls the sex “at the core of being” framework, under which free love 
reformers are classified. She defines, “Believing that sex lay at the core of being, adherents held that sexual 
expression in heterosexual intercourse was the most vital facet of life, as important for women as for men. 
They asserted that because sex was so valuable to the self, it must be freely expressed, that any diversion or 
repression of sexual urges from their ‘natural expression’ in coition was harmful” (Rereading Sex 9). 
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individual new person: could sex, which under free love would be a pleasurable uniting 
of two equal beings with a romantic and spiritual connection rather than just a lawful one, 
produce a spiritual result? Waisbrooker ties together the romantic, individualist ideals of 
nineteenth-century social thought with the scientific ones: free love then becomes a 
means not only to produce evolved new beings, but also evolved spiritual beings. The 
science becomes a warrant for how this “regeneration” occurs.  
 Waisbrooker’s analogies between generation and regeneration, and between 
different forms of life, demonstrate the role of analogy in this discourse. At the level of 
the discourse of science, analogy was employed in relating higher and lower forms of life 
and in representing the part for the whole to illuminate the developments of embryology. 
Medical popularizations employed analogy to relate these microscopic and intangible 
developments to something more descriptive. Finally, free love reformers used analogy in 
connecting scientific warrants to specific rights. Thus, the process of creating analogies to 
discuss evolution in the scientific discourses carries over in reform discourses, though 
these analogies are employed for different purposes. 
 Dissociation techniques and representing the part for the whole are also common 
rhetorical devices used in tracing the incorporation of scientific discourses into reform 
discourses. In scientific discourses, this dissociation was twofold: the part of the embryo 
was dissociated from the body in order to look more deeply at cellular processes, but the 
part was also meant to represent a larger process, particularly in recapitulation theory. 
Medical popularizations then pick up on this first dissociation in their representations of 
embryos, but it is the reformers who exploit the second dissociation: the embryo 
representing the stages of evolution. If evolution is a process embodied by the embryo, 
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the woman is the embodied vessel of evolution. She therefore requires rights to fulfill her 
role. Thus, embryology supports a rhetoric of responsibility focused on the 
disembodiment and re-embodiment of the embryo. 
Conclusion 
 Each of the important findings of embryology translated into this rhetoric of 
women’s sexual rights. The triumph of epiegenesis over preformation created a rhetoric 
focused on influence: since the embryo was no longer envisioned as a preformed entity, 
with each characteristic of the adult present and the stages pre-determined, a new 
potential opened for agency and influence over that embryo’s characteristics, which was 
more clearly exploited in hereditarian discourses. Recapitulation theory, though 
controversial and later discredited, contributed the warrant that embryonic development 
represented the stages of human evolution, which then allowed women to position 
themselves as both vessels and agents for evolutionary change. Cell theory led to the 
finding that both men and women contribute material equally to a new life, which, under 
Lamarckian theories of heredity that accepted the transmission of acquired characteristics 
(discussed in Chapter 5), would then aid in arguments for providing advancements and 
education to women so that they too could pass on positive characteristics to the child.  
While the developments in embryology led to a discourse of heredity, there are 
key differences between the discourses of embryology and heredity: Embryology was 
concerned with the study of the embryo itself and the changes it went through; the 
science of heredity was concerned with the causes and results of such changes. 
Embryology established the hierarchies in evolution; heredity theorized how to achieve 
those higher stages. Embryology showed how both parents’ material contributed to the 
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new life; heredity posited how parents could manipulate the characteristics of that new 
life. These two discourses often overlap in the medical and reform communities. 
 While the ideas in this discourse, especially those of the physicians and reformers, 
often recall older superstitions, to these reformers, the findings in embryology seemed to 
provide a new warrant. Science also provided a justification and exigence for reformers 
speaking about sex. Associating sex with scientific processes made it more acceptable to 
argue for sexual rights. Science then helped to define the situation: it helped to eliminate 
the constraints on sexual speech and provided an audience united in their belief in the 
ascent of human life. The science was the exigence for talking about sex. Waisbrooker 
theorizes, “judging from [Nature’s] past results, she seems to carry her work to a given 
point, and then to wait for man to interpret her language and cooperate with her in its 
further development” (Generation 4). Free love reformers could collaborate with the 
scientists by “interpreting” Nature’s language, connecting their own personal experiences 
with sex to these processes. They also become agents “cooperating” with Nature. In 
hereditarian arguments, this “cooperation” becomes more of a challenge--they attempt to 
challenge and change the course of human development. 
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Chapter 5: Heredity
Real progress is growth. It must begin in the seed (Cooper 62).
Criminals are often made years and years before they are sentenced to 
prison. Alas! Too often made criminal before they are born (Logan 214). 
[The] salvation of the world can only come through better children 
(Woodhull, Tried 32). 
Is there a gene for alcoholism? Is there a gene for sexual orientation? Is there a 
gene for a sense of humor? Do we create our likes, dislikes, habits, and talents, or is it all 
pre-determined at birth? Recent news articles have reported studies on genes for 
alcoholism and obesity.73 The debate over nature versus nurture, a prominent debate of 
the nineteenth century, is clearly not over. Two centuries later, we are still trying to find 
reasons for our behaviors and we still give heredity a central power in our lives. The 
quotations above, from prominent nineteenth-century reformers Anna Julia Cooper, 
Adella Hunt Logan, and Victoria Woodhull, while speaking to our twenty-first century 
concerns over how we become what we are, very much epitomize the nineteenth-century 
nature versus nurture debates. Can we create better children? Can feminist reform bring 
this desired result? 
Contemporary feminists often debate the role of nature versus nurture. For them, 
gender as an inherent or socially-constructed characteristic lays the foundation for many 
theories of social reform. Nineteenth-century feminist activists also took part in this 
debate, but with a major difference—they tended to attribute everything to nature, or 
 
73 See “Gene Mutation May Raise the Risk of Alcoholism.” Reuters. 10 January 2006. Yahoo News. 13 
January 2006. <http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070110/hl_nm/gene_alcholism_dc>, for example. 
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heredity, though environment could affect heredity. What was different from our current 
“nature versus nurture” debates is how “nurture” is defined. Nineteenth-century thinkers 
defined “nurture” as not only what occurred after birth in the raising of children, but what 
occurred before, in preparation for birth. Debates on heredity and the ability to influence 
heredity emphasized the goal of producing “superior” or “ideal” children. Just as in the 
discourse of embryology, in the discourses on heredity, medical writers and social 
reformers stressed the importance of women in creating these ideal offspring. While 
today’s social constructionist feminists reject such determinism and essentialism, 
nineteenth-century feminists embraced it. Consequently, many feminist scholars have 
ignored a particularly prolific feminist rhetoric, one that feminist advocates from such 
diverse interests as temperance, social purity, racial uplift, and free love employed 
throughout the late nineteenth century. Determinism makes us uncomfortable. Racism 
makes us uncomfortable. Colluding with what seems like a highly gendered field of 
science makes us uncomfortable. But nineteenth-century feminist reformers found an ally 
in scientific discourse and popular ideas of heredity: women as vessels of progress could 
demand rights if their bodies were to influence the next generation. Thus, social purity, 
racial uplift, and free love reformers had a firm basis for their arguments for women’s 
rights in hereditarian discourse. These feminists created a “woman culture” out of a 
“child culture.” 
Physician John Cowan stated in 1889 that the ideal of the “self-made man” did 
not exist (155; see also Chapter 4 on Cowan). His proclamation reflects the cultural 
values of this time period. Science had worked to determine the agency of progress 
throughout the century, beginning with Jean Jacques Lamarck. But the ideas prevalent in 
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the hereditarian discourse examined in this chapter do not come from science alone: it is 
in the discourse of heredity that we see most clearly how the scientific and the social 
overlap. In the early 1800s, Lamarck had theorized that acquired characteristics, that is 
characteristics that helped a species adapt to its environment, could be passed on to future 
generations. Thus, reformers posited that the surrounding conditions of the parents could 
help or harm the future offspring. Robert Chambers’ 1844 work, Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation, assumed the embryo would ascend a stage in evolution, rising in the 
hierarchy of species. Darwin had theorized a blending of the parents’ material in the 
transference of their characteristics to the offspring and emphasized the importance of 
competition in the battle for survival. Therefore, in reformist discourse, the begetting of 
children became a goal-oriented procedure, one whose results would elevate the species 
on the evolutionary hierarchy. Embryologists, in studying the cell, had found that both 
parents contributed material to the new organism, thus creating more responsibility on 
both sides. For reformers, this finding showed that parents were equal in their 
responsibility for hereditary characteristics, setting the stage for further arguments for 
equality. Finally, the fall of preformation theory had offered the opportunity for parents 
to intervene in influencing the characteristics of their offspring. These were the key ideas 
spurring discussions of heredity.  
Later findings by Weismann and Mendel, theorizing the mechanism of 
transference and the dominance of some characteristics over others, would transform the 
discourse into what we find more recognizable today. But for much of the nineteenth 
century, it was the former ideas rather than the latter that infiltrated the social sphere. 
Combined with theories of population control and eugenics from social scientists Thomas 
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Malthus, Herbert Spencer, and Frances Galton, a new discourse of generation and 
degeneration emerged, the culmination of the findings in all of the biological sciences 
discussed in this dissertation: physiology, bacteriology, and embryology. This chapter 
analyzes the complicated terrain of the debates on heredity and how they prompted a 
discourse of women’s rights and a discourse of eugenics. 
From the discourse of the scientific communities to that of the social reformers, a 
rhetoric of responsibility emerged. Nineteenth-century thinkers asked, what does the 
current generation owe to future generations? This chapter asks what happens when a 
change occurred in their treatment of this question: how do we go from the findings of 
Lamarck and Darwin to ideas about prenatal influence, to women’s rights, to a gendered 
and racist eugenics? We cannot look at nineteenth-century hereditarian discourse without 
looking at how it transformed into the idea that we should encourage some and 
discourage others from reproducing, the principle behind eugenics. Free love rhetoric 
often incorporated eugenic ideas: they became a means to argue why women should be 
given rights. However, a shift occurred at the turn of the century that caused the women’s 
rights argument to drop out of this discourse. Eugenics became the end in itself, not the 
means for arguing for women’s rights. What happened to cause this shift? This chapter 
looks at the beginnings of hereditarian discourse in science, its appearance in social 
science and medical popularizations, and finally at the feminist reformers’ texts to 
examine how this rhetoric transformed. It is impossible to look at Woodhull’s rhetoric, 
for example, without looking at how the discourse she participated in moved from 
questions of what makes a giraffe’s neck long to statements about how humans can 
reproduce more genetically-desirable offspring, from Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
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to the idea that women are owed sexual pleasure. The progression from findings in 
science, to social ramifications, to medical advice, to Victoria Woodhull’s demand for 
sexual pleasure as a means of producing a more “fit” species can be followed through a 
close analysis of the arguments in each discourse community.  
Towards a Science of Heredity and a Warrant for Women’s Rights 
The science of heredity, or the study of how parents transmit their characteristics 
to their children, was not developed as a formalized science on its own, but in 
conjunction with the other sciences of the body. Physiology enabled the understanding of 
the parts of the body and its functions. It was the changes that occurred in the body from 
generation to generation that led to interest in heredity. Evolutionary biology and 
cytology were also enormously influential in studying the changes from one generation to 
the next and how those changes occurred. But it was the growing scientific discipline of 
embryology and the growing science of heredity that were inextricably linked throughout 
the nineteenth century. Findings in embryology, such as whose material contributed to 
the characteristics of the embryo and the successive stages of the embryo, led to theories 
of heredity. Historians of science Bowler and Morus (2005) explain this strong link: “it 
simply did not seem conceivable that one could study the transmission of characters 
without thinking about how those characters were developed in the embryo. Debates in 
embryology were used to define alternative positions on the role of preformation and 
environmental influence, while evolutionary theory was eventually used to provide an 
understanding of why the embryo’s development followed a preordained course” (191-
192). 
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Clearly the debates in embryology spilled over into discussions of heredity. 
Although the preformation versus epigenesis debate had ended in favor of epigenesis, the 
term “preformation” came to mean something new. In the late nineteenth century, the 
term was employed to indicate how the characteristics of the embryo are “preformed” or 
determined at conception (Bowler and Morus 192). This idea perpetuated throughout the 
nineteenth century: the “refreshed” warrant that “like begets like” and that parents could 
influence the future characteristics of their children prompted opportunities for reform 
discourses. Heredity was key, but heredity could be influenced. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the end of the preformation theory (the idea that every being was 
preformed and thus that the parents could not be significant influences on the new being) 
opened the possibilities for arguments based in prenatal influences and heredity. The 
knowledge that generations were not preformed generations before, but developed in an 
orderly process, offered the possibility of influencing the characteristics of the future 
child. Embryology thus provided the foundation for theories of heredity and hereditary 
transmission discussed in the present chapter. The key figures whose findings generated 
hereditarian discourse often were not searching for or did not even voice a theory of 
heredity. But the findings of Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, and Mendel led to the rhetoric 
of heredity in reform discourse, despite these scientists’ initial intentions. 
Lamarckian Theories of Heredity
Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s (1744-1829) theory of evolution prevailed as the 
dominant theory of heredity for much of the nineteenth century. Lamarck accepted 
spontaneous generation and published his theory of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics in his 1809 work, Zoological Philosophy. This theory posited that species 
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could adapt to their environment, acquiring new characteristics, and then transfer those 
acquired characteristics, which would enable them to survive more easily in their 
environment, to future generations. Lamarck focused on characteristics of the body, such 
as the long neck of the giraffe, which he presumed had changed to adapt to the 
environment. Bowler and Morus illustrate another use of this theory using the muscles of 
a weightlifter as an example: the children of the weightlifter would acquire stronger 
muscles from birth through heredity (137).  
Lamarck did not conceive environmental influence the same way we do today; we 
conceive of environment as all the factors influencing us after birth. For example, debates 
often concern the cause of intelligence: is a child intelligent because it is in her genes 
from parents, or is a child intelligent because she reads a lot? The same debate has raged 
on in feminist circles: do little girls like dolls because it is characteristic of their sex, or 
inherent in their sex, or do they like dolls because of the effect of social constructions? 
These modern examples, however, are different from the kind of nature versus nurture 
debates in the nineteenth century. “Environmental influence” in the nineteenth century 
could mean the environment before birth, in the womb or even before conception, rather 
than after, a meaning derived from both Lamarck and Darwin. Under a Lamarckian 
theory, parents who educated themselves would be able to pass on their enhanced 
intelligence to future generations, because their enhanced intelligence would be carried 
through the sperm or ovum. Thus, a Lamarckian theory of heredity provided exigence for 
social reform and women’s rights: educating women would lead to smarter children, for 
example. Though Lamarck probably would not have gone this far in his theory of 
acquired characteristics, his theories were applied by others who posited that such 
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attributes could become acquired characteristics. Once this theory of acquired 
characteristics was combined with Darwin’s theory of natural selection and “survival of 
the fittest” rhetoric, reforms in the name of heredity adopted even more urgency. 
Darwinian Discourse and Heredity
Darwin’s theory of natural selection, along with his theory of sexual selection to a 
smaller degree, undoubtedly created warrants and set the tone for nineteenth-century 
debates on heredity. Darwin aimed to examine the variation among species, yet his 
theories of natural selection and sexual selection as the means to speciation also laid the 
groundwork for popular debates on heredity. While some of the theories based in what is 
called “Social Darwinism” offer interpretations that Darwin would not have intended, the 
theories expounded in On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man and 
Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) often imply the kinds of reformist discourse that 
became known as “Social Darwinism.”  
Darwin’s focus on variability and on progressive evolution provided a model of 
evolution of increasingly complicated hierarchies. Evolution went in an upwards scale of 
progress, and social reformist discourses on heredity exploited that directed hierarchy. 
That the population was in danger of outgrowing its resources had already been 
established by Thomas Malthus’s theory, but natural selection explained who would 
survive to enjoy the remaining resources. Darwin theorized that “the vigorous, the 
healthy, and the happy survive and multiply” (Origin 66). Thus, the free love feminists’ 
logic on the importance of both the physical and emotional health of women is supported 
by Darwin since he includes that the “happy,” as well as the healthy, will “survive and 
multiply.” 
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Feminist reforms concerning female choice, “voluntary motherhood,” and smaller 
families could also find support in Darwin’s writings. His emphasis on female choice of 
mates in the animal kingdom provided a firm warrant for feminist arguments. Thus, both 
natural selection and sexual selection could be used as support for feminist reforms. 
Women were the vessels in which evolution would occur, and only through them could 
the survival of the human race occur. Some of Darwin’s arguments seem more overtly 
feminist, such as when he says, “The parents, moreover, which had to nourish or provide 
for fewer offspring would themselves be exposed to a less severe strain in the struggle for 
existence, and would have a better chance of surviving” (Descent 320). Thus, feminists 
arguing for voluntary motherhood had firm support in the scientific realm--if they were 
able to choose to have fewer children, they could better mold and support the ones they 
had. 
But how do Darwin’s theories of natural and sexual selection translate into a 
theory of heredity? While Darwin’s thoughts in On the Origin of Species concentrated 
more on finding the mechanism for speciation,74 some of his observations led to the 
theories on heredity in the popular medical literature. For example, when he says, “the 
variation may be due to the male and female sexual elements having been affected by the 
conditions to which either parent, or their ancestors, have been exposed. Nevertheless an 
effect thus caused at a very early period, even before the formation of the embryo, may 
appear late in life” (Origin 358), he provides support for arguments that what affects the 
parents affects the future children. “Conditions to which either parent...” are exposed 
becomes interpreted differently in later discourse than Darwin might have intended. 
Darwin refers to the natural world in these “conditions”; later reformers would 
 
74 Darwin began with examining variation but had no idea how variation was produced. 
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encompass much more under these “conditions.” Similarly, he notes, “It is the opinion of 
most physiologists that there is no essential difference between a bud and an ovule in 
their earliest stages of formation, so that, in fact…variability may be largely attributed to 
the ovules or pollen, or to both, having been affected by the treatment of the parent prior 
to the act of conception” (Origin 10). Here, “treatment of the parent” can be interpreted 
by feminists to promote better treatment for women, and there is support for an 
interpretation of how parents can intervene in the creation of more healthy and superior 
children. It is in The Descent of Man, however, that Darwin comes closer to approaching 
a theory of heredity.  
In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin’s later work on human evolution, Darwin 
is clearly influenced by the popular debates provoked by the theories in the Origin, and 
he uses this work to elaborate his theory of sexual selection. His theory of heredity here 
adopts a more Lamarckian view, accounting for environmental influences as well as the 
influence of habit and surrounding conditions as causes of variation between parents and 
offspring. He says, “natural selection had been the chief agent of change, though largely 
aided by the inherited effects of habit, and slightly by the direct action of the surrounding 
conditions” (Descent 152-153). Like the reformers, Darwin also posits that more than 
physical characteristics are transmitted: “Besides special tastes and habits, general 
intelligence, courage, bad and good temper…are certainly transmitted” (Descent 110). 
Social purity and free love reformers would be especially interested in his thoughts on 
how virtuous habits will go stronger, “becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance” (Descent 
104). Thus, under Darwin’s theory, habits could become fixed, and thus be transferred to 
future generations by inheritance. To return to my earlier example, the little girl’s 
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attention to dolls becomes a habit that is then fixed and passed on to her children. An 
example more relevant to nineteenth-century debates comes from discussions of 
temperance. The habit of drinking becomes fixed and will produce children with the same 
habit. Likewise, the habit of abstaining from drink would become a fixed tendency. 
While today we theorize a “gene” for such tendencies, nineteenth-century thinkers did 
not know the mechanism, but assumed that habits could be transferred. Thus, both 
Darwin’s and Lamarck’s theories offered the possibility for reform with hereditarian 
consequences. 
Darwin’s chief contribution, of course, is his theory of natural selection, which, as 
historians have amply pointed out, underwrote a “Social Darwinist” discourse. Though 
scientists would not state with confidence that both parents contributed material to the 
new being until Hertwig and Fol’s cell experiments in the mid-1870s, Darwin assumed 
both parents’ material would blend together (Bowler and Morus 195). He did not address, 
however, how this transference occurred: Weismann would theorize this agency in the 
1880s. While Lamarck and Darwin are clearly the most influential theorists on the topic 
of heredity through much of the nineteenth century, it is the work of Weismann and 
Mendel towards the end of the century that produced theories with even greater social 
ramifications in the next century.  
Beyond Lamarck: Weismann and Mendel
August Weismann (1834-1914) and Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) would disprove 
the Lamarckian theory of heredity, creating a shift in the popular reformist literature by 
the end of the century. While Mendel’s work comes first, it was not deemed significant 
until its rediscovery in 1900. It was Weismann’s work in the 1880s that would later 
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reveal the significance of Mendel’s findings. August Weismann refuted Lamarck’s theory 
of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and he picked up where Lamarck, Darwin, 
and scientists studying embryology left off--he proposed a material entity by which 
hereditary characteristics are transferred, the germ-plasm.  
Weismann, who had spent his early career studying insects, turned to the 
theoretical side of science after an eye disease left him unable to perform many of the 
experiments in his new areas of interest: natural selection and the mechanism for 
inheritance (Mayr, Growth of Biological Thought 698). Instead of a science based on his 
own experiments, Weismann combined the knowledge accumulated in the studies of 
species and the new knowledge in embryology and cytology to refute Lamarckian ideas 
of inheritance and propose a mechanism for hereditary transmission. Although Weismann 
had previously endorsed a more Lamarckian view of inheritance, findings in embryology 
and cytology prompted his rethinking of the established theories and resulted in his 
publication of a paper in 1883 that refuted the inheritance of acquired characteristics 
(Mayr, One Long Argument118 and 120). Ernst Mayr (1991), himself an evolutionary 
theoriest, describes Weismann’s strategy of refutation as follows: 
Weismann took up one cause after another that simply could not be 
explained by “use and disuse” and other Lamarckian mechanisms. How 
can the numerous special adaptations of the worker and soldier castes of 
ants be inherited by use, when those castes do not reproduce? How can 
habits become instincts through use, when a particular instinct is practiced 
only once in the whole life of the individual as is so often the case of 
reproductive instincts among insects? How can the external structure of 
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insects be modified by use and disuse, when the chitinous skeleton is laid 
down during the pupal stage and never changes afterward? (One Long 
Argument 120)
Weismann’s refutation also showed how some of the characteristics attributed to a 
Lamarckian theory could be better explained by natural selection (121). Mayr explains, 
however, that it was not always considered contradictory in the nineteenth century to 
believe in both the inheritance of acquired characteristics and natural selection (119), 
especially considering that Darwin himself ascribed to Lamarckian ideas in some of his 
writings. This alliance between the two theories explains why Weismann’s conclusions 
did not completely replace notions of inherited characteristics (120). Weismann, 
however, observed a gap in the science of heredity that needed to be filled--the question 
of a mechanism. 
Influenced by the findings in embryology, Weismann proposed that the 
characteristics of the next generation were stored in what he called the “germ-plasm.” 
However, he isolated this germ-plasm from the rest of the body, leaving no room for the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics (Bowler and Morus 158 and 200). Weismann 
explains, “the germ-cells are not derived at all, as far as their essential and characteristic 
substance is concerned, from the body of the individual, but they are derived directly 
from the parent germ-cell” (167-168). Weismann was able to differentiate between the 
germ cells that hold the hereditary material and the soma, or the rest of the body (Mayr, 
One Long Argument 121-122). Since later findings questioned whether germ cells and 
soma cells could affect each other, Weismann renamed the mechanism the “germ-plasm” 
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rather than “germ-cell.” Later writings, discussed below, would posit some influence on 
the germ-plasm, however.  
Another of Weismann’s key contributions was his emphasis on the role of sexual 
reproduction in variation. As a result of findings in cytology in 1883 that the material 
from each parent was recombined rather than fused together, Weismann noted that 
“[g]enetic recombination together with natural selection can thus bring together 
previously separate and independent characteristics that greatly improve the selection 
value of their bearers” (Mayr, One Long Argument 123).  Mayr lists this “recognition of 
the importance of sexual reproduction as a source of genetic variation” as one of 
Weismann’s key contributions, in addition to his more well-known contributions of the 
refutation of Lamarckian theory and the establishment of the germ-plasm theory of 
heredity. However, it would be the rediscovery of Mendel’s work that would resolve the 
nineteenth-century debate over the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Though he published his findings in 1865, Gregor Mendel’s contributions to a 
“theory of heredity” went unrecognized until 1900. Mendel was looking to establish a 
theory of hybridization with his now famous experiments on pea plants. From these 
experiments, Mendel not only found that characteristics can be dominant over each other, 
but also that these characteristics are found in pairs, laying the foundation for the theory 
of genes (Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought 715). Mayr expresses Mendel’s 
hypothesis as follows: “each character was represented in the fertilized egg by two 
hereditary elements (and no more than two) one derived from the mother (from the 
female gamete) and one derived from the father (from the male gamete)” (Growth of 
Biological Thought 713). Mendel’s findings showed how characteristics “existed as 
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discrete units and that one state was somehow ‘dominant’ over the other (the recessive)” 
(Bowler and Morus 197). At the time of the publication of his findings, Mendel was 
unfamiliar with advances in evolutionary biology and in the study of cells. After the 
rediscovery of his work in 1900, his results, combined with the findings in evolutionary 
biology, cytology, and embryology, would lay the foundation for modern ideas of 
heredity. 
When published in 1865, Mendel’s findings failed to cause the explosion of 
interest that their rediscovery prompted in 1900. The reason for the lack of response is 
partly a matter of rhetorical situation. At the time, Mendel’s findings were not deemed 
significant since their applications to a theory of heredity went ignored. Mendel himself 
was not attempting to form a theory of heredity, but rather to record the laws of 
hybridization. Bowler and Morus attribute the difference in the reception of Mendel’s 
ideas in 1900 to the changes that occurred between their publication and rediscovery: 
among these changes were the failure of recapitulation theory, and an increased interest 
in eugenics (199-200). Thus, Mendel’s work was given new significance because of 
social reform discourse. James Wynn (2007) has also proposed that it was Mendel’s 
inattention to audience in his use of mathematical formulae that led to the poor reception 
of his 1865 article (5). It is clear that the scientific community was not ready for 
Mendel’s theories when they were first published, but recognized their significance due 
to the changes in rhetorical situation and in audience. Mendel’s work then became the 
basis of hereditarian thought in the twentieth century and the basis for our modern 
theories of genetics. 
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Lamarck’s theories, however, did not completely subside as a result of Mendel’s 
work. Throughout the early twentieth century, neo-Lamarckism often attracted social 
reformers because accepting Mendel’s and Weismann’s conclusions seemed to negate 
their arguments that social change could affect subsequent generations through heredity. 
Lamarckism would not completely disappear until findings in molecular biology in the 
1950s (Mayr, One Long Argument 120). Early twentieth-century scientists, however, 
mostly accepted Mendel, and it is his work that caused a shift in the discourse at the 
beginning of the century and led to later revolutions in genetics.  
Social Implications and Applications: Malthus, Spencer, and Galton
My contention is that the rhetoric of the social sphere not only overlaps but also 
influences the formation of scientific discourses as much as scientific discourses 
influence the formation of social reform rhetoric. This reciprocal effect is most apparent 
in the social theories of Malthus, Spencer, and Galton, and their later application by 
feminist reformers. While the theories of heredity derived from Lamarck, Darwin, 
Weismann, and Mendel laid the foundation for feminist arguments on the importance of 
women’s physical role as bearers of children, and thus on the rights they should receive, 
it was the new scientific ideas combined with their social implications that created a 
stronger urgency for social purist, racial uplift, and free love feminism. The theory of 
population asserted by Thomas Malthus, the theory of the evolution of society advocated 
by Herbert Spencer, and the theories of hereditary intelligence adopted by Francis Galton 
helped to provide the warrants for feminist arguments. These theories also contributed to 
a new social science by the end of the century: eugenics. The rhetoric of female sexuality 
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in the nineteenth century owes much to the blending of the science of heredity with social 
science. 
Thomas Malthus’s (1766-1834) theory of population not only provided an 
impetus to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, but it also created an exigence for 
discussing the problem of population and of heredity. Malthus’s 1798 “Essay on the 
Principle of Population” critiqued Enlightenment proposals for how humanity would 
reach a “happier state of society” (1.8). He argued that these philosophers ignored the 
crucial premises of his own argument: the necessities of both food and “passion between 
the sexes” (1.14). Examining the ratio of the increase of the population to the increase in 
subsistence, he finds, “Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers 
will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second” (1.18). Malthus 
thus introduces a major premise for later eugenic arguments: the need for checks on the 
population. His main argument “that the power of population is indefinitely greater than 
the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man” (1.17) provided the basis for 
Darwin’s later conception of natural selection. Malthus’s conclusion on the effects of 
these ratios on the family unit also provided the basis for feminist arguments for smaller 
families. He concludes, 
Impelled to the increase of his species by an equally powerful instinct, 
reason interrupts his career, and asks him whether he may not bring beings 
into the world, for whom he cannot provide the means of subsistence. In a 
state of equality, this would be the simple question. In the present state of 
society, other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank in life? Will 
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he not subject himself to greater difficulties than he at present feels? Will 
he not be obliged to labour harder? and if he has a large family, will his 
utmost exertions enable him to support them? May he not see his offspring 
in rags and misery, and clamouring for bread that he cannot give them? 
And may he not be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting his 
independence, and of being obliged to the sparing hand of charity for 
support? (Malthus 2.22)  
In introducing the competition for survival, Malthus provided the foundation for later 
arguments: how can humanity check its reproduction to ensure enough sustenance for the 
growing population? Would the human race actually devolve if subsistence diminished? 
Who would win the competition for survival? How can parents produce offspring “fit” to 
win? Malthus’s ideas greatly influenced Darwin’s thoughts on natural selection and also 
led to a new discourse of heredity some fifty years later. Were it not for Malthus’s 
mathematical and logical conclusions, later students of the evolution of societies, such as 
Herbert Spencer, could not have reached their seminal conclusions. 
Social scientist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a prolific writer beginning at mid-
century, also criticized Enlightenment philosophies of human nature, preferring instead to 
view the course of humanity as a long process of adaptation to environment (Spencer xx). 
Influenced by Malthus, Spencer concludes in his essay “A Theory of Population” (1852) 
that the growth of the population and its struggle for resources encourages rather than 
constrains the ability of humanity to reach perfection (xxi). Using the model of evolution 
as a branching tree in his 1851 work Social Statistics, Spencer compares the evolution of 
humanity to the evolution of society. He finds, “Progress, therefore, is not an accident, 
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but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece 
with the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower” (13).75 Since species 
are influenced by their surrounding conditions, Spencer views civilization as the most 
important influence on human evolution. It is his theory of humanity’s ability to aid 
evolution that became a founding principle of later feminism: 
The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, 
result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and provided the 
human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the same, 
those modifications must end in completeness. As surely as the tree 
becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as 
surely as the same creature assumes the different forms of a carthorse and 
a race-horse, according as its habits demand strength or speed….as surely 
as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes when restrained…so 
surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for the 
social state; so surely must the things we call evil and immorality 
disappear; so surely must man become perfect. (Spencer 13) 
To Spencer, humanity, the species, the family, and the civilization were evolving 
organisms. Applying evolutionary theory to the idea that civilizations are what instigate 
the upwards progression of humanity, Spencer embraced a more Lamarckian view and 
introduced the key concept, usually attributed to Darwin, of “survival of the fittest,” in 
his 1864 work, Principles of Biology. Although he adopts more anti-feminist views in 
 
75 Spencer’s metaphor of the branching tree (coming from the adherents of recapitulation theory and from 
evolutionary theory) was enormously prolific throughout the century. This metaphor was also employed in 
Hulda Potter-Loomis’s argument for social freedom in the 1890s and her claim that free love is a result of 
adaptation to environment. 
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much of his writings, such as his 1861 work Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical,
and his 1873-1874 article on the “Psychology of the Sexes,” both of which assert views 
on women as less developed than men,76 Spencer’s theories of evolution and population 
were enormously influential to later feminists.  
Francis Galton (1822-1911) is another pivotal figure in the debates over heredity 
in the nineteenth century. Darwin’s cousin, he was interested in proving hereditarian 
determinism. His 1869 work, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and 
Consequences, attempts to solidify the importance of heredity through observing how 
intelligence occurs in successive generations of certain families. In his preface to 
Hereditary Genius, Galton claims to introduce the “law of deviation from an average” 
into discussions of heredity. Galton’s key contributions, however, are his contentions that 
humanity has a tendency to degeneration if left unchecked and that conscientious 
breeding could check this decline and produce more intelligent offspring. He compares 
the breeding of dogs and horses to the breeding of human children, an analogy that often 
recurrs in this discourse. Reformers often inquired why less attention was paid to human 
breeding than to animal breeding. Galton postulates that human breeding could aim for 
more specific goals to “produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriages 
during several consecutive generations” (1). This reference to “judicious marriage” 
prefigures later feminist arguments. His emphasis on the responsibility of parents to 
future generations, as when he says, “each generation has enormous power over the 
natural gifts of those that follow” (1), also appears in feminist discourse of the same time 
period. This rhetoric of responsibility to the next generation already existed in some 
feminist writings before Galton, but gained more prevalence afterwards. Galton’s theories 
 
76 See Russett (1989) on Spencer’s anti-feminist views. 
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were often contradicted, but the popularity of Darwin’s work made them more appealing. 
Though Galton himself did not adhere to the Lamarckian theory of acquired 
characteristics, reformers who combined Galton’s observations and calculations with 
their own Lamarckian views had support for social reforms in education: intelligence 
could be acquired and passed on to future generations. 
Galton is also credited with coining the term “eugenics” in 1886, though the 
theory behind eugenics had existed before his formal naming of it. Eugenics, or the idea 
of improving the race through selective breeding, blended together the science of Darwin 
and Lamarck, and later of Weismann and Mendel, with the social theories of Malthus, 
Spencer, and Galton. Eugenic theories went from encouraging the “superior” to 
reproduce, known as “positive eugenics,” to discouraging, or even forcing, the “unfit” 
from reproducing, known as “negative eugenics.” Eugenic practices, such as sterilization, 
became institutionalized through laws in the early twentieth century, such as the 1927 
Supreme Court decision upholding sterilization of the “feeble-minded” (English 13). Yet, 
nineteenth-century American feminists often invoked the theories behind eugenics long 
before laws were enacted in its name and even before Galton gave the concept a new 
name. “Stirpiculture,” a form of eugenics, was often practiced in free love communes, 
such as John Humphrey Noyes’ Oneida community, where men and women deemed 
worthy were paired to reproduce. 
It is tempting to dismiss eugenics because of its subsequently discredited nature 
and its racist applications, but historian Nancy Stepan (1991) warns against dismissing 
eugenics as a “pseudoscience,” since many prominent scientists were involved (5). The 
theory of eugenics gives us insight into how scientific theories were affected by and 
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affected popular value systems. Eugenics also reveals nineteenth-century concerns about 
imperialism, immigration, and race relations, as well as how such theories could be 
altered for different purposes 
When do hereditarian discourse and the focus on relieving future suffering 
become eugenic? One of the central questions of this chapter concerns this shift from 
reformers discussing heredity to advocating more eugenic outcomes. I treat eugenics as 
more of a social science, on a par with Spencer’s and Galton’s popularizations of 
Darwin’s theories, though biological science legitimized it. When Lamarckian theories of 
heredity were more popular, eugenics seems less like the insidious theory we currently 
know it as, because of twentieth-century practices and its popularity with racist policies 
(such as compulsory sterilization of certain groups). Lamarckian theories, combined with 
a eugenic goal, gave scientific credence to social reforms. Changes in education and in 
marriage laws could be justified in the name of evolution and progress, since the material 
that built future generations would improve. Eugenics left its mark on social reform 
discourse, and became integral in the racial uplift and birth control rhetoric of the 
1920s.77 The benefit of superior offspring becomes a driving force behind many reforms, 
with warrants in hereditarian science. The shift between these two discourses of heredity 
and eugenics occurs when arguments move from the cause and value stases, where 
heredity is theorized and celebrated, to the action stasis, where specific eugenic reforms 
are introduced. It is when reformers shift from the value to the action stasis in discussing 
heredity that hereditarian discourse becomes eugenic. 
 
77 W.E.B. DuBois, for example, urged the “talented tenth” to reproduce. Margaret Sanger’s birth control 
goals were also influenced by eugenics. 
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The combination of theories on population control, social evolution, and eugenics 
with the theories of heredity based in the work of Lamarck, Darwin, and Weismann set 
the stage for late nineteenth-century women’s reform rhetoric. Before it reached that 
stage, however, the medical community weighed in.  
Medical Popularizations and the Power of Heredity 
The shift in stasis from cause and value to action, resulting in a shift in the aims 
and kinds of hereditarian discourse, was aided by popular medical advice books. In the 
late nineteenth century, this genre frequently contained discussions of heredity. 
Combined with feminist goals, some of these advice books shifted into more explicitly 
eugenic discourses. Physicians’ discussions of heredity often combined the disciplines of 
physiology, bacteriology, and embryology in the ultimate goal of advising women on the 
best choices to make in order to produce “fit” offspring. 
Nineteenth-century physicians had already noted the importance of heredity in 
diagnosing patients and taking their histories, a popular methodology, as shown by critic 
Susan Wells’s examination of the “heart history” in nineteenth-century women 
physicians’ texts and by physician Clelia Mosher’s late nineteenth-century sexuality 
questionnaire.78 The medical advice books and essays by physicians Russell Trall, John 
Cowan, Elizabeth Blackwell, and Emma Drake illustrate both how physicians adapted 
medical knowledge and how they bolstered advice on sexual conduct, marriage, and 
health with discussions of heredity. Making lifestyle decisions on diet and sex were not 
only important to women’s health, but to the health of future generations. This medical 
 
78 Mosher asked respondents for details on the paternal and maternal grandparents and parents, including 
the age they married, their health, and diseases in the family. She also asked about “any prenatal influences 
before your birth” in the section on the respondents’ mothers’ information.  
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advice genre often combined superstitions and “old wives’ tales” about pregnant women 
with scientific knowledge about heredity. However, each text reflects the specific 
moment of the knowledge of heredity: Trall and Cowan reflect more Lamarckian views, 
Blackwell reflects the Lamarckian and Darwinian focus on the effects of habit, and Drake 
reflects a combination of the older Lamarckian views, which had yet to be removed 
completely from hereditarian discourse, with the newer knowledge of germ plasm 
provided by Weismann.  
Russell Trall
Russell Trall’s popular medical advice book, Sexual Physiology: A Scientific and 
Popular Exposition of the Fundamental Problems in Sociology (1866), argues more 
feminist points of view in attempting to naturalize women’s bodies and functions (See 
Chapters 2 and 4). Moving from chapters explaining the sexual organs to later chapters 
advocating specific lifestyle choices, Trall also invokes hereditarian arguments. At the 
time his book was written, hereditarian discourse had yet to gain the prominence it 
acquired in later texts. His arguments therefore seem more in line with older ideas about 
pregnant women and superstitions about heredity. However, as the findings in 
embryology had opened up the possibility for prenatal influence and for intervention on 
the part of the potential parents, his participation in hereditarian discourse illustrates the 
theories of his particular moment.  
Trall’s advice book often borders on a women’s rights manifesto (as pointed out 
in Chapter 2), not only arguing for the naturalization of women’s bodies, but also 
specifically advocating women’s rights. For example, his chapter on “Regulation of the 
Number of Offspring” begins with a statement on “woman’s rights” to choose when and 
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under what circumstances to have children. He also blames the lack of women’s rights 
for the stillbirths, the prevalence of venereal diseases, and the “depravities” of the current 
generation. He asserts, “And when her supremacy is fully recognized, there will soon be 
an end of stillbirths, and of frail and malformed offspring who can seldom be reared to an 
adult age, or, if they can, are only curses to themselves and to the world” (203). His 
arguments anticipate those of the reformers examined later in this chapter: if women are 
not given rights, how can they be expected to bear healthy children who will further the 
goals of evolution? His argument also reflects many of the feminist reformers’ claims 
that the diseases and weaknesses in children are the result of the mother’s limitations, 
since their status confines them to situations where their own health suffers. 
Trall, however, goes further in his advocacy of women’s rights by emphasizing 
the importance of women’s choice of partner and of women’s sexual pleasure in 
producing children more “fit” to live in the world. Although the idea that women must 
experience orgasm to conceive had been refuted by medical knowledge by this time, 
women’s orgasm was yet represented as a means to producing superior children. Trall 
notes that orgasm is not required for conception, but enumerates its benefits when he 
discusses the conditions under which children should be conceived. He argues that what 
is transferred to the child, the characteristics that form the growing being, occurs at 
conception, and thus the conditions at conception must be of a certain kind to yield 
positive results. These conditions include women who desire sex with their husbands, 
since no “offspring [can] be as perfect as it should be unless the act is both desired and 
enjoyed by both parties. This rule or law, for it is a law of Nature, at once suggests the 
conditions which are necessary to insure this result” (245). Trall also defines these 
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conditions as including both women and men who experience pleasure during 
conception, and who are “in their best bodily and mental condition when the fruitful 
orgasm is experienced” (254). Trall believes, “Children are often from birth stamped 
through their whole organization with the depravities, propensities, infirmities, 
eccentricities, and disordered conditions which one or both parents exercised during the 
act of reproduction” (xiii). Thus, Trall combines ideas of “romantic love” popular in the 
nineteenth century with the idea that the parents can make impressions on the fertilized 
egg: if both parents have full rights and experience “at-one-ment” during the act of 
conception (232), what is transmitted to the child will less likely result in “depravities, 
propensities, infirmities, eccentricities, and disordered conditions” for the future 
generation. His rhetoric, blaming social ills on heredity, reflects the trends beginning in 
reformist rhetoric of the same time period. Trall’s emphasis on women’s rights in order to 
perfect the qualities passed on to the offspring also occurs in other medical texts. 
John Cowan
Physician John Cowan’s The Science of a New Life (1889) is based on the premise 
that parents can consciously influence the characteristics of their future children, a view 
owing much to embryology (see Chapter 4). His book thus becomes a conduct book with 
the aim of producing better children. Like Trall, Cowan includes sections explaining 
sexual physiology, as well as sections on women’s rights. Like the larger reform 
movements, Cowan bases his hereditarian ideas on the possibility of influence, adopting a 
Lamarckian perspective also supported by embryological theories of the time. 
Cowan, like many social reformers, believes that the responsibility for reform lies 
with parents rather than reformers and temperance workers (21). He participates in the 
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rhetoric of responsibility that attributes both good and bad characteristics and actions in 
offspring to their parents’ behavior. However, unlike our current “rhetoric of 
responsibility” that emphasizes the way parents rear their children, the rhetoric of 
responsibility in the nineteenth century concentrated on actions taken by the parents 
before the child is born. If a child is imperfect, it must be because of hereditary influence 
or influence while the child was in the womb.  
The Science of a New Life posits three different periods of influence on the young: 
the period of introductory preparation, the period of gestatory influence, and the period of 
nursing influence (141). In all three instances, Cowan emphasizes what is passed to 
children through the body rather than social or environmental influences. The body of the 
woman becomes more central, since she is housing the soon-to-be life, but both parents 
are included in Cowan’s rhetoric of responsibility. Cowan devotes sections in his advice 
book to what men should abstain from, such as alcohol and meat, since both men and 
women can influence future generations through their current habits.  
Cowan goes so far as to tell parents that they should choose the profession of their 
child before it is born. He lists professions and goes through actions, thoughts, and 
readings likely to produce a child who will become this type of professional (151). For 
example, he advises that if parents want their child to be a geologist, they should travel, 
go for long walks, and read in preparing to have such a child (156). His advice in this 
area recalls older ideas about the influence pregnant women have over the unborn, even 
to the point that images the pregnant woman looks at will affect the offspring’s 
appearance (166). Cowan also recalls earlier nineteenth-century physiological ideas on 
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the importance of the nervous system (see Chapter 2), since he states that daily thoughts 
and actions influence children, through the reactions of the nervous system (189). 
Women’s rights also become a central part of Cowan’s hereditarian ideology. The 
bedroom becomes a setting for women’s rights, since he believes that if children are not 
propagated under the right conditions, they cannot be reared under the right conditions 
(131-132). He advocates female choice in a partner, which has its warrant in Darwin’s 
sexual selection theory, as well as choice in when to have sex (109). He also advises that 
parents should prepare their future offspring for professions regardless of the sex of the 
baby since females can be inventors, too (154). For Cowan, it is not only the actual 
characteristics passed on through heredity that influence the offspring, but also the 
surrounding conditions and agency of both parents before conception and before birth. 
He adheres to the nineteenth-century ideology that there is no such thing as a “self-made 
man” (155)--it is all determined before birth. 
Elizabeth Blackwell
Elizabeth Blackwell combined her medical knowledge and social purity aims in 
her essays, and her advice on heredity focused on the power of habit. Her 1894 essay The 
Human Element in Sex: being a Medical Inquiry into the Relation of Sexual Physiology to 
Christian Morality by Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell attempts to connect the mental and 
physical aspects of sexual relations (see Chapter 2), a connection which also occurs in her 
discussions of heredity. Blackwell’s hereditarian discourse centers on the power of the 
will and on the power of habit. 
Blackwell acknowledges that there is not enough information on heredity, but, 
following Lamarck and Darwin, she believes in the power of habit and how habits can 
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become tendencies that are transferred to future generations. Darwin had speculated, 
“Natural selection had been the chief agent of change, though largely aided by the 
inherited effects of habit, and slightly by the direct action of the surrounding conditions” 
(Descent 152-153), and his reference to “the inherited effects of habit” provides the 
warrant for Blackwell’s contention that potential parents should work hard to control 
their habits, also a Lamarckian perspective. She enumerates how the power of the will 
can help humans change their tendencies, which then can become modified through habit 
and become part of the hereditary strain (Human Element 61). Her social purity aims are 
apparent in these beliefs, since the tendencies and habits she discusses concern 
temperance and the power of the will. The power of will, to Blackwell and many others 
before her, is what separates humanity from lower evolutionary stages. 
Blackwell also participates in the growing connection between the rhetoric of 
heredity and the rhetoric of women’s rights. Referring to women as “mothers of the race” 
(Human Element 30), she highlights the role of women’s health in the production of a 
“vigorous healthy race” (Essays 253). As the woman’s body is the vessel in which this 
race will be bred, Blackwell theorizes that the uterus is “capable of containing a perfect 
child” (Human Element 29). In this way, she shows that deficiencies in the child are not 
the result of its pre-natal housing, and sets up her argument for how women can achieve 
that “perfect child” through a temperate lifestyle for both parents. Blackwell combines 
the discourse of physiology in her discussions of what the female body is capable of, with 
the discourse of bacteriology in her discussions of how venereal disease leads to 
“degenerations” and how purity can result in more perfect children, and with the 
240
discourse of heredity in her discussion of the improvement of the race as the ultimate 
result of these lifestyle choices.  
Blackwell’s rhetoric also anticipates more racist eugenics in her discussions of 
heredity and self-sovereignty. Stephanie Athey’s (2000) study of the rhetoric of eugenics 
posits that the rhetoric of female self-sovereignty, or the right of women to control their 
own bodies, often privileged the white race (1-2). When discussing the power of the mind 
over the body, or the power of the will over the control of venereal disease, Blackwell 
notes, “We should uproot our whole national life and destroy the characteristics of the 
Anglo-Saxon race, if we gave up this natural right of sovereignty over our own bodies” 
(Essays 125). Like other reformers of the time, Blackwell places women’s control or rule 
over their own bodies as the key to race progress; if women cannot control their own 
bodies, the tendency towards degeneration will continue. This argument reflects the 
growing trend of discussions about heredity contributing to nationalistic discourse. 
Recalling the rhetoric of Herbert Spencer, Blackwell argues that sex education is vital to 
the growth of a nation (Essays 239), because of the central function of the family in 
society (Essays 204).  Thus, the role of heredity becomes crucial not only in the health 
and well-being of individual families and future generations, but also in the survival of a 
nation. This argument reflects many of the changes occurring in the late nineteenth-
century and the combination of hereditarian and nationalistic arguments in the discourse 
of eugenics. Blackwell, like many feminist social reformers, created a feminist eugenics 
by stressing women’s rights. 
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Emma Drake
While Blackwell’s essays often focus more on purity arguments, using 
hereditarian arguments as part of her case for moral responsibility, physician Emma 
Drake, also a social purity advocate, focuses more on moral responsibility in heredity 
itself. Hereditarian arguments are the claim, rather than the support, in her writing. 
Drake’s 1901 advice book, What a Young Wife Ought to Know, includes a chapter 
entitled “The Moral Responsibility of Parents in Heredity,” and her text explicitly refers 
to the science of heredity, quoting Frances Galton and Charles Darwin. This chapter falls 
before the chapter on intrauterine growth, which incorporates recent knowledge in 
embryology, demonstrating the science at this time: advice on heredity comes before the 
advice on intrauterine growth because the influence of heredity comes first. 
Drake begins the chapter with a quotation from Galton on parents’ moral 
responsibility to the next generation, which becomes a key feature of her argument. For 
Drake, parents are responsible not only for bringing up their children once they have been 
born, but also for the characteristics they transmit to the children before they are born. 
She then leads into a quotation from Charles Darwin on how both parents contribute 
characteristics to the new life. Unlike Blackwell, who acknowledges that heredity is not 
yet an exact science and that there is still much to learn concerning heredity, Drake 
believes the opposite: “We might go on indefinitely making quotations from undisputed 
authorities on this great science of heredity, for to-day it has become almost an exact 
science” (137). Drake’s rhetoric positions Galton and Darwin as “undisputed authorities” 
in this science in order to make her argument that since the effects of heredity are known, 
it is the responsibility of the parents to control those effects. Her book, contrasting with 
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the three previous ones, not only benefits from the writings of Darwin and Lamarck, but 
also the later theories of Galton and Weismann. She refers to Weismann’s theories when 
she quotes Dr. Holbrook, who says, “‘Every child born into the world is essentially an 
experiment; we cannot tell what its chief characteristics will be; these depend upon the 
potentialities stored up in the germ-plasm’” (qtd in 143-144). This quotation references 
the germ-plasm theory of heredity and incorporates social values. Thus, Drake’s writings 
show how the newer knowledge of the sciences was being combined with older ideas on 
heredity at the turn of the century. Though Weismann’s ideas, which negated the 
possibility for influence from the parents’ habits, had gained more popularity by this 
time, many still believed in the possibility for influence on the future generation from the 
parents’ lifestyle. 
Drake insists that both parents contribute characteristics to the new life, which 
draws on the newer scientific knowledge, but she clarifies that the mother is a stronger 
influence since it is her body that holds the new life, which recollects older ideas. Drake 
writes, 
That both in the law and the gospel of heredity, of the two parents, the 
mother has a far greater influence we believe firmly; yet this does not 
relieve the father from responsibility. The germ from him, which is “bone 
of his bone, flesh of his flesh,” contributed to the formation of the child in 
its beginning, must be of high nature and cultivation, seed from a noble 
sire, or the little life is dwarfed from the outset, and the mother must 
expend much precious time and strength in making good the terrible 
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deficiencies which such a beginning entails, and then mourn that so much 
can never be overcome. (138) 
Drake’s word choices signify a combination of the scientific and the social: the science is 
“the law” and social values “the gospel.” The gender roles implied--the man supplying a 
germ that must be cultivated and corrected by the woman--also demonstrates how social 
values were derived from scientific discoveries: while both parents contribute, the woman 
is more important in molding the new life. Drake directs young women on their choice of 
a mate throughout the book and in this chapter also focuses on the responsibilities they 
have to change themselves, saying, “Begin by weeding out the habits and tendencies that 
you would not wish to transmit, and by cultivating the qualities and accomplishments, 
which you would delight to see repeated in your children” (145). Her advice is both part 
of her rhetoric of responsibility and a conduct edict. Drake combines the ideas of the past 
on the influence they can exert, citing that “children have become what they were trained 
to be in intra-uterine life” (144). She also combines scientific ideas with anecdotal 
evidence in her advice. She tells a story about a traveler who meets a family of several 
“coarse, boorish” sons and one “refined” daughter. When asked about the difference, the 
mother attributes the difference not to gender, but to her reading of Scott’s Lady of the 
Lake while pregnant with the daughter, which she believed helped to mold the child’s 
refined character (142-143). This example recalls the arguments, ultimately derived from 
embryology, on prenatal influence.  
Drake’s combination of older, even ancient, ideas with newer ones on heredity 
and prenatal influence shows the status of the discourse at this particular point in time, 
when Mendel’s work was just beginning to become more well-known, though not yet 
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incorporated. Drake’s proclamations also begin to sound more familiar to the modern 
reader, such as ideas about listening to classical music and reading to the unborn. What 
also becomes more modern is her notion of “environment” because “environment,” once 
known as conditions before birth, now becomes what children experience after birth: 
“What our children become depends upon two conditions; what they are at birth, and 
what environment makes them” (138).  
Medical Advice and Heredity
These four texts by Trall, Cowan, Blackwell, and Drake demonstrate the trend in 
the use of hereditarian discourse in medical advice manuals aimed at popular audiences. 
Each text is a hybrid, starting with an explanation of the body and its processes and 
ending with advice on conduct that will aid these processes in producing better offspring. 
Each text also exemplifies the status of hereditarian knowledge at its particular time. Trall 
has no knowledge of Weismann, so his hypothesis of how characteristics are transferred 
focuses on conditions outside the body that affect it; for him, the feelings of pleasure 
experienced by the parents during the act of conception impress themselves on the 
embryo. Two happy, healthy, and self-owning parents result in healthy, happy, self-
owning (and less depraved) offspring. For Cowan, writing at the time when 
embryological theories proliferated, influences on the embryo can mold its future 
characteristics. Both men imply Lamarckian and Darwinian ideas in their rhetoric of self-
improvement for the sake of future generations. Blackwell, writing at a time when fears 
of venereal disease caused fears of “degeneration” in future offspring, focuses on how to 
avoid these degenerating influences through a life of purity motivated by the will. Last 
Drake, with her knowledge of Weismann, combined with purity ideals, focuses on how 
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women can make the best decisions to ensure that the germ transferred and cultivated 
becomes the more refined offspring desired, and her rhetoric of responsibility accounts 
for both heredity and environment. It is in these four texts that we see the discourses of 
physiology, bacteriology, and embryology combined into a new rhetoric of heredity that 
reformers in the social purity, racial uplift, and free love movements exploited in 
emphasizing the rights of women in sexual practices and motherhood. 
Feminist Reformers, Heredity, and Eugenics 
What made hereditarian discourse and eugenic rhetoric so appealing to 
nineteenth-century social reformers? Many contemporary feminists would reject such 
discourse, since arguing on the basis of heredity often implies biological determinism for 
women’s abilities and roles. While this determinism was undoubtedly present throughout 
the nineteenth century in anti-feminist arguments, causing our current wariness of it, 
feminists of that time period also found support in stressing the all-encompassing nature 
of heredity. Since arguments for women’s rights based on natural law and “Republican 
motherhood” did not always appeal to audiences hostile to giving women rights and 
viewing them as sexual beings, a focus on the role of women in the evolution of the 
human race would appeal to stronger values in these audiences. What Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell has called the argument from expediency, or what we might know as the 
argument from difference, focused on giving women rights since they are different from 
men and one of their differences is their refining role in begetting and raising children. 
Nan Johnson’s study of nineteenth-century women’s rhetoric shows how women rhetors 
often positioned themselves as “mothers of the nation,” arguing to extend their sphere of 
influence on the basis of the values of “Republican motherhood” (113). These are 
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familiar arguments. But something is added to these arguments when we look at them 
through the lens of nineteenth-century hereditarian discourse. Feminist rhetors 
participated in the intense focus on progress through better children, but added the 
position of women as a key factor in that progress. We see how women could argue for 
rights on the basis of their status as “mothers of the race” because of scientific discourse. 
The “mothers of the race” argument led to material reforms, such as the eugenic 
law testing men for venereal disease before a marriage license was granted, the change in 
the age of consent, and more liberal divorce laws. This “scientized” rhetoric was often 
convincing to nineteenth-century audiences. But using an appeal to “mothers of the race” 
led to other developments: a rhetoric of feminist eugenics. In earlier texts, the type of 
eugenics advocated is the more positive kind: feminists asserted a woman’s right to 
choose a partner that would help her bear more fit offspring. Many rights could be 
advocated under this line of argument. However, towards the late nineteenth century, 
eugenic discourses became more racist and more deterministic.79 The new consciousness 
of disease transmission and its effects on degeneration also influenced this discourse. 
Later feminist advocates of eugenics, instead of using eugenic arguments for feminist 
ends, created arguments that champion more “negative” eugenics than “positive” 
eugenics. Eugenics became the end rather than the means to argue for feminist reforms.  
Despite its appeal to nineteenth-century feminists, few scholars have addressed 
the prevalence of eugenic rhetoric in their texts. An exception is Stephanie Athey’s essay 
“Eugenic Feminisms in Late Nineteenth-Century America:  Reading Race in Victoria 
Woodhull, Frances Willard, Anna Julia Cooper, and Ida B. Wells” (2000), which 
 
79 Angelique Richardson’s (2003) study of the same discourse in British feminist texts notes that in 
England, eugenics became a discourse centered on class rather than race. 
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identifies eugenic arguments in four famous rhetors and focuses on how such women 
reinforced white supremacy and imperialism with their use of eugenic discourses. Athey, 
however, often seems to view the discourse of hereditarian science itself as racist, rather 
than its applications in eugenics. However, examining key texts of the social purity, racial 
uplift, and free love movement, we see a more complicated use of hereditarian and 
eugenic discourse. These feminists used eugenic rhetoric in their positioning of women’s 
sexuality as a purifying force, an argument that later degenerates into more raced, 
classed, and nationalist discourse. In the following examples, the focus of the eugenic 
arguments is on women’s rights, but the implications for the later, more negative 
eugenics are also present. 
Social Purity
The social purity movement’s arguments, with their goals of eliminating the 
double-standard between men and women and instituting temperance for both sexes, 
often seem similar to the rhetoric of responsibility present in medical reformers’ texts. 
Both discourses emphasize that better children result from temperate and healthy 
lifestyles. Though less radical than the arguments of free love advocates, social purity 
advocates do participate in the conversation on female sexuality and women’s rights. For 
them, female sexuality can be a purifying force. Frances Willard, one of the most 
prominent advocates for social purity and temperance, reveals how the discourses of 
sexuality and motherhood transformed in the late nineteenth century with the addition of 
the goals of heredity. Her interest in abolishing alcoholic beverages, for example, had 
added backing when it was believed that alcoholism could be passed on through heredity. 
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She also attempted to “scientize,” or professionalize, the role of motherhood in her 
concept of “scientific motherhood.”  
Willard discusses “scientific motherhood” in her 1891 presidential address to the 
National Women’s Council, where she urges a shift from “The empirical maxims and old 
wive’s [sic] fables of the nursery…to the hard-earned results of scientific investigation” 
(27). Willard employs the term “science” here in a different sense: as a method and 
theory that will professionalize motherhood. In other parts of the speech, however, more 
familiar contemporary meanings of science are employed in her references to hereditary 
and pre-natal influences: “The best work of the mother will be intelligently done, on the 
bases of heredity, pre-natal influence, and devout obedience to the laws of health” (27). 
Willard here uses the same arguments employed in contemporary medical advice books: 
in order to bear healthy children and have these children survive their early years, women 
needed education in hygiene, considered a “science” by many medical schools and 
women’s colleges in the nineteenth century, a field that applied medical knowledge of the 
body and of disease to everyday life. To Willard’s ideal mothers with the proper 
education, “Children will be born of set purpose and will cut their teeth according to a 
plan” (27). Thus, the right of females to an education had even more exigence: if mothers 
were to bear children who would survive their first year, they needed extensive 
education. Willard repeatedly emphasizes the role of educated mothers in this speech. 
Her theories allude to eugenics as a method for bearing and raising a “happy specimen of 
scientific babyhood, who rapturously greets this scientific woman as ‘ma-ma.’” (28).  
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Willard’s exigence concerns the mortality rate of children during the time period, 
an “imperfection” (in Bitzer’s terms) also noted by other feminists. It is here that we 
begin to see her hereditarian ideas shift into eugenic rhetoric: 
Four hundred thousand babies annually breathe their first and last in the 
United States--being either so poorly endowed with vital powers or so 
inadequately nourished and cared for that they can no longer survive. One-
third of all the children born depart this life before they reach five years of 
age. In Oriental countries they swarm thick as flies, and the existence of 
woman (a being so impure that her husband begs pardon for referring to 
his wife at all) is tolerated only because she is a necessary prerequisite to 
the transformation of a man into a father of sons. It thus appears that 
exclusive devotion to maternity has not resulted in the best good of 
woman or the highest development of humanity. In those same Oriental 
countries, the Anglo-Saxon race has conquered the native and holds it in 
subjection, though outnumbered at the rate of twenty-five hundred to one. 
Possibly if fewer children were born, and of a better quality, it might be a 
blessing to all concerned. (27) 
Willard’s criticism of the subjugation of women in order to show that more than an 
“exclusive devotion to maternity” is needed to bear and raise healthy children takes the 
conclusions of Malthus, Darwin, and Spencer as its basis, and adds women’s rights goals. 
Her goal to elevate the roles of wives and mothers is evident in her critique on the status 
of “Oriental” women as “impure.” Her language choices, such as “thick as flies,” in 
relation to Oriental society, show her condemnation of the status of women and of a 
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society so low on the evolutionary hierarchy that outsiders, the Anglo-Saxon race, have 
conquered it. Thus, Willard creates a mixture of feminist and racist rhetoric typical in 
“mothers of the race” discourse. Herbert Spencer would have approved of her 
conclusions that progress in societies can also be measured by evolution. Willard’s 
eugenic ideal is also illustrated by her belief that “It seems to be a law of nature that 
quantity decreases as quality improves” (27). For Willard, then, it is not only education 
that is needed, but also attention to producing a “better quality” of children. Thus, she 
shifts from the value stasis in enumerating the benefits of heredity and critiquing the 
status of women and children in societies, to the action stasis in urging fewer children to 
produce better children--demonstrating the shift into eugenic rhetoric. Her particular 
references reveal the racist ideologies produced by more explicit eugenic theories, but 
also stress the role of honoring and educating women with the goal of producing “better 
quality” children. Willard creates a new version of the voluntary motherhood arguments 
produced by suffragists: women should choose when and how often to have children and 
choose to have fewer children to improve their quality; rather than “voluntary 
motherhood,” she advocates “scientific motherhood.” 
Like her characterization of motherhood, Willard’s discussions of sexuality also 
employ hereditarian discourse and contain eugenic implications. In “A White Life for 
Two” (1890), she critiques the double standard that allows men free reign over their 
wives and does not hold men to the same standard of purity as women. She criticizes 
laws that allow marital rape and grant custody to fathers rather than mothers. She adds,  
Last of all, and chiefest, the magnum opus of Christianity, and Science, 
which is its handmaid, the wife will have undoubted custody of herself, 
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and as in all the lower ranges of the animal creation, she will determine 
the frequency of the investiture of life with form. My library groans under 
accumulations of books written by men to teach women the immeasurable 
iniquity of arrested development in the genesis of a new life, but not one 
of these volumes contains the remotest suggestion that this responsibility 
should be equally divided between husband and wife. (336) 
Willard’s combination of Christianity and science is similar to Drake’s later reference to 
the “law and gospel” of heredity. Her reference to the “lower ranges of the animal 
creation” incorporates evolutionary theory by showing that, in subjugating women, 
human beings are not adhering to natural laws, such as sexual selection. That women 
should choose when to have sex and bear children based on the rule of female choice 
followed in the animal kingdom is a popular argument in this discourse, one also 
employed by free love feminists. This line of argument is an attempt to give scientific 
backing to voluntary motherhood.  The phrase “arrested development” in relation to “the 
genesis of new life” not only refers to the practice of abortion, but also implies the 
argument found in other feminist texts that restricting women from choosing when to 
have children, and subjecting them to undesirable conditions to bear children, will not 
produce a “better quality” of children to be the “hope of the race.” Willard also criticizes 
the men who blame only women for the “arrested development” of a child. She knows 
that both parents contribute germ plasm to the new child. Her argument that “this 
responsibility should be equally divided between husband and wife” further echoes some 
of the free love rhetoric that emphasizes that equality in the marriage bed will produce 
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better results and implies the argument that men are just as responsible as women for 
“arrested development,” or what they called “degenerate” children in later discourse. 
Willard’s “scientific motherhood” becomes one of the means to her overall purity 
aims. Emphasizing the ultimate result of better quality children also makes her argument 
for purity more appealing. Though she urges protection for women, it is not a rejection of 
women’s sexuality; she wants women to have complete control over their sexuality. 
Willard’s discussion of sexuality and eugenics is less explicit, but the more explicit 
rhetoric of the more radical feminists reveals how even Willard is participating in this 
larger discourse while also creating her own trademark rhetorical style, blending religious 
and scientific language in her goal of “home protection.”  
Racial Uplift
While the social purity movement’s interest was the elevation of women, the 
racial uplift movement’s interest was the elevation of African Americans through 
education and legislation. Many African American women, however, thought that not 
enough attention was paid to the role of women in this uplift, and aimed to fill that gap. 
They noted the importance of women, and used hereditarian discourse to do so. Although 
some nineteenth-century science writers aimed to use such discourse to promote 
determinism and inferiority of the black race, the discourse of heredity could also be used 
to promote positive changes to show how racial improvement would benefit future 
generations. Women, once again, were the vessels for evolution and racial uplift. The use 
of hereditarian discourse in racial uplift rhetoric also shifts into eugenics. In the early 
twentieth century, activists such as W.E.B. DuBois urged the “talented tenth” to 
reproduce, an example of positive eugenics. Women speaking for racial uplift in the 
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nineteenth century also incorporated eugenics. Anna Julia Cooper and Adella Hunt Logan 
provide two examples of the overlap between scientific rhetoric and racial uplift. 
Anna Julia Cooper (c1858-1964) was born a slave in Raleigh, North Carolina, 
likely the child of a union between Hannah Stanley and her white master. Cooper earned 
several degrees, including a Bachelors in 1884 from Oberlin College, and a doctorate 
from the Sorbonne in 1925 (Garraty and Carnes 5.432-433). Cooper taught literature and 
math at Wilberforce University and later became the principle of the M Street Colored 
High School in Washington, D.C. Cooper left her position as principal after she lost the 
battle to keep college preparatory courses when the school wanted to focus on vocational 
training (432). In 1930, Cooper became the president of Frelinghuysen University, which 
focused on educating adult learners; she even held classes in her home (Logan, With Pen 
and Voice 48). Cooper was active in many social organizations, such as the NAACP, and 
founded the Colored Women’s League.  
Cooper’s goal s to elevate womanhood within the discourse of racial uplift shares 
some similarities with Willard in her goals and language choices. Like Willard, she is not 
as explicit in addressing women’s sexuality, but such discourse is implied. Her language 
also blends religious and scientific terms. Her speech “Womanhood a Vital Element in 
the Regeneration and Progress of a Race” (1886) points to the importance of women in 
the goal of racial uplift, but also alludes to arguments about sexuality and motherhood. 
Her references to an “impure homelife” (54) and to the Christian church’s influence on 
the marriage relation reveal a subtle critique of restrictive ideologies of women’s 
sexuality. For example, in speaking of the ways the Christian Church has prevented the 
elevation of womanhood, she says, “Making of marriage as a sacrament and at the same 
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time insisting on the celibacy of the clergy and other religious orders, she gave an inferior 
if not an impure character to the marriage relation, especially fitted to reflect discredit on 
woman” (56). Her argument here seems similar to that of free love advocates, especially 
Lois Waisbrooker, who criticize the way the Church positioned sex as impure, thus 
demeaning and degrading women’s position. Her goals are also similar to Willard’s in 
her insistence that women and men should be held to the same standard of morality (57).  
The very title of Cooper’s work, ending in “Progress of a Race,” implies a 
eugenic argument, but her eugenic rhetoric is created mostly through metaphors that 
show how she is participating in the same scientific and cultural discourses as Willard. 
Rather than focusing on women’s role as mothers of children, however, Cooper focuses 
on how women’s role in society is holding back “real progress.” She refers to “the 
vitalizing, regenerating, and progressive influence of womanhood on the civilization of 
to-day,” and the “narrow, sickly and stunted growth” of nations (58). She also mentions 
“the hope in germ of a staunch, helpful, regenerating womanhood on which, primarily, 
rests the foundation stones of our future as a race” (62). The “germ” of “regenerating 
womanhood” also engages with hereditarian ideas, such as August Weisman’s germ 
theory of heredity. Cooper employs this metaphor to show how women hold the promise 
of regenerating the race. Cooper further refers to “regeneration” and “progress,” two 
terms often employed in the discourse of evolution and heredity. The reference to the 
“narrow, sickly and stunted growth” of a nation is also similar to the rhetoric used as 
exigence in feminist eugenics to describe the children who are ill and dying. Moreover, 
her rhetoric seems similar to hereditarian thought when she refers to “[Women’s] 
influence on the individual personality, and through her on the society and civilization 
255
which she vitalizes and inspires…” (60). These metaphors reveal how Cooper hopes to 
elevate women’s role in racial uplift by comparing womanhood to nationhood, a 
comparison whose possibilities are implied in Herbert Spencer’s rhetoric. When these 
general arguments are read against the backdrop of widely held scientific beliefs, rather 
than the more popular interpretation of the woman as nation, we can see that Cooper 
implies a eugenic ideal: women are the hope of uplifting the race since they hold and 
protect the germs of future generations, and may control whether the race will 
“regenerate” rather than “degenerate.”   
Cooper seems to use an argument for how environment affects heredity to blame 
slavery for any “degeneration” that has occurred. According to Stephanie Athey (2000), 
Cooper reconfigures what counts as “inheritance” to include the legacy of 
institutionalized racism affecting future generations (par. 45). Cooper observes that 
African Americans not only inherit the characteristics of their parents, but also a legacy 
of inequality encompassing social and economic factors, and she legitimizes that legacy 
by connecting it to the science of heredity. In Cooper’s speech “What are we Worth?” 
Athey finds evidence of explicit engagement with eugenic theories as Cooper expands the 
discourses on heredity to show that centuries of oppression have produced inequalities. 
Cooper sees in women of the race the promise of overcoming such obstacles and creating 
a more positive legacy for the future generations they will grow and nurture. Athey adds, 
“Cooper…alters the emphasis of ‘regeneration’ from strictly reproductive citizenship to 
an emphasis on women’s role in training and regenerative reform” (par. 45). Thus, 
Cooper’s mixture of the discourses of science, religion, and nationhood creates a rhetoric 
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of racial uplift that forefronts the role of women, combining “Republican motherhood” 
discourse with “mothers of the race” discourse.   
Another rhetor in the racial uplift movement, Adella Hunt Logan (see Chapter 4), 
makes explicit what Cooper alludes to in metaphor in her 1897 address significantly titled 
“Prenatal and Hereditary Influences.” Logan presented this speech at the Second 
Conference for the Study of Problems Concerning Negro City Life in Atlanta. Her speech 
was the only one by a woman at the conference not delivered at the separate women’s 
meeting (Logan, We are Coming 169), which signifies the powerful status of hereditarian 
rhetoric in this discourse. In the speech, she argues for the duty of the mother to raise 
good children, but her argument relies less on the kind of republican motherhood and 
scientific motherhood appeals found in Willard and more on the hereditarian thought of 
the late nineteenth century. She urges not only more prenatal care, but also attention to 
acquired characteristics. Logan applies the argument that women are a “vital element in 
the regeneration and progress of the race” quite literally: in Logan’s view, it is through 
production of children and attention to heredity and prenatal influences that racial uplift 
will occur.  
Logan begins her speech by noting common ideas associated with hereditary 
transmission: “The boy takes his large nose from his grandmother, the small mouth from 
his father, and a quick temper from his mother” (211). She even brings in the question of 
“how is it that the young man seems prone to the social sin” (211)? She urges attention to 
the “silent, but powerful, thing known as heredity” (212) and also advocates a scientific 
education for those involved in racial uplift. Unlike Willard, however, when she uses the 
word “science,” she is not using it to describe the need for a method or theory of 
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childbearing and rearing, but is rather referring to scientific disciplines and their 
discoveries. She references the findings of embryology in her discussion of men’s and 
women’s contributions to a new life and in her ideas of prenatal influence. Logan also 
applies Lamarck’s theory of acquired characteristics (which had yet to fall out of favor, 
despite Weismann’s refutations). She invokes the “like begets like” warrant to argue that 
mental, moral, and physical characteristics are transferred to the offspring:  
[T]he intellectual and ethical cast will follow as closely the law, “Like 
begets like,” as will the physical. We do not expect to find the children of 
white parentage having black faces or kinky hair, nor the children of black 
ancestry having fair brows, blue eyes, and flaxen locks. It would be just as 
unreasonable to expect the intellectual and ethical characteristics of 
children to be radically unlike those of their ancestors as it would be to 
expect their physical features to be radically different. (212) 
Thus, potential parents must ensure that they can transfer “intellectual and ethical 
characteristics” to their children; if they do so, racial uplift must occur. Logan adds a new 
dimension to the racial uplift arguments of the late nineteenth century since individuals 
would not only be elevating themselves and the race, but also future generations.  
Logan also emphasizes women’s rights in her contention that women need a 
positive atmosphere so they do not transfer negative characteristics to the next 
generation. She urges that women control their thoughts in order to prevent negative 
thoughts from making an impression on the growing embryo. Thus, in her line of 
argument, women need to be in positions where they will not dwell upon their oppression 
and lowly position; their position should be elevated to prevent such thoughts. Women 
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need to be in a position where their children will not be unwanted, not perceived as a 
burden, where female inequality will not cause resentment, and where their subjection 
won’t cause thoughts of rage to be transmitted to the unborn children. This ideal “mother 
of the race” needs rights to fulfill her special goal in racial uplift. These older arguments 
become refreshed by the new warrants provided by scientific theories and medical 
discourse. 
For Cooper and Logan, eugenic rhetoric is a means to argue for women’s 
prominence in racial uplift. Using hereditarian logic, they show how women’s low status 
can be transferred to future generations if not corrected. This logic becomes eugenic 
when they specify the goal of superior children in giving these rights to women. Both 
rhetors are more concerned with motherhood than other aspects of women’s sexuality, 
but we can see how sexuality arguments are implied when we look at them alongside free 
love rhetoric. 
Free Love
As discussed in earlier chapters, the goals of the free love movement were more 
radical than the social purity and racial uplift movements, and thus required more radical 
interpretations of the new sciences. They critiqued the current system of marriage that 
allowed husbands “ownership and control of their wives’ sex organs.”80 To free love 
advocates, the marriage system was corrupt and often entered into for the wrong reasons, 
such as societal expectations and economic necessity. Free love rhetors drew on 
evolutionary theory as a warrant, positing that the race could not evolve and achieve 
progress without sexual freedom--which they defined as the freedom to choose a partner 
 
80 A popular phrase in free love texts to refer to the wife’s subjugation to the husband under the law. 
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regardless of church, state, or other compulsory influences. They also drew on sexual 
selection theory in their insistence on the female’s choice, violated only in humans. Early 
free love practitioners include John Humprey Noyes who practiced an early form of 
eugenics, referred to by Woodhull as “stirpiculture,” in his Oneida commune, matching 
the “best” women and men for “superior” results. The free love feminists writing in the 
1870s, such as Woodhull and Severance, critiqued such a practice on the basis that love, 
rather than a notion of “superiority,” would create more fruitful unions. Later male 
writers who promoted free love, such as Moses Hull and Moses Harman, also explored 
eugenic theory, as illustrated by Harman’s change in the name of his radical free love 
periodical from Lucifer, the Light Bearer to The American Journal of Eugenics in 1907. 
This shift from free love to eugenics is critiqued by feminist writer Lois Waisbrooker, 
although even she does not dismiss eugenics entirely, but simply attempts to make it 
more suited to a women’s rights agenda. 
Like Adella Hunt Logan, Juliet Severance, a physician and free love speaker who 
lectured throughout the midwest in the 1870s and 1880s, was concerned about the 
hereditary and prenatal influences affecting the next generation, which she elaborates in 
her 1881 pamphlet and lecture, A Lecture on Life and Health, or How to Live a Century.
Like Willard, she begins her discussion by referring to loved ones lost, using the deaths 
of children as an exigence for her eugenic thought (3-4). She then harshly condemns the 
conditions that result in infant mortality to introduce her main argument: 
Are we fit to reproduce? This is the question! How many fathers and 
mothers ever think of, much less seriously consider, this question? They 
see puny, sickly, half-made-up children born to them, living out a few 
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years of miserable existence and then, with streaming eyes and lacerated 
hearts, they place their little forms around which cluster so many tender 
memories and loving associations, beneath the sod and call it a 
dispensation of Providence. It should be said that every child who dies, 
had better never have been born. Aye more: Those who live to grow up 
filled with disease and pain, a constant burden to themselves [and] all 
around them, should never have been born and would never had their 
parents been instructed in the grand law of parentage. (5; emphasis in 
original) 
Severance explicitly addresses the question that Willard, Cooper, and Logan skirted 
around: fitness for reproduction. It is here we see the implications of positive and 
negative eugenics. While most feminists asserted a positive eugenics, they leave the 
question of negative eugenics, of keeping the “unfit” from reproducing, unstated (though 
some, like Woodhull, incorporated both “positive” and “negative” eugenics). Severance’s 
rhetoric seems to draw attention to the elephant in the room. Women’s rhetoric, in 
participating in eugenics to argue for women’s rights, implies a “fit” and “unfit” 
mentality. However, each woman had a specific purpose in engaging in such rhetoric, and 
Severance’s was to promote free love ideology and sexual rights for women. 
As a basis for her argument for women’s rights, Severance shows that obstacles 
are placed in the way of women producing healthy children, in contrast to children who 
are “a constant burden.” These obstacles, she clarifies, are both the fault of the marriage 
laws and of women’s choices in husbands. Like other free love rhetors, she blames the 
marriage laws, where the husbands dominate and own their wives, for creating obstacles 
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in securing the best “conditions” for creating healthy children. She insists, “…man alone, 
of all the animals, takes from the female the control of her person and compels her to 
maternity, and…he has invented and maintains laws to perpetuate this usurpation. 
Woman wants the control of her person and right to exercise her maternal instincts under 
her own direction. These our present marriage system takes away” (7). Her wording here 
and comparison to the animal kingdom evoke the free love emphasis on evolutionary 
theory and sexual selection theory: a woman should have control over her own body and 
choice of mate since withholding such choice violates the natural order found in the 
animal kingdom. She, like Darwin, points out that while the female has the choice in the 
animal kingdom, the human male takes the choice away from the woman. Consequently, 
Severance’s first “prerequisite for proper parentage” is “Woman should exercise the right 
entrusted to her by virtue of her functions, to determine when, and under what 
circumstances she will, and under what she will not become a mother, and it is her right 
and sacred duty to do this inexorably…” (6). For Severance, “proper parentage is not a 
question of legality” (9). She focuses not only on the law’s role in ensuring proper 
conditions for proper parentage, but also the woman’s role. Like Willard, she urges 
women to question the habits of the man “who seeks to associate himself with her” to 
ensure that they are not drinkers or tobacco users who would impart such habits to the 
offspring (9), advice frequently found in medical advice books addressed to women in the 
late nineteenth century.  She also incites women to ask, “Are you as pure and free from 
the effects of social vice as you expect me to be” (9), critiquing the double-standard, 
aligning her stand with social purity reform goals, which took on a new urgency after the 
discovery of bacteria as the agent in venereal disease and the prevalence of venereal 
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disease in women. Finally, she requires that women take responsibility for the kinds of 
unions they seek: they should reject unions based on economic necessity, tradition, or 
compulsion, only accepting unions based on mutual love:  
Is the attachment between us worthy to be called love? and will it secure 
the transmission of our best instead of worst qualities; is either of us 
induced to this association for any reason, other than that of love? Is either 
of us seeking any selfish gratification incompatible with proper parentage? 
Do I seek a home, position, fortune, or any other thing more than a father 
for my children and a lover for myself… (9) 
This popular demand for love between the parents is given new urgency due to texts like 
Russell Trall’s, who was a mentor of Severance. Severance’s “mothers of the race” 
discourse urges women to claim choice and freedom for themselves as a “prerequisite for 
proper parentage” (6). She differs from Willard, Cooper, and Logan in her emphasis on 
sexuality and the nature of the relationship between the parents. In other works, such as 
her treatise on Marriage (1901), she brings in arguments based on children almost as an 
afterthought, mentioning the benefit of better children towards the end of her argument 
promoting the practice of free love. That the argument about better children receives such 
prominence in many other works on free love speaks to the persuasiveness of such 
discourse to popular audiences. 
Severance also participates in the discussions of prenatal influences, and her 
similarities to Logan reveal the connections in this family of arguments. She writes, “As 
certainly as like begets like, as surely as temperament, traits of character, complexion, 
color of eyes and hair are imparted by parents to offspring, so surely is the loathing, the 
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pollution, the hate that filled that mother’s mind transmitted to her child” (Marriage 29-
30). This image of the mother’s resentful feelings creating resentful and hateful children 
recurs across social movements and boundaries, though employed for different ends. It 
reveals the adaptability of “mothers of the race” discourse to different situations.  
Victoria Woodhull’s “mothers of the race” rhetoric shares some of the same goals 
as Severance’s in her insistence on love between parents, but Woodhull’s rhetoric 
undergoes shifts between her 1874 speech, Tried as by Fire, or The True and the False 
Socially, and her later works, Stirpiculture; or, The Scientific Propagation of the Human 
Race (1888) and The Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit (1891). Woodhull’s early 
arguments highlight the importance of love between parents to produce healthy children; 
later, she gives more emphasis to how women’s health is improved by giving her more 
freedoms; finally, her later work, such as The Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit, seems to 
drop women’s rights arguments for a more purely eugenic ideology. 
Woodhull’s radical rhetoric of women’s sexuality urged increased sex education, 
as well as more liberal marriage and divorce practices and laws. She conducts her 
personal “war against marriage,” often calling for the abolition of a marriage system that 
degrades women. Her eugenic rhetoric is particularly evident in her 1873 and 1874 
speeches, The Elixir of Life, or Why do we Die? and Tried as by Fire, or The True and 
the False Socially, the first aimed at an audience of spiritualists and the second at a more 
popular audience. In both speeches, she justifies her radical social reform goals by 
eugenic ends: if women are given more knowledge about sex, as well as about hereditary 
and prenatal influences, and if they are given the freedom to choose sexual partners 
regardless of the marriage laws, they will produce “superior” children who will be the 
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“hope of the race.” Woodhull’s arguments even go so far to posit that pleasurable sexual 
lives will lead to “superior” offspring. For Woodhull, women need to be supplied with 
the proper conditions, and those conditions include a sexual partner where “mutual love” 
and “reciprocal benefit” are observed (Tried 15). Similar to Severance, she insists that 
because it is a system that keeps partners together when love is not present and it does not 
always uphold “reciprocal benefit” in marital relations, “[Marriage] stands directly in the 
way of any improvement in the race, insisting upon conditions under which improvement 
is impossible” (Tried 7). Her argument proposes that relationships that observe these 
rules will see the results in their offspring, whether they are married or not. She 
juxtaposes these two types of relationships and results when she says, “a woman who 
bears a dozen or less scraggy, scrawny, puny, half-made-up children, by a legal father, is 
a disgrace to her sex and a curse to the community; while she who bears as many perfect 
specimens of humanity, no matter if it be by as many different fathers is an honor to 
womanhood and a blessing to the world” (Tried 30). Woodhull’s argument is actually 
similar to Willard’s in its characterization of the “disgraceful” children populating the 
earth, and clearly influenced by the new focus on physical fitness caused by Spencer’s 
“survival of the fittest” discourse.  
Woodhull even uses her own mentally-challenged son as an illustration of the 
harmful results of marriages where women are uneducated about sex and heredity and 
forced to submit to brutal husbands without “mutual love” and “reciprocal benefit”: “My 
boy, now nineteen years of age, who should have been my pride and joy, has never been 
blessed by the dawning of reasoning. I was married at fourteen, ignorant of every thing 
that related to my maternal functions. For this ignorance, and because I knew no better 
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than to surrender my maternal functions to a drunken man, I am cursed with this living 
death” (Tried 27). Her rhetoric reveals the “fit” and “unfit” mentality in eugenic rhetoric, 
but she expands the definitions of “fit” and “unfit” to include a feminist argument: give 
women rights and give them sex education and they will no longer bear children who 
suffer a “living death.” Her condemnation of the “unfit” is more prominent than in other 
feminist rhetoric at the time.  
However, Woodhull does refute certain ideologies of eugenics. Responding to 
John Humphrey Noyes’ and the Oneida community’s practice of “stirpiculture,” she 
clarifies that this type of eugenics will not produce “superior” children, noting, “when a 
woman desires a child she should select for its parent, some person, who, from physical 
health and perfectness, should be something like an ideal man. I utterly repudiate all such 
stirpiculture as this. I do not believe it possible for a woman to produce her best child, 
except by the man whom she loves best and for whom she has the keenest sexual desire” 
(Elixir 11). Woodhull and Severance both agree that the key ingredient in the formula for 
a healthy and intelligent child is not the characteristics of its parents but the conditions 
under which the child is produced. For them, the love between parents will create a happy 
and stable environment, and those feelings will be passed on to the healthy child, due to 
environmental and prenatal influence. Free love feminists reinterpreted the degree of 
environmental influence on heredity in order to create a theory compatible with their 
feminist reforms. 
Woodhull in particular both uses and abuses scientific discourses in her rhetoric. 
Her earlier arguments suggest eugenics as a means and a result of feminist reform, but 
her later arguments in Stirpiculture; or, The Scientific Propagation of the Human Race 
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(1888) and The Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit (1891) de-emphasize the feminist 
arguments and focus more on eugenic arguments, to the point where eugenics becomes 
the end in itself rather than a benefit of giving women rights. She thus illustrates the shift 
occurring in free love discourse: in using eugenic ideologies to justify free love, these 
rhetors become so enmeshed in it that the eugenic ideologies start to supercede other 
aims. The discourse seems to lend itself to this shift: if one is going to argue that creating 
better children is an important end, how far does one have to go to then argue that certain 
groups of people should be prevented from propagating the species?  Not very far. The 
implied arguments of negative eugenics that were part of the earlier discourse then begin 
to take over feminist eugenics. Woodhull’s 1891 book, The Rapid Multiplication of the 
Unfit, displays this tendency in its title itself. Though Woodhull had attempted to redefine 
who was “fit” and “unfit” in earlier discourses, her definitions got away from her, and her 
later arguments emphasize a more “hard line” eugenics, discouraging the poor and ill 
from procreating, lines of argument later picked up by birth control pioneer Margaret 
Sanger. While Woodhull does discuss social causes of “unfitness” in this text, noting that 
some workers are worked so hard that their bodies become unhealthy, which then 
prevents the bearing of healthy children (Rapid Multiplication 10), a sense of inherent 
hereditary “unfitness” of some people is also present: “The best minds of to-day have 
accepted the fact that if superior people are desired, they must be bred; and if imbeciles, 
criminals, paupers, and otherwise unfit are undesirable citizens they must not be bred” 
(Rapid Multiplication 38). Here, Woodhull expresses a determinism not found in her 
earlier works, and the women’s rights arguments are given much less emphasis while the 
case for eugenics is given more. 
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The shift from free love advocacy to a more purely eugenic discourse is critiqued 
by Lois Waisbrooker, who puts a different spin on hereditarian ideas in her 1907 book on 
eugenics.  This text responds to arguments by free love advocates such as Woodhull and 
Moses Harman that used eugenics to justify reforms and that urged women to change 
their practices to produce better children. She refutes these ideas drawing from theories of 
heredity that stressed the power of habit, such as Elizabeth Blackwell’s. Waisbrooker 
maintains that if a woman changes her habits only to produce a better child, the child will 
not inherit that changed tendency.  Instead, she urges, the woman must change for 
herself.  For example, she notes that if a woman stops drinking for the benefit of her 
child, her child will still be born with a tendency to drink. However, if the woman stops 
drinking for the benefit of herself, her child would not be born with a tendency to drink. 
For Waisbrooker, if the woman changes the habit and alters her own self, she will 
transmit that tendency to the children. In her argument, the warrant of “like produces 
like” means that a woman must change herself for herself; otherwise, such superficial 
changes will not create a “like” result. She implores women, “You are the material out of 
which the race is built, and only as you live for yourself do you live for the race” (10). 
Her argument recalls Darwin’s focus on the effects of habit and how habits can become 
tendencies transmitted to the future generation. She uses this discourse on the power of 
habit, also endorsed by Elizabeth Blackwell, to emphasize the power women have to 
change themselves for the better. Waisbrooker’s main critique of the type of eugenics 
expounded by the later Woodhull lies in its means rather than its end: “the transformation 
from sex slavery to living for the next generation is not freedom” (Eugenics 65).  
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Yet, Waisbrooker does not entirely condemn eugenic ideology since she does not 
critique the goal itself of producing an improved race. She compares the womb to a 
chemist’s lab (Eugenics 10), a comparison strengthened by the fifty years focus on 
producing stronger children through heredity in the medical and popular literature.81 In 
her 1893 book The Fountain of Life, or the Threefold Power of Sex, she argues that in 
order for a race to be “well born” and in order to clear out jails, new laws and social 
reforms “must supply women with the very best conditions” (81). In these conditions, no 
undesired sexual relations will occur (Eugenics 30). Therefore, even though she critiques 
the way some conceived of eugenics and feminism, she does not reject the connection 
entirely nor question the goal itself. She shows how free love feminist eugenics focused 
on the conditions under which children can be produced, a focus which allowed for 
arguments on women’s sexuality as well as rights pertaining to motherhood. In their free 
love arguments, the emphasis on observing natural laws, laws established by natural and 
sexual selection theories, shows a basis in science applied to very radical reform goals. 
Conclusion 
The movement from the discourse of science to social reform in the science of 
heredity reveals the depth of impact of scientific discoveries on social reform. The shift I 
have identified, the shift from arguing for women’s rights using eugenics to simply 
arguing for eugenics, fully occurs after the turn of the century. Looking at this shift 
alongside the discoveries of science reveals a parallel: it was after the rediscovery of 
Mendel’s work that a shift fully occurs from women’s rights arguments to eugenic 
discourse. While Weismann had refuted Lamarckian ideas, the inheritance of acquired 
 
81 See the Holbrook quotation in Drake discussed in this chapter on children as “an experiment.” 
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characteristics persisted in reform discourse until the rediscovery of Mendel’s work, 
which changed the nature of hereditarian and eugenic discourse. Though eugenics would 
later be used in Margaret Sanger’s arguments for birth control, it was a different kind of 
eugenics, more focused on discouraging the “unfit” from breeding than on encouraging 
women to better themselves to create better children. Once Lamarck’s theory of acquired 
characteristics becomes less accepted, the arguments for social reforms to improve the 
next generation receive less exigence, since an “improved person” would not be able to 
pass these improvements on to the next generation through the body. “Environment” 
becomes the conditions after birth rather than conditions before birth; there is thus no 
longer any need to argue for specific improvements in parents or in conditions during 
sexual intercourse.  
Lois Waisbrooker proposes, “Instead of child culture I would have the movement 
called eugenics named woman culture” (17). From the discourse of Lamarck and Darwin 
to the free love reformers who used their conclusions as a warrant, a “child culture” 
emerged, celebrating the next generation as the means to human evolution. The 
nineteenth-century women examined here created a “woman culture” out of a theory of 
eugenics that often resulted in raced, classed, and gendered discourse. The argument from 
difference, long examined by scholars of women’s rhetoric, evolved into “mothers of the 
race” discourse, showing that women could use arguments from difference with a basis in 
science to actually support women’s rights. Reading these women’s arguments alongside 
the findings in science and the rhetoric by social scientists and medical reformers that 
emerged from these findings shows how this shift in women’s arguments occurred. We 
can see the new dimensions of arguments based in “Republican motherhood” and how 
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the ethical appeals of the “mothers of the nation” were transformed into the logical 
appeals of the “mothers of the race.” 
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Coda: Rereading and “Refreshing”: Contributions to Rhetorical Scholarship on 
Women’s Movements
“[T]hose who want sex-science will get it” (Forster 9). 
In 2005, Michael Perry published two anthologies of Victoria Woodhull’s 
speeches, Free Lover: Sex, Marriage and Eugenics in the Early Speeches of Victoria 
Woodhull and Lady Eugenist: Feminist Eugenics in the Speeches and Writings of Victoria 
Woodhull. In his introductions to the speeches, he often dismisses her claims as “too 
weird and too mystical” (106). With qualifying statements such as “Medically, what 
Woodhull was saying was nonsense” (103) and “Science would never find evidence for 
what even Woodhull could not argue logically” (136), Perry’s interpretations indicate 
why nineteenth-century free love texts have mostly gone unexamined by scholars. 
Woodhull’s claims may be “weird” from a twenty-first-century perspective, but looking 
more closely at the scientific context behind her claims shows that there is a logic to her 
claims, however far she may stretch it. Perry’s reading, based on Woodhull’s adherence 
to spiritualism and eugenics, only touches on the intersections between her claims and 
nineteenth-century science and ignores the context of the free love movement, where 
other rhetors made similar claims. This dissertation, in elaborating the discoveries of 
science and their popularizations by physicians to read against the claims of the free love 
movement, attempts to provide a context for Woodhull’s startling statements. By 
situating her claims not only in the traveling discourses of science, but also in the larger 
conversations about women’s sexuality by physicians and reformers, we see that while 
her strategies were unusual, they were shared by many other rhetors. Looking at women’s 
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free love rhetoric and its use of scientific warrants illuminates some of Woodhull’s 
“weirder” rhetorical choices.  
To conclude, I explore the questions of why texts by nineteenth-century free love 
advocates have gone unnoticed by rhetorical scholars and consider contributions to 
feminist historiography and feminist recovery practices. I then explore how rereading 
nineteenth-century discussions of sexuality against the background of science can 
contribute to the scholarship not only on women’s rhetorical practices, but also on 
scientific discourses. Finally, I conclude how examining warrants has aided in 
illuminating the choices of nineteenth-century sexual reform rhetors.  
Feminist Historiography 
Woodhull is not the only free love advocate who has been misread or under-
examined by scholars. In recovering the rhetorical practices of nineteenth-century 
women, many scholars have found a rich body of texts by women previously unknown to 
us. Yet, recovery work has not extended to the prolific rhetors Mary Gove Nichols, Juliet 
Severance, and Lois Waisbrooker, for example. One of my initial questions in my study 
of nineteenth-century rhetorics of female sexuality was: Why have these texts been 
under-examined by rhetorical scholars? Perry’s reading of Woodhull offers one possible 
answer: perhaps the rhetorical practices of women discussing sexuality are just “too 
weird.” However, Carol Mattingly (2002) offers another possible explanation: she 
questions whether texts from moral purity advocates have gone unexamined because of 
seeming “conservative” or too different from contemporary feminism (“Telling 
Evidence” 103). Mattingly notes that many social purity arguments were dismissed by 
feminist scholars because of their equating temperance with “prudery” (103). The focus 
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on motherhood as a benefit of free love (and stances against abortion) in nineteenth-
century feminist texts would also remove their arguments from contemporary feminists 
looking for views that separated sexuality from reproduction or views adhering to 
(post)modern definitions of feminism.  
 Recent recovery work by historians has illuminated some of the fascinating lives 
and writings of these women in the nineteenth-century free love movement, yet rhetorical 
scholars have rarely examined their collective discourse. The focus on suffragist rhetoric 
and its offshoots in contemporary criticism offers yet another possibility for the absence 
of these women in rhetorical scholarship: are we not looking at “unsuccessful” rhetorical 
practices? That the “prudish” reading of nineteenth-century sexuality has persisted 
indicates that free love rhetoric, countering “Victorian prudery,” was not successful in its 
aims. They are simply lone voices from the “lunatic fringe.” However, as reading these 
texts in the context of medical discussions shows, both medical and popular reformers 
used similar lines of argument, and there were multiple voices in the nineteenth-century 
debate over women’s sexuality. 
The final chapter of this dissertation, analyzing hereditarian discourse and its 
production of a feminist eugenics, provides yet another possibility for the gap in 
scholarship: is it the racist implications of such rhetoric that revolt contemporary feminist 
scholars? Do we feel, as scholars, that a recovery of feminist practices must also celebrate 
and endorse those practices? It would seem so, since anti-suffragist arguments by women 
are not often included in anthologies of women’s rhetorical practices. As discussed 
above, perhaps we are looking for rhetorical practices similar to the goals of 
contemporary feminism. Perhaps eugenics is a movement we do not want identified with 
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feminism. Uncovering the prolific use of eugenics in feminist discourse, we see that it 
was a line of argument with cultural power in the nineteenth century. Further work could 
illuminate how scientific, economic, and nationalistic forces helped to shape feminist 
eugenics. Therefore, feminist recovery work must acknowledge the forces and biases that 
have excluded certain rhetors and social movements from the rhetorical tradition. This 
project aims to contribute to feminist history, not only in recovering the work of 
previously unexamined feminist rhetors, but also in situating these social movements in a 
specific context: the cultural capital of nineteenth-century science. In doing so, this 
project also encourages a “rereading” of the traditional view of nineteenth-century 
discussions of female sexuality as only endorsing “prudery.” What these women said was 
quite different from how current feminists discuss sexuality. But their practices should 
nevertheless be included in definitions of feminist advocacy. 
“Rereading” 
Feminist scholars of women’s rhetoric have often examined what prompted 
women to speak publicly when such speech was often restricted, what constraints upon 
their speech these women faced, and how they accommodated those constraints. These 
questions are especially important in thinking about women discussing sexuality in the 
nineteenth century. In answering these central questions, this project examines the growth 
of sexual speech as a movement and its connections to the emerging cultural capital of 
science. This dissertation offers the possibility that it is science that provided the context 
for speeches on sexuality. Offering alternatives to the reading of “Victorian prudery” and 
of nineteenth-century science as a central force in justifying limitations on women, the 
chapters of this dissertation read both scientific and medical texts in a different context. 
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Such a rereading reveals the multi-faceted nature of discussions of sexuality in scientific 
and reform fields. Carol Mattingly (2002) observes, “We must continue to question the 
stories handed down to us, and even those we have helped to create” (“Telling Evidence” 
102). This project takes as its premise the questioning of the traditional reading of 
nineteenth-century discussions of sexuality. 
Kenneth Burke’s theory of terministic screens, also noted by Mattingly, is useful 
to explain the “rereading” method in this project: If we read these texts through a screen, 
or lens, of “Victorian prudery,” we will find evidence supporting such a reading. If we 
read these texts through a screen that acknowledges the multi-faceted nature of the 
nineteenth-century conversations about female sexuality, our reading will reveal it. Thus, 
this project contributes to the growing scholarship on “rereading” nineteenth-century 
sexuality by both looking at medical texts in new ways and looking at previously 
unexamined reform texts. 
The history of women’s rhetoric and the examination of scientific discourses have 
often seemed at odds with each other. This project questions whether such a contradiction 
exists by showing that women could use scientific warrants for feminist reforms. It 
further enlarges the view of women’s participation in science. The analysis of Darwinian 
warrants in Chapter 1 reveals a clear rhetorical trend, showing that it is impossible to read 
these women’s texts fully without the context of science. Furthermore, while much 
scholarship has uncovered how women wrote science, it has left out the participation of 
reformers who used scientific warrants in their goals. Could these feminist reformers, 
then, be seen as participating in science? If we acknowledge the roles of Herbert Spencer 
and Francis Galton in the making of scientific ideas since they applied science to their 
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social theories, we must also acknowledge the women using scientific warrants to support 
their own feminist social reform theories. It is in analysis of warrants that this project 
finds the strongest evidence for rereading nineteenth-century discourses of sexuality. 
“Refreshing” 
In reading women’s rhetoric of sexuality through the lens of the scientific 
discoveries of the time, this project finds evidence of both an explicit and an implicit use 
of science. Darwinian discourse, analyzed in Chapter 1, presents the most obvious 
example of the explicit use of science in feminist discourse: Free love feminists used the 
language of Darwin to prove that marriage was a culturally-imposed institution holding 
back progress and that women should be given freedom to choose a mate. Social purists 
also explicitly invoke Darwin in their arguments that women are more evolved than men 
and that women should therefore set the standards of “purity.” Language use and 
emphasis also prove some of the more explicit uses of science. For example, in their 
insistence on “plain speaking” (see Chapter 1), free love feminists established a 
preference for scientific language. Waisbrooker’s preference for “race creating” over “the 
language of the street” (qtd in McElroy, Individualist 83) reveals an inclination for 
situating the sexual and reproductive acts in a more scientific context. In addition, many 
of the free love feminists urged naming the actual organs of the body, a choice they 
deemed more scientific, rather than alluding to them in euphemism. Furthermore, the 
titles of some of the works examined in this project reveal a scientific bias: Anna Julia 
Cooper’s “Womanhood: a Vital Element in the Regeneration and Progress of a Race” 
(1886), Woodhull’s Stirpiculture; or, The Scientific Propagation of the Human Race 
(1888), Hulda Potter-Loomis’s Social Freedom: The Most Important Factor in Human 
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Evolution (c1890), and Adella Hunt Logan’s “Hereditary and Prenatal Influences” 
(1897), to name a few. These titles indicate the enormous impact of nineteenth-century 
science on discussion of social topics. There are some explicit references to scientific 
discoveries in feminist discourse as well. Again, the use of Darwin is the most explicit, as 
he and his supporters, such as Herbert Spencer and Francis Galton, are often referenced 
by speakers like Victoria Woodhull. Other references to scientific discoveries also 
received mention, such as Adella Hunt Logan’s emphasis on how both parents contribute 
material to the offspring, a fairly recent discovery at the time of her speech (see Chapter 
4), and Margaret Sanger’s references to Albert Neisser’s discovery of the gonococcus 
germ and Prince Albert Morrow’s findings on the prevalence of venereal diseases within 
marriages (see Chapter 3). These more explicit references to scientific discoveries 
confirm that reading these works against this background reveals their rhetorical 
influences. 
However, such a reading also finds more implicit uses of science that may go 
unnoticed without an analysis of warrants. Perry’s reading of Woodhull claims, “Science 
would never find evidence for what even Woodhull could not argue logically” (136). 
However, he looks at the more direct evidence for her claims, rather than their warrants, 
or the assumptions or premises that connect her claims to her evidence. Chapter 2 
explores the use of a warrant from the medical community: the anti-feminist idea that 
defined women’s bodies as controlled by their sexual and reproductive organs. Reformers 
advocating free love made the claim that practicing free love would help maintain 
women’s health, with the support that sexual pleasure leads to good health. Thus, the 
warrant behind this claim appropriates the “rewriting” of women’s bodies as defined by 
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their sexual organs to argue that women should be able to practice free love and that they 
are entitled to pleasurable sex. The warrants provided by bacteriology are more concrete. 
Since science had established that venereal diseases were caused by a germ, reformers 
could argue that, like other infectious diseases, the spread of that germ could be 
prevented. They were then able to attack social ideologies, such as the belief that young 
men need to “sow wild oats,” on the basis of prevention. Physicians such as Morrow who 
studied the prevalence of venereal diseases also provided reformers with an important 
warrant: that marriage did not protect a woman from venereal disease. The feminist 
critiques of the inequalities within marriage were then given more salience. 
Embryology and bacteriology, though, provide the strongest warrants to the 
claims for women’s protection and for their improvement. Chapter 4 demonstrates how 
embryology provided the important warrant for women’s protection. By using the 
embryo as the model for evolution, especially salient in recapitulation theory, reformers 
could then situate evolution as occurring within the woman’s body. She, therefore, is an 
agent of evolution and deserves protection. Hereditarian theories derived from Lamarck’s 
theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics also lent weight to reformers’ claims. 
Cell theory had enabled scientists to show that both women and men contributed 
characteristics to the new embryo. Lamarckian theories of inheritance posited that 
acquired characteristics, such as intelligence gained through education, could be 
transferred to the offspring. Combined, these findings produced the argument that women 
should have rights because they could then transfer the benefits of those rights to their 
offspring, creating a stronger race. That the eugenic feminism found in these texts shifted 
after the discoveries of Weismann and, especially, Mendel were made public shows the 
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clear influence of science on their reforms. After the rediscovery of Mendel’s work, 
reformers lacked the Lamarckian warrant that supported personal improvement. 
Consequently, feminist eugenics became centered on keeping the “unfit” from breeding. 
Thus, reading these texts against the discoveries of science reveals how and why free 
love discourse became more focused on eugenic arguments. 
Finally, my project introduces the idea that new warrants can “refresh” old 
arguments. Combining the work of Stephen Toulmin, which reveals the warrants behind 
an argument, and of Lloyd Bitzer, which defines how a situation is rhetorical by the 
exigence for the rhetorical response, we see that the newly available warrants from 
science created the exigence for arguments for feminist reforms. Yet, in many cases, the 
arguments for reform seem to precede the new scientific warrant. Thus, the science, in 
providing the new warrant, “refreshed,” or gave a new dimension to old arguments. 
The analysis of Darwinian discourse in Chapter 1 presents one such case for the 
“refreshing” of old warrants. Feminists had argued that women should choose who they 
selected as a mate and the conditions under which they would engage in sexual relations 
or bear children. Mary Gove Nichols’ 1854 arguments imply such female choice 
arguments. After Darwin’s publication of his sexual selection theory in On the Origin of 
Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871), the argument for female choice was 
refreshed by the warrant that, in the animal kingdom, females not males choose mates. 
The arguments for female choice were then given more prominence in arguments by 
Victoria Woodhull and Lois Waisbrooker, who even explicitly referred to sexual 
selection theory in their arguments. The timeline that presents the dates of scientific 
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discoveries alongside the dates for free love texts also provides evidence that old 
arguments were given new life by the sciences. 
Chapter 2, while concentrating primarily on the multi-faceted nature of the 
conversation surrounding women’s sexuality in the nineteenth century, also provides an 
instance of a scientific warrant “refreshing” old arguments. Why is it that Clelia Mosher 
was still making the same arguments that physicians like Mary Gove Nichols, Russell 
Trall, and Elizabeth Blackwell were making in earlier texts? Since Mosher was still 
attempting to refute ideas that women’s bodies make them inherently less capable than 
men in 1921, does that mean that previous arguments by Nichols, Trall, and Blackwell 
were unsuccessful? Or, is it that Mosher, a product of the more scientific medicine of the 
late nineteenth-century, was able to use that emphasis on scientific medicine as a warrant 
for older claims? Mosher’s argument is supported by the statistics she gathered on 
women’s menstruation, and the warrant that scientific medical study is guided by 
statistics then refreshes the older arguments of physicians who had attempted the same 
arguments, but only had the theoretical focus of physiology to draw on. 
Bacteriology provides the strongest evidence of a warrant “refreshing” old 
arguments. Chapter 3 shows how women often critiqued marriage by invoking the 
metaphor of a “diseased” institution. Gove Nichols’ 1854 critique in Marriage and 
Woodhull’s 1873 critique in The Elixir of Life present two examples of this metaphor. In 
the 1870s, scientists were discovering the germs for specific diseases. These findings then 
allowed further study into the prevalence of venereal disease, and findings like Emil 
Noeggerath’s and Morrow’s in the late nineteenth century “refreshed” the argument that 
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marriage was in fact a “diseased” institution: their findings revealed the prevalence of 
actual diseases within the marriage system. 
Finally, ideas from embryology and the study of heredity gave new life and new 
meaning to even older arguments. The fall of preformation theory in favor of epigenesis 
created the possibility for prenatal influence since the characteristics of an embryo were 
no longer conceived as “preformed” and encased in a primordial organism. Thus, older 
ideas on how women’s thoughts and surroundings affected the embryo seemed newly 
warranted to medical writers and feminist advocates. The persistence of Lamarckian 
ideas on inheritance is also explained by this “refreshing” of older ideas. Darwin and 
Spencer offered more Lamarckian views at mid-century, which lent further scientific 
support to the theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics. Weismann’s refutation of 
Lamarck did not seem to cause an immediate shift in reform arguments, perhaps because 
writers like Darwin and Spencer were “refreshing” Lamarckian ideas with their own 
theories. Reformers’ arguments, then, mostly remained in a Lamarckian perspective until 
the twentieth century. 
Therefore, the rhetorical strategies of women arguing for sexual reform were 
influenced by what was newly available to the situation. It is clear that events can 
“refresh” older debates and arguments. To use a few contemporary examples, the case of 
Terry Schiavo revived the debate on euthanasia, Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth 
provided exigence for further debates on global warming, and Hilary Clinton’s candidacy 
for president will most likely revive older arguments on women’s capabilities as 
politicians. In offering the possibility that new warrants can “refresh” older arguments, 
this project aims to provide a new perspective on analyzing rhetorical influences: while 
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events can clearly “refresh” older arguments and debates, new warrants derived from 
science can as well. 
Conclusion 
This project offers one way to reread the nineteenth-century discourse on female 
sexuality and sexual reforms. The speeches on sexuality by women offer new insights 
into what nineteenth-century women spoke about and how they spoke about it. Further 
analysis of these texts could examine how legal, economic, and scientific influences 
converged in these texts. Further research could illuminate the role of science in other 
early women’s movements, or connect social movements that may seem at odds with 
each other, as free love and social purity might initially seem. Finally, the idea that 
arguments can become refreshed by a new context, that old arguments can gain renewed 
cultural power, offers another way to read the rhetorical strategies and logic behind a text. 
Therefore, the story that this project tells about the ways women used science to promote 
social reform provides a methodology for situating nineteenth-century discourse on 
sexuality as part of a rhetorical tradition. 
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Appendices
Appendix to Chapter 2: Timeline of Texts on Physiology 
Year Physiology Text  Year  Free Love Text 
1684 Aristotle’s Master-piece  
1686 Nicolas Venette, Tableau de 
L’amour Conjugal 
1720 Venette, Conjugal Love 
Revealed (English translation) 
 
1787 Albrecht von Haller, First Lines 
in Physiology 
c1780 Venette, Conjugal Love, or the 
Pleasures of the Marriage Bed 
(English translation) 
 
1801 Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichat,  
Anatomie generale 
1846 Mary Gove, Lectures to Women 
on Anatomy and Physiology 
with an Appendix on Water 
Cure 
1850 Frederick Hollick, The 
Marriage Guide or Natural 
History of Generation; A 
Private Instructor for Married 
Persons and Those about to 
Marry 
1854 Mary Gove and Thomas L. Nichols, 
Marriage: Its History, Character, and 
Results; its Sanctities, and its Profanities; its 
Science and its Facts. Demonstrating its 
Influence, as a Civilized Institution, of the 
Happiness of the Individual and the Progress 
of the Race 
1855 Mary Gove Nichols, Mary Lyndon 
1859 Robert Dale Owen, Moral 
Physiology 
1866 Russell Trall, Sexual 
Physiology: A Scientific and 
Popular Exposition of the 
Fundamental Problems in 
Sociology 
1873 Edward Clarke, Sex in 
Education: A Fair Chance for 
Girls 
1873 Victoria Woodhull, The Elixir of Life, or, 
Why Do We Die? 
1873 John M. Scudder, On the 




1874 Mary Gove Nichols, A
Woman’s Work in Water Cure 
and Sanitary Education 
1874 Victoria Woodhull, Tried as by Fire; Or, The 
True and the False Socially 
1876 Juliet Severance, A Lecture on the Philosophy 
of Disease, and How to Cure the Sick Without 
Drugs, with an Explanation of Magnetic 
Laws 
1881 Juliet Severance, A Lecture on Life and 
Health, or How to Live a Century 
c1890 Hulda Potter-Loomis, Social Freedom:  The 
Most Important Factor in Human Evolution 
1894 Elizabeth Blackwell, The 
Human Element in Sex:  Being 
a Medical Inquiry into the 
Relation of Sexual Physiology 
to Christian Morality by Dr. 
Elizabeth Blackwell 
1901 Juliet Severance, Marriage 
1905 Dora Forster, Sex Radicalism as seen by an 
Emancipated Woman of the New Time 









Year Reform Text 




conceived as the 
same disease  
 
1854 Mary Gove Nichols and 
Thomas L. Nichols, 
Marriage: Its History, 
Character, and Results; 
its Sanctities, and its 
Profanities; its Science 
and its Facts. 
Demonstrating its 
Influence, as a Civilized 
Institution, of the 
Happiness of the 
Individual and the 
Progress of the Race 
1859 Louis Pasteur, 
microorganisms as 
cause of disease 
 
1872 Emil Noeggerath, 
“latency period” of 
gonorrhea 
 
1873 John M. Scudder, On 
the Reproductive 
Organs, and the 
Venereal 
1873 Victoria Woodhull, The 
Elixir of Life, or, Why Do 
We Die? 
1876 Robert Koch, 
anthrax bacillicus 
 
1879 Albert Neisser, 
gonococcus 
 
1880 Alfred Fournier, 
Syphilis and Marriage 
(English translation) 
 
1881 Elizabeth Blackwell, 
“Rescue Work in 
Relation to 
Prostitution and 
Disease: An Address 
Given at the 
Conference of Rescue 
Workers held in 
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London, June, 1881” 




1885 Louis Pasteur, 
rabies vaccine 
 
1888 Victoria Woodhull, 
Stirpiculture; or, The 
Scientific Propagation of 
the Human Race 
1890 Frances Willard, “A 
White Life for Two” 
c1890 Hulda Potter-Loomis, 
Social Freedom: The 
Most Important Factor in 
Human Evolution 
1890 Victoria Woodhull, 
Humanitarian 
Government 
1893 Angela Heywood, “Body 
Housekeeping” 
1897 Elizabeth Blackwell, 
“Medical 
Responsibility in 
Relation to the 
Contagious Diseases 
Act: An Address 
Given to a Meeting of 
Medical Women in 
London, April 27, 
1897” 
 
1901 Emma Drake, What a 
Young Wife Ought to 
Know 
1901 Juliet Severance, 
Marriage 
1902 Elizabeth Blackwell, 
Essays in Medical 
Sociology 




1920 Margaret Sanger, What 
Every Girl Should Know 
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Appendix to Chapter 4: Timeline for Embryology 
Year Scientific Milestone Year Medical 
Popularization 
Year Reform Text 
1651 William Harvey, “All 
that is alive comes from 
the egg” (qtd in Pinto-
Correina 2) 
 
1684 Aristotle’s Master-piece  
1686 Nicolas Venette, Tableau 
de L’amour Conjugal 
1821 Johann Friedrich 
Meckel, endorsement of 
recapitulation theory 
 
1827 Carl Ernst von Baer, On 
the Origin of the 
Mammalian and Human 
Ovum 




observation of sperm 
within the egg 
 
1855 Robert Remak, cells 
form by division 
 
1859 Charles Darwin, On the 
Origin of Species 
1860s Wilhelm His, three-
dimensional models of 
embryos 
 
1866 Ernst Haeckel, 
recapitulation theory 
1866 Russell Trall, Sexual 
Physiology: A 
Scientific and Popular 
Exposition of the 
Fundamental 
Problems in Sociology 
1874 Victoria Woodhull, 
Tried as by Fire; 
Or, The True and 
the False Socially 
1876-
1877 
Oscar Hertwig and 
Hermann Fol, 
examination of how 
sperm penetrates the egg 
and how the cell to form 
a new organism comes 
out of two nuclei 
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1879 Lois Waisbrooker, 
From Generation 
to Regeneration, or 
The Plain Guide to 
Naturalism 
1889 John Cowan, The 
Science of a New Life 
1893 Lois Waisbrooker, 
The Fountain of 
Life, or the 
Threefold Power of 
Sex 




1901 Emma Drake, What a 
Young Wife Ought to 
Know 
1901 Juliet Severance, 
Marriage 
1907 Lois Waisbrooker, 
Eugenics; or, Race 
Culture Lessons 
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Year Reform Text 
1798 Thomas Malthus, 








1844 Robert Chambers, 
Vestiges of the 
Natural History 
of Creation 
1851 Herbert Spencer, 
Social Statistics 
1852 Herbert Spencer, 
“A Theory of 
Population” 
 
1859 Charles Darwin, 
On the Origin of 
Species 
1864 Herbert Spencer, 
“survival of the 
fittest” 
 
1864 Herbert Spencer, 
Principles of 
Biology 




1866 Russell Trall, Sexual 
Physiology: A Scientific 
and Popular Exposition 
of the Fundamental 
Problems in Sociology 
1869 Francis Galton, 
Hereditary 
Genius: An 
Inquiry into its 
Laws and 
Consequences 
1871 Charles Darwin, 
The Descent of 
Man and 
Selection in 
Relation to Sex 
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1873 Victoria Woodhull, The 
Elixir of Life, or Why do 
we Die? 
1874 Victoria Woodhull, Tried 
as by Fire; Or, The True 
and the False Socially 
1881 Juliet Severance, A
Lecture on Life and 









1886 Francis Galton, 
term “eugenics” 
 1886 Anna Julia Cooper, 
“Womanhood a Vital 
Element in the 
Regeneration and 
Progress of a Race” 
1888 Victoria Woodhull, 
Stirpiculture; or, The 
Scientific Propagation of 





1889 John Cowan, The 
Science of a New Life 
1890 Frances Willard, “A 
White Life for Two” 
1891 Frances Willard, “Address 
of Frances E. Willard, 
President of the Woman’s 
National Council of the 
United States ... at its First 
Triennial Meeting, 
Albaugh’s Opera House, 
Washington, D.C., 
February 22-25, 1891.” 
1891 Victoria Woodhull, The 
Rapid Multiplication of 
the Unfit 
1893 Lois Waisbrooker, The 
Fountain of Life, or the 
Threefold Power of Sex 
1894 Elizabeth Blackwell, 
The Human Element in 
Sex: being a Medical 
Inquiry into the Relation 
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of Sexual Physiology to 
Christian Morality by 
Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell 
1897 Adella Hunt Logan, 
“Prenatal and Hereditary 
Influences” 




1901 Emma Drake, What a 
Young Wife Ought to 
Know 
1901 Juliet Severance, 
Marriage 
1902 Elizabeth Blackwell, 
Essays in Medical 
Sociology 
1905 William Bateson, 
term “genetics” 
 
1907 Moses Harman, The 
American Journal of 
Eugenics 
1907 Lois Waisbrooker, 
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